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Abstract
The size and the structure of pubÜc debt play an important role in the macroe­
conomic environment and can even affect the decision-making process at the firm 
level. The recognition of this fact and the rising debt levels in the 1980’s and part 
of the 1990’s for many OECD countries have generated a renewed, buoyant interest 
in the subject. Prom an academic standpoint, this interest has led to a plethora of 
theoretical and empirical contributions during the last two decades. As a result, the 
implications of debt policies are now better understood. Moreover, policy-making 
has also progressed as the design and implementation of fiscal policies have become 
more transparent and sophisticated. In several cases, governments have established 
specialised agencies with the aim of monitoring closely the developments in the debt 
markets and delivering ‘optimal’ debt policies.
This project examines several aspects of the relation between inflation and the 
level and structure of government debt. First, we ask to what extent higher debt 
levels result in higher inflation rates. Results from this exercise are a useful reminder 
to policy-makers of the importance of fiscal policy. In a subsequent chapter we ex­
amine the effect of inflation on the choice of government debt structure. We develop 
a model to allow for the joint determination of inflation and the share of inflation- 
sensitive securities. We assume that governments have a preference for nominal
V
long-term debt in domestic currency. We show that the subgame perfect equihb- 
rium involves a negative relation between inflationary expectations and the share of 
such debt. Panel data estimation for fifteen OECD countries provides strong support 
for the theory. Finally, we are concerned with the issue of whether price-indexed 
debt insulates the budget from macroeconomic disturbances. In other words, we ask 
what type of debt is optimal from a tax-smoothing perspective. Results are highly 
relevant to the implementation of optimal debt strategies.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The size and the structure of pubÜc debt play an important role in the macroe­
conomic environment and can even affect the decision-making process at the firm 
level. The recognition of this fact and the rising debt levels in the 1980s and part 
of the 1990’s for many OECD countries have generated a renewed, buoyant interest 
in the subject. From an academic standpoint, this interest has led to a plethora of 
theoretical and empirical contributions during the last two decades. As a result, the 
implications of debt policies are now better understood. Moreover, poficy-making 
has also progressed as the design and implementation of fiscal policies have become 
more transparent and sophisticated. In several cases, governments have established 
speciahsed agencies with the aim of monitoring closely the developments in the debt 
markets and defivering ‘optimal’ debt policies.^
Figure 1.1 on the following page shows the trend in the level of indebtedness for 
five OECD countries between 1970 and 1995.  ^ The increase in the debt to CDP
I^n the United Kingdom this task is the responsibility of the Debt Management Office as an 
executive agent of the Treasury. Before 1998, debt management was a function of the Bank of 
England.
^Source: International Financial Statistics of the IMF and Missale (1999).
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Figure 1.1: Debt to GDP Ratios 1970-1995
ratios is evident throughout the 1980s and mid 1990s for France, Germany, Italy 
and the United States, but not for the United Kingdom. In 1970, the UK’s debt to 
GDP ratio was the highest among the five countries. In contrast, in 1995 it was the 
lowest. In addition, the UK is the only economy among the five that experienced 
a drop in the level of debt from 1985 to 1990. The high indebtedness of the early 
1970s possibly led to more prudent fiscal policies in subsequent years.
Before proceeding to a more detailed discussion of what the notion of optimality 
of debt policies entails, it would be useful to begin by clarifying the word structure in 
the context of debt management. The government borrows from the private sector 
by issuing securities that promise the payment of a stream of future cash flows (the 
‘coupon’ payments) and a final payment of the principal and the last coupon on the 
maturity day of the loan. Maturity is the length of time between the date of issue 
of the security and the time when the payment of the principal along with the final 
coupon have to be made. Coupon payments are usually made twice a year, but it
Introduction
is common to quote the promised return on these securities on a yearly basis. The 
term used to describe these fixed-income securities is coupon bonds. The maturity 
of coupon bonds can vary from just over a year to several decades.^ Another type of 
bond is the zero-coupon bond. This security makes a single payment at the maturity 
date. The maturity of such obUgations is normally shorter and does not exceed 12 
months. Treasury Bills usually take this form.
The return that the investors are promised on a government security varies with 
the maturity of the Üability. This means that the government can choose to issue 
bonds of specific maturities that minimise the return it has to pay to investors. 
However, even though minimising the expected debt service costs is possibly the 
most important consideration for the policy-maker, it is not the only one. Other 
implications of the issuing strategy are also taken into account. Consider, for in­
stance, the case of short-term debt. A yield curve of the usual positive slope would 
indicate that borrowing by issuing short-term securities is cheaper than borrowing 
by issuing long-term securities. However, a debt strategy that relies on issuing large 
quantities of short-term liabilities exposes the budget to refinancing risk, as there 
is always the possibility of unexpected increases in interest rates. As short-term 
debt has to be rolled over frequently, such increases result in higher debt service 
costs. Thus, the risk of having to refinance debt at higher interest rates reduces the 
scope for strategies that take advantage of lower interest rates on short-term debt. 
Other factors like the demand of investors for government securities, liquidity con­
siderations, attitudes towards several kinds of risk, and incentives for the conduct 
of monetary policy, also affect the decision-making process regarding the maturity 
composition of government debt.
Maturity is not the only characteristic that can differ among debt issues. The 
issuing authority might choose to index the return of certain bonds to the price 
level, so that investors enjoy a specified-in-advance real return. This is in contrast 
to the nominal returns offered by conventional bonds. Long-term investments in
^For example, in the United States bonds with maturity of 30 years are issued. Debt issues of 
similar maturity are also available in the United Kingdom.
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nominal bonds may deliver lower real returns if unexpected inflation occurs after 
the investment has taken place. Thus, a clear distinction has to be made between 
n o m in al and real returns. When asking for a return on nominal bonds, investors 
take into account their inflationary expectations and ask for a premium accordingly. 
But if inflation is higher than anticipated, then the real return of holding nominal 
securities will be lower. As unexpected inflation erodes the returns on nominal debt, 
the policy-maker may want to provide investors with alternative securities with 
returns contingent on the reaÜsation of inflation. For such bonds, an unexpected 
surge in prices would lead to an increase in the nominal return of the security so that 
the promised real return would remain unaflected. Inflation-index-Ünked bonds are 
now issued in some countries even though the share of such securities in the portfoÜo 
of governments’ ÜabiÜties is not particularly high. The UK is the exception with 
such debt currently representing 25% of the total debt.^ The majority of countries, 
however, do not issue inflation-protected securities. The debate on why this is the 
case is interesting and we discuss it in the next chapter.
The government can also issue debt denominated in a foreign currency. Foreign 
currency debt is mainly issued in developing countries so that access to foreign 
investors’ funds is easier. Investors usually require a premium to hold domestic debt 
in countries with weak currencies. The reason is that even with larger premiums 
devaluations of the currency at which debt is denominated reduce the real value of 
the returns. By issuing foreign currency debt, a government that wants to borrow 
provides investors with returns in a preferred strong currency -for example in US 
dollars. In that way it gains access to funds that would otherwise be unavailable or 
available only at very high premia. Smaller amounts of such debt are also issued in 
developed countries, but for diflerent reasons, which we examine at a later stage. The 
returns on debt can also be indexed to short-term domestic interest rates (variable- 
or floating-rate debt). In that way debt returns move closely with the policy rates 
set by the monetary authorities.
' S^ource: Debt Management Office. End March 2001.
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The above discussion indicates that the fiscal authorities have a variety of debt 
instruments at their disposal. Maturity, currency denomination, indexation to the 
price level or an interest rate are characteristics that the policy-maker can use to 
design a desired structure of debt. Henceforth, we will be using the term ‘debt 
instrument’ to describe a class of debt with certain maturity, denomination and in­
dexation features. For example, maturity distinguishes short-term from long-term 
debt, price indexation distinguishes nominal from price-indexed debt, etc. Combi­
nations of debt instruments are used to form the ‘debt portfolio’ of the government. 
Table 1.1 on the next page reports the main instruments issued in 1995 by 18 OECD 
countries. It can be easily seen that the composition of debt among countries is far 
from uniform, even though medium- and long-term debt in domestic currency is the 
most widely used instrument is most cases.
The main question that arises concerns the determination of the structure of 
debt, or, in other words, the relative weights of each instrument in a debt portfolio. 
What are the considerations that the poficy-makers take into account when deciding 
on the issuance and quantity of specific instruments? And what determines which 
structure of debt is the appropriate one for the economy under consideration? Put 
simply, what is the optimal debt management strategy for a given economy?
The literature has identified these issues and has shed plenty of light on sev­
eral aspects of the debt management process. The first step is to address whether 
debt management matters. If the choice between debt or taxes is irrelevant, as a 
proposition known as the Ricardian equivalence argues, then, on the same grounds, 
government debt management does not have any real effects either. However, the 
nature of the assumptions on which the neutrality of debt is based is quite restrictive, 
and possibly does not describe economic reality in an accurate way. For example, 
the proposition that debt and taxes are perfect substitutes assumes that taxes are 
non-distortionary and, thus, do not affect the incentives of economic behaviour. Re­
laxation of this assumption assigns a real role for debt policies. Other assumptions 
like the existence of perfect and complete capital markets are also debatable. Nev-
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Table 1.1: Composition and Level of Debt 1995'
ST PIL FC FR VR Debt
Australia 13.3 3.0 3.1 76.4 3.5 19.9
Austria 3.2 - 22.0 45.7 21.8 57.4
Belgium 17.4 - 11.4 60.3 10.0 120
Canada 35.4 1.2 3.5 52.5 - 77.1
Denmark 7.6 - 15.6 73.9 2.7 78.9
Finland 10.2 - 46.4 38.3 - 68.1
France 8.0 - 3.7 70.3 2.7 42.9
Germany 0.4 - 0.0 49.2 0.8 57.3
Greece 26.5 - 22.8 - 35.3 106.7
Ireland 2.9 - 35.1 44.9 4.7 77.5
Italy 18.1 - 7.4 36.9 22.8 116.2
Japan 12.9 - - 64.5 1.5 60.1
Netherlands 3.1 - - 78.0 - 62.7
Portugal 12.7 - 17.4 20.9 26.9 68.4
Spain 32.3 - 8.7 54.4 - 51.4
Sweden 14.4 1.2 27.9 47.3 - 81.1
UK 3.2 12.0 4.4 59.6 1.5 48.3
USA 14.9 - - 50.3 - 45.2
Notes. ST: Short-term debt including Treasury Bills (maturity less 
than 1 or 2 years depending on country). PIL: Price-index-linked debt. 
PC: Foreign currency debt. PR: Fixed-rate debt (includes medium- 
term and long-term debt). VR: Variable-rate debt. Debt: Privately  
held debt to  GDP ratio (Central Bank holdings not included), except 
for FVance and Portugal where th e  total debt to  G DP ratio is reported. 
All numbers expressed per cent. Note that the reported shares of debt 
instruments do not necessarily add up to  100 per cent, as only the  
main categories of debt are presented. Source: Missale (1999).
ertheless, despite the criticism that the Ricardian equivalence has attracted it has 
provided researchers with an extremely useful theoretical framework and starting 
point for the creation of more realistic models. The empirical evidence on the va- 
hdity of the proposition can be described as mixed and has intensified the debate. 
We discuss this evidence more extensively in the following chapter.
Even though economic research is not unanimous on the relevance and effective­
ness of debt policies, governments take a more pragmatic approach. Both the size 
and the composition of public debt are closely monitored, and macroeconomic goals 
are pursued with the active management of public liabilities. The consistency of
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debt management policy with the pursued monetary policy is one of the most well- 
stated goals of the debt management authorities. Suppose that government debt is 
nominal, long-term, and denominated in the domestic currency. Once such debt has 
been issued the government has an incentive to create surprise inflation in order to 
reduce the real returns on pubflc debt. In other words, if zero inflation was optimal 
at the time of issuance, a positive rate of inflation is optimal once pubflc debt has 
been sold to the private sector. This discrepancy between the optimal policies at two 
points in time due to the diflerent incentives faced by the policy-maker is known as 
time-inconsistency. If the government is ‘suspect’ for such opportunistic behaviour 
the private sector will require an increased premium to hold such securities. As a 
result, less credible governments will face higher debt service costs.
If, however, the government is genuinely determined to keep inflation low it can 
benefit from issuing inflation-index-flnked debt. As realised inflation is lower than 
expected, the real returns on such debt fall. At the same time the willingness to keep 
inflation low is signalled to the market: any effort to create surprise inflation would 
only increase the returns on indexed debt. In fact, an incentive mechanism comes in 
place that penalises excessive (higher than expected) inflation, and rewards policies 
that result in lower than expected inflation rates through interest savings. It can 
be argued that the issuance of this instrument enhances monetary policy credibility 
by reducing inflation expectations.^ The policy of issuing ‘real’ securities has been 
successfully implemented by the British debt management authorities over the last 
20 years. As a result, substantial savings in debt service costs have been made as the 
British monetary policies have delivered lower inflation rates than the market has 
expected. However, despite the positive experience of the UK with indexed debt, 
this practice is not particularly widespread. We explore this issue in greater detail 
in the next chapter.
^The same desirable effect is also the outcome of the delegation of the monetary policy author­
ity to an independent institution. Indexation of debt returns to the price level is not necessary 
anymore, as the time-inconsistency situation does not arise if monetary policy is exercised inde­
pendently from political pressures. We examine the case for central bank independence in Chapter 
3.
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Solution to the time-inconsistency problem of monetary policy is not provided 
solely by indexed debt. All debt instruments whose returns cannot be eroded by 
unexpected inflation quahfy for this purpose. In other words, instruments that 
exhibit low or zero inflation sensitivity can be used to signal the anti-inflationary 
intentions of the government. Short-term debt and foreign currency debt are the 
most widely used instruments along indexed debt in debt portfoflos designed to 
convince investors that the creation of surprise inflation is not in the interest of the 
government.
On another level, appropriate debt management strategies can be implemented 
in order to minimise the risk of having to change the tax rate frequently. Assuming 
that taxes distort economic incentives the government might want to smooth tax 
rates over time and across states of nature. For example, if a bad state of nature 
is realised (e.g. an output or spending shock), what is the structure of debt that 
would minimise the adverse eflects on the budget? Insight into the right answer is 
given by studying the link between the macroeconomic shock and debt returns, that 
is, unexpected inflation. If a negative supply shock creates unanticipated inflation 
as is expected, then the returns on nominal long-term debt in domestic currency 
will decrease. The timing of this result is beneficial: as the tax base shrinks due to 
the adverse output shock and the budget is in shortage of revenues, the decrease in 
the real value of debt reduces the need for revenues. In a sense, by issuing nominal 
long-term debt the government buys insurance from the private sector against bad 
times. If, on the other hand, an aggregate demand shock that is accompanied by an 
unexpected fall in prices hits the economy, then the preferred instrument is price- 
indexed debt. What is important for tax-smoothing is to have sufficient information 
on the shocks that are most likely to hit the economy. In other words, the optimal 
design of public debt regarding risk minimisation depends on the stochastic structure 
of the economy. We undertake the task of characterising the optimal debt policy 
from a tax-smoothing standpoint for the UK economy in Chapter 5.
We have already identified two potential policy targets that debt management
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can be effective in achieving: reducing time-inconsistency problems through setting 
up the appropriate incentive mechanisms, and minimising variations in the tax rates 
over time and across states of nature. The choice of a policy, however, is not equally 
straightforward. The reason is that a policy that is appropriate for a certain problem 
can be inappropriate for another. For example, a monetary regime that lacks cred- 
ibihty might benefit from the issuance of instruments with low inflation sensitivity. 
If the economy is subject to supply shocks, however, such debt instruments require 
higher revenues for interest payments whenever the tax base is low. This conflict 
between the optimal prescriptions that are relevant to diflerent poflcy targets is a 
common phenomenon in debt management. Debt instruments that exhibit desirable 
properties for one set of macroeconomic goals might be inappropriate in other cir­
cumstances. Moreover, as the debt manager tries to minimise expected costs he/she 
takes into account other considerations that compflcate the choice even more. For 
instance, one consideration is whether the optimal instrument has a ‘benchmark’ 
status (i.e. if there is a flquid market for it). Benchmarks save on liquidity premia 
as investors require a higher return in order to hold non-Üquid instruments.
Our discussion so far has indicated that debt management is a multi-dimensional 
process. Our contribution to understanding better the decision-making mechanism 
is in Chapter 4. Therein, we discuss how time-consistency considerations affect the 
choice of the actual proportion of debt instruments that are optimal from a tax- 
smoothing perspective in the debt portfoHo. In general, the aim of the thesis is 
to study the two-way relation between the level and management of government 
debt and inflation in order to provide both normative and positive insights into the 
subject. Even though a greater weight is placed on the management angle, we do not 
ignore the role of indebtedness and how it affects the macroeconomic environment. 
In that way, we deliver a more integrated study on the role of pubflc debt. The 
material is organised as follows.
In Chapter 2 we survey the literature on pubflc debt management. As the volume 
of work in this area has grown significantly in the last decade, presenting the main
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contributions in a systematic way is a challenging task. At the same time, it is also 
a rewarding task as the progress made in the understanding of debt management in 
recent years is particularly encouraging. We begin the discussion of the Üterature 
with a presentation of the debate surrounding the Ricardian equivalence proposition. 
The rest of the chapter discusses the impÜcations of the presence of debt in an 
economy as well as contemporary issues regarding its management. These issues 
include the role of debt management in reducing the possibiÜty of confidence crises, 
the debate on indexation, etc.
Chapter 3 is an empirical section. Using observations on a cross-section of coun­
tries we measure the effect of debt on inflation. One contribution of this chapter 
lies in introducing a strong theoretical justification for using an openness variable, 
using some new control variables, and using significantly more observations than in 
previous studies. In order to obtain a robust result we control for institutional char­
acteristics (e.g central bank independence), the degree of openness of the economies, 
past inflation experience, etc. Our specification also includes the natural rate of un­
employment, which consistently with our expectations is found to be significantly 
associated with inflation. Confirming previous studies, we find that countries with 
larger debts face higher inflation rates. In addition, in what we think is a coherent 
analysis, we discuss the rationale for the inclusion of these variables in the estimated 
equation. In particular, the eflects of openness on inflation are also supported by 
the model of al-Nowaihi, Levine, and Mandiiaras (2001), which we present in some 
detail. Our efforts in this chapter have been directed towards the implementation 
of a careful econometric exercise regarding the eflects of debt, using an up-to-date 
data-set and examining our results for diflerent sub-samples.
In Chapter 4 we show that despite the fact that the government might have a 
clear preference for inflation-sensitive debt (for tax-smoothing purposes), it will not 
be able to issue the desired quantity of such debt unless it can fully commit itself 
to a certain level of future inflation and a certain structure of debt. This result 
shows clearly that time-consistency considerations will always reduce the amount of
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debt that hedges output shocks below the optimal level. The intuition here is that 
other forms of commitment must be implemented for the government to be able 
to choose the optimal composition of debt from a risk-minimising perspective. Our 
conjecture that increased inflationary expectations and the initial level of debt reduce 
the amount of inflation-sensitive instruments that the debt management authorities 
can issue is strongly supported by the data. Panel data estimation for fifteen OECD 
countries clearly shows a negative correlation between inflation expectations and 
debt, and the share of deflatable government securities.
In Chapter 5 we study the stochastic structure of several OECD economies using 
a vector error correction model. Our aim is to derive the correlations between in­
novations in inflation and innovations in income and spending, as these can provide 
useful insights into the risk management of public debt. These correlations have 
been estimated in the past using vector autoregressions, but the long-term infor­
mation has been ignored. In contrast, we discuss the long-run relationships and 
their implications for debt management. In addition, using a rolling methodology, 
we are able to capture the evolution of these correlations over time and discuss the 
dynamics of the estimated relationships.
The implementation of the econometric analysis in chapters 3, 4, and 5 has 
involved the collection of a variety of data. Every effort has been made to collect 
the information in a consistent way and from reliable sources. These sources are cited 
in the relevant chapters or in the appendices of these chapters. Detailed information 
on the construction of variables and further definitions -where necessary- are also 
provided. Moreover, at various stages we discuss the adopted methodology, and 
justify the use of the chosen econometric techniques.
Finally, in Chapter 6 we summarise and discuss the main findings of this study. 
We also acknowledge the limitations of this project and outline directions for future 
research.
CHAPTER 2
Ricardian Equivalence, Debt and Debt Management
2.1 Introduction
Economic theory is rarely unanimous on a subject as researchers are often in dis­
agreement as to which angle or methodology is appropriate. Even when they adopt 
the same analytical framework the derived intuitions and implications are not al­
ways consistent, as models can be sensitive to even small changes in the underlying 
assumptions. As a result, decision-makers who, ideally, base their actions on the 
study of economics are not always guaranteed specific policy prescriptions that they 
can readily use.
This, however, does not undermine the necessity of economic theory for effec­
tive poficy-making. The plethora of research output is a signal of a lively debate 
surrounding a subject, and might eventually lead to a consensus regarding the ba­
sic mechanisms behind an economic phenomenon. Moreover, the advancement of 
econometrics in recent years has helped establish the practical relevance of economic 
models and enabled testing them in specific macroeconomic or microeconomic envi-
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ronments.
The above observations hold true in the case of the literature on public debt and 
debt management. The approaches regarding the effects of debt on the macroecon­
omy can be broadly categorised in two schools: the ‘traditional’ Keynesian approach 
and the Ricardian equivalence approach. The dominance of the IS-LM model as the 
main analytical tool of the economics profession in the mid-1950s led to the adoption 
of the Keynesian thought on public debt: issuance of debt instead of levying taxes 
increases consumption in the short-run and crowds-out investment in the long-run. 
This line of thinking became the traditional view.
More recently, work mainly by Barro (1974, 1979) brought to light another angle: 
rational agents are indifferent between taxes today and taxes plus interest tomorrow; 
thus, issuance of public debt does not have any effects, i.e. it is neutral. Since 
the birth of this debate, the economics profession has engaged in a ‘marathon’ of 
theoretical and apphed studies in its effort to reach a consensus. It is exactly this 
evolution in economic thinking that helps us understand the issues and identify the 
effects of specific policies in certain economic environments.
In what follows, we present a historical overview of economic thinking regarding 
the role of the level and structure of government debt in a macroeconomic context. 
Our approach is thematic, i.e. we identify the different issues and examine them 
separately. An emphasis is placed in recent contributions, and both theoretical and 
empirical studies are presented. We begin our journey in the literature on debt with 
the most basic question.
2.2 Does Debt Matter?
In this section we examine the channels through which debt affects the economy, 
and discuss a proposition widely known as the Ricardian equivalence. The Ricardian 
equivalence theorem states that for an exogenous path of government expenditure, 
the timing of taxes should not affect the consumption decision made by the individu­
als paying the taxes: a debt-financed tax cut in period t implies that taxes will have
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to be raised at a future period t + s to service the debt. Since in this setting agents 
are forward-looking and base their consumption decisions on permanent income, the 
wealth of the representative household should not be affected. The agents will save 
an amount of money equal to this period’s tax cut in order to pay next period’s in­
creased taxes. Thus, current consumption will be unaffected and the choice between 
debt and taxes is irrelevant.
With rational, non-myopic agents, sufficient conditions for this result to hold 
are: first, taxes are lump-sum and consequently do not affect economic incentives; 
second, households have an infinite horizon (or they are involved in intergenera- 
tional transfers motivated by family relations); third, there is certainty about future 
levels of public spending, interest rates, income, etc.; and fourth, capital markets 
are perfect. Under these conditions the present value of taxes is determined by the 
exogenous level of government outlays. This result appfies as long as the govern­
ment cannot keep issuing additional debt in order to finance debt repayments. Prom 
a theoretical point of view, these assumptions appear to be quite restrictive. The 
distortionary nature of taxation, the pursuit of non-altruistic behaviour, the pres­
ence of fiquidity constraints and uncertainty about future incomes might constitute 
features of a realistic description of an economy. Thus, Ricardian equivalence has to 
overcome a number of theoretical obstacles if it is to be a convincing approximation 
to economic reafity.
The implications of the theorem contradict the traditional Keynesian approach, 
which assumes myopic agents who only care about present disposable income. Under 
this line of thinking, the tax cut increases the households’ disposable income and 
perhaps their lifetime wealth as well. This increase will boost household spending on 
consumption goods, and, thus, shift aggregate demand and raise national income.^ 
In the long-run, conventional analysis suggests that an effect of increased debt will 
be a reduction in the country’s capital stock as a result of a declining national saving
^Such a policy may be recommended during a recession in order to stimulate economic activity. 
At high levels of debt, though, a fiscal deficit may even prove to be a contractionary measure as a 
debt stabilisation program will then need to be implemented, e.g. see Sutherland (1997).
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and investment. This can be seen from the following identity:
S ^ - { T - G )  = I - \ - NFI
where S  stands for private saving, T —G denotes public saving, I  is investment and 
N F I  is net foreign investment. If we assume that public saving decreases due to 
a tax cut and that private saving rises by less that the fall in public saving, then 
investment must also decÜne. Less investment leads to a smaller capital stock and 
a higher interest rate.
Elmendorf and Mankiw (1998) provide several other long-run effects of debt. 
They report effects on monetary poffcy,  ^ on the deadweight loss of taxes,^ on the 
pohtical process that determines fiscal policy,^ on the vulnerability of the economy 
to a crisis of international confidence,^ and even on the country’s political indepen­
dence.®
The idea that government bonds are perceived as net wealth by the private sector, 
and thus issuance of government debt increases private consumption is discussed in 
Barro (1974).^ He argues that even with finite lives in an overlapping generations 
model, the intergenerational transfers (for example from the old to the young) imply 
that government bonds do not have a marginal wealth effect. However, it is shown 
that under certain assumptions (imperfect capital markets, government monopoly 
in the production of liquidity services), government bonds might be considered as 
wealth. In contrast, under the assumption of transaction costs the net wealth effect 
of holding public debt can be shown to be negative. Thus, the author argues, “there 
is no persuasive theoretical case for treating government debt, at the margin, as a
high debt to GDP ratio would mean high interest rates. The monetary authorities could 
follow expansionary policies in order to reduce those rates. Inflation would result in the long-run.
^As debt is being accumulated deadweight losses from taxation decrease. The opposite happens 
when the debt is being serviced with higher taxes.
^The possibihty of government borrowing might reduce the discipline of the budget process, as 
the agents will assert less pressure for contained spending.
^High debtor countries are more prone to currency crises (especially when debt is held abroad).
®High debtor nations are less likely to gain international power.
^This paper by Robert Barro generated the extensive discussion of Ricardian equivalence that 
followed.
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net component of perceived household wealth”
In an equally influential study, Barro (1979) explores the issue of the optimal 
amount of pubflc debt. He accepts the Ricardian proposition, but he also introduces 
some additional (‘second-order’) considerations. The tax-smoothing assumption he 
uses in this paper became the framework of several subsequent studies on debt man­
agement. He finds evidence that government debt is positively affected by temporary 
increases in spending and negatively affected by temporary increases in income. In 
other words, public debt is countercyclical.
Thus far we have presented the main arguments behind Ricardian equivalence 
and the traditional Keynesian approach. We have also seen that the neutrafity 
theory of public debt is based on rather strong assumptions that have led researchers 
to suggest that theoretical validation of the equivalence is implausible (e.g. Seater, 
1993). We examine these assumptions in turn.
One of the main reasons for the break-down of Ricardian equivalence is distor­
tionary taxation. Under the neutrafity proposition taxes are assumed lump-sum. 
If, however, taxes distort incentives (of how much to work, and how much to pro­
duce), the issuance of public debt plays an important role as it affects the timing of 
taxes. Additionally, a higher debt level leads to higher debt service, which in turn 
requires a higher tax rate. A higher tax rate leads to a higher before-tax interest 
rate, which leads to a smaller steady-state capital stock. Thus, government debt 
crowds out capital, even though the mechanism is different than the one adopted
I^n an earlier contribution by Musgrave (1958, Chapter 23) the choice between taxes and debt 
would be important even in a ‘classical’ system with full employment and prices purely depending 
on monetary policy: it determines whether resource withdrawal comes from private capital for­
mation or from private consumption. The outcome depends on the interest rate elasticities of the 
savings and investment schedules. With inelastic savings and elastic investment debt finance re­
sults in withdrawal of resources from capital formation, whereas tax finance results in withdrawal of 
resources from both private consumption and capital formation. With elastic savings and inelastic 
investment debt and tax finance collect resources from private consumption: the interest rate rises 
until savings increase by the amount of public borrowing. With both schedules elastic resources are 
withdrawn from both consumption and capital formation in both types of finance. However, tax 
finance draws more resources from consumption. In this classical setting, policies aiming to boost 
growth should be tax financed, whereas policies aiming to increase current consumption should be 
debt financed.
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by the Keynesian approach.
A different approach is taken by Seater (1993). He argues that despite the fact 
that changes in public debt may be associated with changes in the timing of marginal 
tax rates and thereby also with real effects, the correlation will only be imperfect. 
Thus, since it is the path of the marginal tax rate and not the path of the debt that 
determines whether there are real effects, Ricardian equivalence might still hold 
in the presence of distortionary taxation. However, most researchers believe that 
distortionary taxation causes the theory to break down. In Barro’s (1999) words: 
“The most important reason for the failure of Ricardian equivalence is probably the 
distortionary effect of real-world taxes” .
A second issue concerns the intergenerational distribution of resources. With 
finite horizons, if the burden of the increased tax tomorrow (implied by a tax cut 
today) falls on the next generation, the current generation will not save the tax cut, 
but, instead, will increase its consumption. Hence, debt policies do matter. Barro’s 
(1979) critique on this approach is that the current generations care about the future 
ones as they are connected with them through family relations (this is known as the 
‘intergenerational altruism’ argument). If this is a true economic mechanism, then 
the current generation will save the tax cut and bequeath upon the next generation 
enough wealth to enable it to pay the future taxes generated by the current debt 
issue. The question is whether altruism indeed translates into a certain economic 
behaviour. The effect of the number of childless families in an economy would also 
appear to have an impact upon the validity of this argument.
In the same context, Stiglitz (1983) argues that in the absence of intergener­
ational distribution effects, public financial policy is irrelevant. He argues that 
changes in the level, issuance strategy, and maturity structure of debt have neither 
real nor financial effects. The reason is that whether a change in public financial 
policy has any effect depends on whether the change has an effect on the intertem­
poral distribution of income. It has to be noted, though, that a basic assumption in 
Stiglitz’s analysis is that taxes are non-distortionary. When taxes are distortionary.
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the timing of taxes also affects the total deadweight loss imposed by the system, 
and debt policies become an important concept.
Buffer and Kletzer (1991, 1992) derive a redundancy proposition of public debt. 
In a two-period overlapping-generations setup, they show that any intergenerational 
redistribution achieved by a combination of debt and taxes can also be supported 
with the use only of taxes and without debt. Public debt becomes a valuable instru­
ment in the pursuit of distributional objectives if the tax-transfers menu is restricted.
Another reason in support of the idea that a tax cut will indeed increase con­
sumption is that of capital market imperfections. In this context, a debt-financed tax 
cut can be regarded as the loan that the financially restricted households required 
but could not obtain from private lenders. This will boost the restricted households’ 
consumption causing the Ricardian equivalence to fail. A government debt policy 
might have real effects in that respect due to the following reason. As debt issues 
are mainly purchased by wealthier people, and the tax cut has a greater effect on 
individuals at the lower end of the income distribution, a debt issue can be regarded 
as a loan from the wealthier to the poorer. If individuals at the lower end are facing 
fiquidity constraints (for example due to transaction costs and/or adverse selection 
problems), the issuance of public debt can be thought of as having real effects.
Another reason that may cause the neutrafity proposition to fail is uncertainty. 
It is possible that government debt changes the agents’ perception of risk. It can be 
the case that consumers discount risky uncertain income and uncertain future taxes 
at a higher rate than the interest rate on debt. This means, that in the event of a 
tax cut they prefer to increase their current consumption.
It is also interesting to examine the case in which the government chooses to 
finance debt repayments with additional debt instead of imposing taxes.^ If the 
interest rate on government debt is greater than the growth rate of the economy, 
then government debt will increase faster than the economy and this scheme (of 
rolling debt over) will eventually prove to be infeasible. However, if the interest rate
^This practice is known as a Ponzi scheme. As we have seen, the absence of such schemes is a 
necessary condition for the Recardian equivalence to hold.
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is lower than the growth rate, the government can keep on rolling debt over forever. 
This is the case of ‘dynamically inefficient’ econom ies.These are economies that 
have overaccumulated capital and would be better-off by increasing consumption and 
reducing the capital stock today. In that way, future generations will have a lower 
capital stock to maintain, and they can also consume more output. It follows that 
when the competitive equiÜbrium is Pareto-inefficient, Ponzi finance can be Pareto 
improving. Hence, Ponzi games are feasible in dynamically inefficient environments 
and could lead to a break-down of the Ricardian proposition.
We now introduce the concept of debt management in our analysis. As mentioned 
in the introduction, governments employ several debt instruments in order to achieve 
certain macroeconomic goals (enhance their credibility, minimise debt servicing costs 
after taking into account risk, reduce price and taxes variations, etc.). FYom a 
practical point of view, the composition of debt can affect future taxes since different 
‘debt portfolios’ can yield different returns on debt across future states of nature. 
In that way, the path of future government liabilities and, hence, the need to tax 
will vary according to the choice between the available instruments.
On a theoretical level, the debate on the neutrality of debt can be extended to 
include these debt management considerations. In a Ricardian world, the size and 
structure of government debt is not relevant as the representative household cares 
only about the present value of taxes (see Barro, 1999). However, if certain assump­
tions are relaxed a theoretical framework is formed in which decisions about debt can 
play a significant role in the economy. In the first effort in the literature to produce 
a debt management neutrality theorem, Missale (1999) presents the assumptions 
under which the management of public debt does not affect the real allocation of 
resources: (1) agents are not myopic and/or care about future generations, (2) fu­
ture taxes are state-independent, (3) capital markets are perfect, (4) private asset
®^In the 1960s and early 1970s many countries experienced real GDP growth that exceeded the 
real interest rate. For these countries budget deficits did not necessarily result in growing debt- 
GDP ratios. Milbourne (1997) argues that if the rate of growth falls below the real interest rate 
less the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth, then a country will enter a ‘debt trap’. 
There will be high accumulation of foreign debt, and difficulties in repaying the debt will occur.
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markets are complete, (5) the use of debt cannot create value (no Ponzi schemes), 
and (6) taxes are not distortionary. Conditions (1), (2), and (5) are not necessary 
if the return on debt is not affected and, consequently, taxes need not adjust. If, 
however, different debt strategies affect the returns on debt across future states of 
the world, debt management does not have any real economic effects if and only if 
all the above conditions hold.
We have discussed all of the above assumptions except (4). It can be shown 
that Ricardian equivalence for debt management does not hold if a full set of state- 
contingent claims does not exist {incomplete markets). The introduction of a new 
asset could then alter the consumption patterns of the agents and financial innova­
tion as a part of debt management would become relevant.
The above approaches have been used to debate the theoretical relevance of the 
Ricardian equivalence.^^ The effects of higher government debt on interest rates, ex­
change rates and other macroeconomic variables have been studied in the empirical 
literature but do not provide clear evidence on the validity of the Ricardian hy­
pothesis. Studies employing different data-sets, countries, periods, and econometric 
methodologies have produced -rather unsurprisingly- conflicting conclusions. De­
spite the controversy, Seater (1993), who carries out a comprehensive review of em­
pirical studies until the early 1990s, regards the case for debt neutrality as stronger.
In what follows we review recent contributions in the applied literature regarding 
the Ricardian proposition. Empirical evidence by Leachman (1996) suggest that the 
government’s choice between debt and taxes affects aggregate demand and capital 
formation. However, the author does not attribute this result to a potential failure of 
rational expectations, but rather to the “government’s unwillingness to raise taxes in 
order to compensate for increasing debt” . Thus, according to this explanation, the 
Ricardian equivalence fails because of the public sector’s behaviour. Khalid (1996) 
tests the irreverence proposition using time-series data on developing economies. 
He is not able to reject the proposition in 12 countries, but he identifies a source of
^^ Our analysis of the Ricardian hypothesis has largely been based on Seater (1993), Elmendorf 
and Mankiw (1998), and Missale (1999).
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deviation from the proposition in 5 countries: the presence of fiquidity constraints 
(imperfect capital markets) causes Ricardian equivalence to fail. Becker (1997) 
tests for Ricardian and non-Ricardian behaviour in the US economy. Using a vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model with cointegrating constraints he finds some support for 
the theorem, but also concludes that there are some deviations from its predictions 
as well. Additionally, he finds little support for a simple Keynesian model. Faruqee 
et al. (1997) re-examine Blanchard’s (1985) model employing what they describe as 
realistic lifetime earnings profiles. They argue that the effects of government debt 
on the real interest rate and the capital stock are indeed considerable.
A critique of the way authors have previously implemented Ricardian equiva­
lence tests comes from Cardia (1997). She uses simulated series to argue that these 
tests produce unreliable estimates of the effects of government debt and taxation 
on consumption, and, thus, do not constitute appropriate applications for obtaining 
clear conclusions. She also argues that a low correlation between the current account 
and budget deficits cannot be used to obtain clear conclusions.^^ In a more recent 
study, Wheeler (1999) tests the debt neutrafity hypothesis using a VAR technique 
with USA data for the period 1980-1995. His results suggest that shocks to govern­
ment debt have significant negative effects on the interest rate, the price level, and 
output. The explanation for these impacts is that an increase in government debt 
decreases wealth (a possibility first identified by Barro, 1974).
In this section we have presented the debate on the validity of the irrelevancy 
proposition in public finance known as Ricardian equivalence. Our aim has been to 
provide an introduction and a concise review of one of the most basic issues regarding 
the effects of fiscal policy. This discussion is used as the starting point for our 
analysis and is by no means an extensive comment on Ricardian equivalence. Despite 
the limited scope of our analysis, however, the study of the relevant literature enables
^^Cardla (1997) lists several earlier empirical studies accepting Ricardian equivalence -Kormendi 
(1983), Kormendi and Meguire (1986, 1990, 1995)- or rejecting it -Feldstein (1982), Modigliani 
and Stirling (1986, 1990), Feldstein and Elmendorf (1990), and Graham (1995). A review of these 
papers is not pursued here as it would be beyond the scope of our analysis. We confine ourselves 
to showing the conflicting conclusions of the recent literature.
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us to argue that the neutrafity proposition is based on restrictive assumptions that 
in reafity are not very likely to hold. More specifically, distortionary taxation is 
one of the main reasons that could cause Ricardian equivalence to fail. As changes 
in the tax rates bear clear implications for the decision-making process of firms 
and individuals, the decision to finance a given government expenditure with taxes 
or debt becomes relevant. Other grounds on which the theory might fail are the 
assumptions about the economic agents’ qualitative characteristics (non-myopic and 
caring for future generations), and about the efficiency and completeness of capital 
markets.
The statistical evidence -the arena on which competing theories usually solve, 
their differences- is not unanimous. Nevertheless, authors like Seater (1993) have 
expressed their belief that the applied work in the field is rather positive for the irrel­
evance theorem. However, differences in the data-sets, time-periods and employed 
methodologies make the results difficult to compare and assess. Given this inability 
of applied economics to offer a clear ‘verdict’ on the issue, what is the angle that 
the governments adopt? The answer is simply that policy-makers seem to believe 
that the fiscal policies they apply are likely to affect the decision-making process of 
economic agents.
In the next section we narrow down our focus and examine the relation between 
debt and inflation, as well as some issues related to debt in the Context of a monetary 
union.
2.3 Debt and Inflation
Many developed countries experienced high levels of indebtedness in the 1980s and 
1990s. Some of them can still display extremely high debt to GDP ratios (for 
example Italy, Belgium and Greece). What are the implications of this phenomenon 
for the real economy? Is monetary policy affected by the size of public liabilities? 
Is there an optimal level of debt? These are questions that have occupied several 
researchers’ minds. In this section we explore the relevant literature and present the
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main contributions.
One of the main issues is the relation between indebtedness and inflation. Buchanan 
(1958) argues that the issuance of public debt is an anti-inflation measure. He writes 
“Debt issue provides one means of combatting inflation since it involves an exchange 
of debt instruments for money. The sale of securities effectively withdraws money 
from the private sector, “destroys” currency in circulation” . In other words, the is­
suance of securities is a means of reducing fiquidity in the economy and, thus, leads 
to lower inflation rates. However, this line of thinking ignores intertemporal aspects 
of debt and solvency issues. It is widely believed by economists that countries with 
lower debts and fiscal deficits will generally face lower long-term interest rates and 
levels of inflation.
In a Ricardian world budget deficits are not inflationary. The non-myopic public 
expects that in the future real tax revenues will increase and the budget will move 
to a surplus. However, if a proportion of debt is monetised then deficits can be 
inflationary. People will recognise the government’s incentive to create money in 
order to reduce its debt obligations and inflation will increase. Dornbusch (1998) 
describes large debts as a ‘standing invitation’ for creation of unexpected inflation.
In most countries the design of debt is dominated by instruments of high inflation 
sensitivity (for example, nominal long-term debt). Consequently, unexpected infla­
tion has the desirable effect of reducing the real burden of such liabilities. In the 
absence of alternative forms of precommitment, governments with low reputation 
for fighting inflation and a large stock of such securities will face increased infla­
tionary expectations. Dornbusch (1998) states that the mere presence of debts and 
the resulting temptation is a source of inflation unless credible commitments can be 
made.
To what extent governments resort to inflationary strategies in order to erode 
the real value of government debt remains to be found. Despite the recognition 
by Dornbusch that high debts certainly create the temptation, he also argues that 
in today’s world the implementation of such strategies is not feasible. The reason
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is that as the markets are so sensitive to inflation, any effort in the direction of 
inflationary flnance results in higher real interest rates. He also argues that the 
maturity structure is too short for the governments to follow such policies (because 
surprise inflation is impossible). Persson et al. (1998) study the case of Sweden. 
They flnd that the Swedish governments have enjoyed considerable budgetary gains 
from higher inflation. However, these gains do not arise flrom a reduction in the real 
value of debt, but rather from the tax system.
If higher interest rates are indeed a characteristic of economies with a high debt 
burden then monetary policy can be affected (see Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1998). 
The monetary authorities might become under pressure to reduce the interest rates, 
possibly in order to avoid under-investment, and an expansionary policy can be 
implemented. In the short-term rates will be reduced, but in the long-run the 
economy will only face a higher inflation rate.
Previous empirical studies have not delivered uniform results. Grilfl et al. (1991) 
study 18 OECD countries and flnd very little evidence that over time the inflation 
tax is caused by lax budgetary policies or that it is used efficiently. However, the 
countries that have relied more on the inflation tax, are the ones with unsustainable 
debt paths. They assert that few countries use seignorage and regular taxes as 
complementary sources of revenues and, thus, seignorage has not been the result of 
an optimal taxation approach.
In an empirical study, Campillo and Miron (1996) flnd that an initially high 
level of government debt is indeed associated with high future inflation. Civen that 
the OECD countries do not rely on seignorage so much, the rest of the countries 
use the inflation tax to a greater extent. In our econometric exercise in the next 
chapter, we examine whether the 1980 stock of debt has had a signiflcant impact 
on the inflation rates of the countries in our data-set for the period 1980-1998. 
We distinguish between OECD and non-OECD countries so that our results are 
comparable to Campillo and Miron (1996). We flnd a positive effect of debt on 
across-countries inflation rates and this pattern is robust in all sub-samples.
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2.4 Debt in the Context of a M onetary Union
The European Monetary Union (EMU) offers a suitable ground on which theories 
about the coordination of fiscal and monetary policies can be tested. The rules of 
the game involve a European Central Bank (ECB) that conducts monetary pohcy 
independently, and the fiscal authorities of the member-states that can make deci­
sions of their own in order to meet the fiscal standards set by the Maastricht Treaty 
(MT). Authors in the past have examined the issues arising from the interaction be­
tween independent monetary and fiscal authorities (e.g. Sargent and Wallace, 1981). 
The difference in the case of the EMU is that the fiscal rules have been predefined 
so that it is unlikely that the ECB is forced de facto to create excess inflation in the 
case of serious fiscal imbalances (see Winckler ei al, 1998).
Two of the fiscal rules set by the MT are that the national stock of debt should 
not exceed 60 percent of CDP, and that the budget deficit should not exceed 3 
percent of CDP. So, are these fiscal restrictions justified by the theory and the data? 
Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) provide a rationale for a Stability and Crowth Pact in the 
context of a monetary union. Policy-makers have an incentive to raise money from 
the debt markets to pay for expenditure. A stability pact commits the participants 
of the union to low-debt policies. The fact that any high-debt country might put 
pressure on the common central bank to inflate, gives a strong incentive for low debt 
countries to try and enforce disciplined fiscal policies. The need for a ‘debt ceiling’ 
is also explored and argued for in earlier work by Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997). 
In this model, a monetary union with a conservative, independent central bank and 
no debt target produces excessive levels of debt.
Recent research by Woodford (1998) shows that variations in aggregate demand 
resulting from fiscal shocks necessarily result in price instability (and variations in 
real economic activity and interest rates as well). He argues that a limit on the value 
of the public debt, together with a monetary policy rule can ensure price stabifity 
even in the face of such fiscal shocks. In that way the Ricardian equivalence is 
re-established. Empirical evidence by Uctum and Wickens (2000), however, paint a
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somehow different picture. They test for the sustainability of European and US fiscal 
policies, and comment on the effects of a debt ceiling. They find that, in the medium 
term, most countries have sustainable fiscal policies without the ceiling. In addition, 
they argue that imposing a deficit or debt limit has the adverse effect of implying 
an intertemp orally inconsistent budget. Thus, they conclude that setting up debt 
ceilings renders politically infeasible fiscal policies, and satisfying the intertemporal 
budget constraint is a sufficient condition for producing disciplined fiscal poficies.
The optimal debt management decisions with a stability and growth pact are 
discussed in Missale (2001). It is argued that debt management can be effective in 
stabilising deficits to a level less than 3% (‘deficit smoothing’), as required by the 
Pact. The author compares the optimal decisions under a regime where member 
countries conduct their monetary policies separately, with the case where mone­
tary policy is delegated to a supranational authority (ECB). It is shown that if the 
ECB values inflation stabilisation more than output stabilisation compared to the 
national monetary authorities (i.e. it is more conservative), a longer maturity of 
nominal debt is optimal for deficit smoothing. The share of inflation-indexed debt 
also increases with the degree of conservatism of the ECB. Lengthening the matu­
rity of conventional bonds is also found optimal in the case of asymmetric shocks 
hitting the member-states. If, however, common shocks have a varying impact 
on different countries, the intuition changes: for a member-country with a greater 
macroeconomic uncertainty the optimal instrument is short-term nominal debt. A 
long maturity should also be preferred by countries with a more sensitive aggregate 
demand to changes in the interest rate.
2.5 How Much Debt?
Turning to the issue of an optimal quantity of government debt Aiyagari and Mc- 
Grattan (1997) develop a model where debt is assumed to enhance consumption- 
smoothing by the households. It is also assumed to have adverse wealth and distri­
bution effects (via the implied future taxes), and to crowd out capital. The authors
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find that the optimal quantity is an increasing function of the effectiveness of debt in 
smoothing out consumption over the lifetime of an individual. It is also a negative 
function of the degree that debt crowds out capital and, therefore, lowers future 
consumption. The optimal quantity of debt is also predicted to be low if the incen­
tive effects of higher distortionary taxes are important. Applying their analysis on 
post-war US data they find that the path of the US debt to GDP ratio has been 
close to the optimal one.
Tabellini and La Via (1989) examine US data for the period 1955-1985. They 
argue that the burden in stabilising public debt in that period fell exclusively on the 
fiscal authority. Increases in the stock of public debt have been associated with a 
reduction in fiscal deficits. At the same time no positive relation with the monetary 
base is reported. It appears that debt monetisation did not take place in the US 
during the period under consideration.
Bohn (1998) confirms that the United States’ fiscal policy for the period 1916- 
1995 is satisfying an intertemporal budget constraint. The author argues that the 
fiscal authorities take corrective action when the debt to GDP ratio grows, and 
produce primary budget surpluses (or reduce deficits). In that sense, the American 
fiscal policies have been sustainable.
In this section we have presented theoretical and empirical contributions to the 
debate on the economic effects of debt burden. Despite the ambiguities in the 
literature, most policy-makers follow a ‘pragmatic’ approach when making decisions 
on the level of debt: the issuance of government debt stimulates aggregate demand 
and increases national income in the short-run, but crowds out capital and reduces 
national income in the long-run. In addition, debt managers are actively engaged in 
the task of optimally selecting the composition of their governments’ debts in order 
to implement desired economic policies. We turn to this function of the policy-maker 
in the following section.
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2.6 M anaging Public Debt
2.6.1 Tim e-consistency Considerations
In macroeconomic policymaking credibility problems typically arise. This is a situ­
ation where the policy-maker finds that the ex ante policy is not optimal ex post as 
a result of the different incentive constraints that he/she faces at the start and at 
the end of the period. Thus, a different pohcy must be implemented at the end of 
the period, and this makes the original plan time-inconsistent. This implies that the 
policy-maker operates in a second-best economic environment. If the policy-maker 
had already achieved a first-best allocation at the start of the period, it would be 
economically inefficient to deviate from the ex ante optimal plan (see Persson and 
Tabelhni, 1995, pp 3-4). An example of dynamic inconsistency can be drawn from 
the incentive constraints present in the function of debt management. The presence 
of long-term nominal government liabilities creates an incentive for the government 
to create unexpected inflation in order to reduce the real burden of debt. If a zero 
inflation policy was optimal before the issuance of such debt, it might no longer be 
optimal since the government could realise benefits from the expropriation of debt 
holders through unexpected inflation.
Time-inconsistency would not matter if the policy-maker could abide by a rule. 
In a seminal paper by Kydland and Prescott (1977) it is argued that “if in each 
period the policy decision selected is the one which maximises the sum of the value 
of current outcomes and the discounted valuation of the end-of-period state, the 
policy selected will be consistent but not optimal” . Thus, the authors argue, rules 
(e.g. a monetary growth rule) should be preferred rather than discretion. Barro 
and Gordon (1983) examine the incentives of the government to resort to surprise 
inflation (one of which is to repudiate the debt), even if rules are in place. In 
other words they study the temptation of a policy-maker to ‘cheat’. The benefits 
of cheating if people expect the rule are the highest amongst all possible outcomes. 
The second-best outcome results from following the rule, and the third-best results
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from optimising in every period (discretion). Since people cannot be systematically 
deceived in the model, the pursuit of the first-best leads to an equiÜbrium that is 
lower than the second best (rule) and closer to the third best (discretion). The loss 
of reputation (credibility) from cheating, however, may be enough to support the 
rule.
In reality, it is most common that policy-making takes place in discretionary 
regimes where policies are often revised. In such economic environments, mecha­
nisms or commitment technologies have to be developed in order to replicate the 
optimal policies under a rule. What is important for our analysis is that as Lucas 
and Stokey (1983) and Persson et al (1988) show, certain choices of the maturity 
and contingency structure of government debt can be so effective that they can make 
the time-inconsistent second-best policy optimal. In other words, the full precom­
mitment optimum (the outcome that would prevail in an economy where perfectly 
credible commitments could be made) can be achieved in a rational discretion world 
(where poficies are decided according to maximising a utility function each period).
Building on these studies, Calvo and Guidotti (1990b) examine the optimality 
of different maturity and indexation structures assuming incomplete markets and 
introducing costly actual inflation (in addition to the costs of unexpected inflation). 
Issuing price-index-linked bonds is a commitment technology as it reduces the incen­
tives for creation of unexpected inflation.^® However, full price indexation (indexing 
the total amount of debt to the price level) is not optimal (as the government would 
be completely prevented from applying the inflation tax to smooth out taxes). Calvo 
and Guidotti (1990b) examine the optimal shares of indexed and nominal debt, as 
well as the different maturities that guarantee that poficies are time-consistent. In 
the case of a three-period model (where each period is assumed to reflect the term of 
office of successive administrations), optimal maturity is found to depend on whether 
the first government can index optimally. If it can, then debt should be long-term; 
if it cannot, it should be short-term. If no government can precommit the policies
^^Price indexation and interest rate ceilings are also advocated by Calvo (1988) in order to 
prevent inflation from increasing as a result of high interest rates.
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of subsequent administrations, and indexed debt is not available, then a short ma­
turity appears to be optimal. According to the authors, nominal short-term debt 
increases welfare and the servicing costs appear to be low. In a similar setting, but 
with only nominal debt available Calvo and Guidotti (1990a) find that with some 
precommitment debt should be of a short maturity, whereas absence of precommit­
ment impfies a more balanced maturity structure. They also find a positive relation 
between optimal maturity and the stock of debt, and a negative relation between 
optimal maturity and government spending.
The ability of certain debt instruments to resolve time-consistency issues is in­
vestigated in Missale and Blanchard (1994). As a government with nominal debt 
outstanding benefits from surprise inflation (and the benefits increase with the level 
and the maturity of debt), it will try to keep its non-inflationary policy credible by 
switching to shorter-term debt, as debt increases. Their result is interesting because 
in a reputational equilibria regime, if the government has had resort to surprise 
inflation in the past, it can still achieve zero equilibrium inflation if it drastically 
shortens the maturity structure of debt. In the empirical section of their paper, the 
authors derive an inverse relationship between the level of debt and its maturity for 
high levels of indebtedness. In other words, an increase in the debt/GDP ratio is ac­
companied by a decrease in maturity (this result is robust for high debtor countries, 
but it disappears for countries with low levels of debt).
In Mandilaras and Levine (2001)^  ^ we extend this model to allow for the joint 
determination of inflation and the share of inflation-sensitive debt. We define as 
inflation-sensitive instruments the kinds of debt whose returns are negatively cor­
related with unexpected inflation. Assuming that governments have a preference 
for domestic nominal long-term debt (i.e. instruments of high inflation sensitivity), 
we show that the subgame perfect equilibrium involves a negative relation between 
inflationary expectations and the share of such debt. The theoretical implication is 
confirmed from a panel estimation of fifteen OECD countries.
“^^See also Chapter 4.
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Despite the fact that instruments with low or zero inflation sensitivity -e.g. price- 
indexed debt, short-term debt, etc.- reduce the incentives of the government to re­
sort to surprise inflation, the delegation of monetary authority to an independent 
institution is more effective in reducing the inflationary bias.^ ® Falcetti and Missale 
(2001) show that in the presence of an independent central bank, the optimal policy 
is to issue long-term nominal bonds. The reason is that conventional debt increases 
the sensitivity of taxes and output to unexpected inflation by enlarging the infla­
tion tax-base. Given a supply shock, less distortionary taxes have to be raised 
since unanticipated inflation erodes conventional debt returns. Monetary pohcy is 
also more effective in stabilising output as less unanticipated inflation is needed to 
dampen the impact of the shock. At the same time, a ‘conservative’ independent 
monetary authority prevents the creation of increased inflationary expectations that 
would otherwise occur in the presence of deflatable debt.
This paper by Falcetti and Missale (2001) nicely complements our analysis in 
Chapter 4, where we show that when there is a credible commitment mechanism 
that allows the government to commit to future inflation, the debt manager can issue 
the desired quantity of conventional debt.^® In the absence of such a mechanism the 
time-consistent solution to our model indicates that the debt manager issues a lower- 
than-desired share of nominal long-term debt.
A different approach of the time-consistency of policies and how to achieve it in 
a discretionary world is taken in De Broeck (1997). In this paper it is shown that it 
is not only maturity instruments that can enforce future policies, but also the type 
of debt ownership (financial sector or private investors) is an important parameter. 
The optimal composition of the two maturities and the two types of ownership is 
expressed as a function of the (untaxed) outstanding debt obligations. In this model 
a policy of no taxation on debt cannot be made time-consistent, thus, in equifibrium
®^We review the main findings in the literature on Central Bank independence in the next 
chapter.
®^We assume that conventional debt as a fraction of total debt is highly desirable by the gov­
ernment for stabilisation reasons.
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debt taxes are always imposed.
In this section we have discussed how debt management decisions can affect fu­
ture pohcies by creating incentives to deviate from or abide by the optimal plan 
(which is decided at the same time when the structure of debt is designed). Price 
indexation is Usually the preferred commitment mechanism over its antagonist, for­
eign currency debt. The reason is that the latter exposes the budget to exchange 
rate risk: a devaluation of the domestic currency will raise the costs of debt service. 
Obviously, foreign currency debt is regarded as a commitment mechanism exactly 
because it prevents the government from creating excessive inflation. If the govern­
ment inflates the currency is devaluated, and this has an adverse effect on interest 
costs. However, the exchange rate is not determined solely by the government, and 
this feature has led most policy-makers that have access to alternative markets to 
rely on other instruments (e.g. price-indexed securities). Of course, if an interna­
tionally transmitted price shock takes place and all debt is indexed to the price 
level, then the government will also have to pay increased returns to bond holders 
even though it was not its intention to inflate. This is why time-consistency is not 
the only consideration that the debt managers take into account when designing 
the debt structure. In the following section we present studies that investigate the 
optimal debt structure from a different prism.
2.6.2 M inimising Cost and Risk
In this section we examine two other parameters of the debt management process. 
One parameter concerns the efforts of the debt manager to reduce the debt service 
costs. Cost minimisation is a particularly desirable function from a pofltical view­
point, since lower payments on interest free resources that can be then directed to 
public investment. However, the pursuit of this goal might imply reliance on debt 
instruments that do not provide acceptable budget protection from certain shocks. 
For example, if a fall in economic activity (and thus a fall in the tax base and 
revenues) is associated with unexpected inflation, the effect on the budget will de-
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pend on the debt instruments that have been issued. If large quantities of nominal 
long-term debt are in place the outcome is highly desirable: the reduction in the 
real value of debt takes place at a time when obtaining revenues from a shrunk tax 
base is difficult. If, in contrast, short-term nominal debt is in place (for example 
because the yield curve is upward sloping and it is less expensive to issue short-term 
debt) the government has to refinance (‘roll-over’) its short liabifities at a higher 
interest rate. This example shows that there are trade-offs between cost and risk 
minimisation.
So, which properties should the chosen debt instruments exhibit if the objective 
is to minimise risk? We quote from Missale (1999): “The objective of minimising 
risk calls for low debt returns in states where output is lower and public spending 
is higher than expected so as to avoid high tax rates when bad shocks to output 
or public spending occur” . So, ideally, the policy-maker should issue instruments 
whose returns co-vary negatively with government spending, and positively with 
output growth.
This takes us to the analysis by Barro (1995, 1997). Assuming that a government 
faced with exogenous, stochastic expenditures wants to avoid (distortionary) varia­
tions in taxes, an optimal public debt policy is derived. The government issues debt 
contingent on the realisation of expenditures, an instrument that pays low when 
spending is high and the tax base is low. However, if the moral hazard problem 
(an obvious incentive to over-spend) is serious enough to preclude issuance of debt 
contingent on spending, indexed bonds of a long maturity should be the preferred 
instrument. In Barro’s setting there is very little or no role for nominal debt: if the 
moral hazard consideration rules out the issuance of debt contingent on spending, it 
also rules out the issuance of nominal debt. Furthermore, the returns of the latter 
also vary as a result of changes in spending, and thus, the resulting volatiÜty in the 
need for taxes is in antithesis with the optimisation objective.
Before Barro’s (1995, 1997) contribution, in an effort to explain why the debt 
management authorities throughout the world issue at least some nominal debt
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(in many cases nominal debt is the only instrument), Bohn (1988) had used the 
risk-minimising argument. If an output shock in the economy creates unexpected 
inflation, the real value of the government liabilities will be deflated. The timing 
of the reduction in the debt burden is favourable: it comes exactly when is most 
needed, during a period when the tax base is low. If the choice of instruments was 
such that the debt returns increase as a result of an output shock, then distortionary 
taxes would have to be raised at a time of weakening economic activity.
The tax-smoothing argument (first used in Barro, 1979) is also the analytical 
basis of Bohn (1990b). The idea here is to explore the correlations between re­
turns on several securities with the present value of output. This information is 
important because it shows which debt instruments can be used for hedging against 
output shocks. The author begins his analysis by showing that the tax-smoothing 
hypothesis cannot be rejected with US data, i.e. taxes follow a random walk. In­
terestingly, though, the innovations in tax rates are not found to be uncorrelated 
with innovations in the returns of several instruments. The implication is that these 
instruments can be used to smooth taxes over time and across states of nature. 
Using a VAR methodology, the author finds evidence of the effectiveness of nominal 
government debt in tax-smoothing. Implications about maturity are not as robust. 
He also proposes debt denominated in other currencies, like the German Mark and 
the Japanese Yen. However, depsite the fact that the correlations are rightly signed 
for the hedging purpose, they are not always signiflcant. Another proposition of 
the author is that the debt management authorities can take a short position in the 
stock market, as this action would provide insurance against shortfalls in govern­
ment revenue resulting from output shocks. We extend Bohn’s analysis in Chapter 
5. We use a cointegrating VAR methodology in contrast with Bohn (1990) where 
first-differenced series are analysed in the context of a VAR.
The exact role of foreign currency debt is explored in Bohn (1990a). In this 
paper, it is argued that if foreign surprise inflation is negatively correlated with 
domestic output, foreign currency debt can serve as a hedging device against output
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shocks. Of course, a negative correlation is more Ükely to exist between domestic 
surprise inflation and output. In this case domestic nominal debt could provide the 
required insurance. However, due to incentive problems (discussed in more detail in 
2.6.1) the authorities might be required to pay a premium for domestic, nominal, 
long-term debt. Hence, there is a role for foreign currency debt. The two instruments 
are substitutes in the government’s debt portfolio if inflation is positively correlated 
across countries.
Bohn’s general ideas on debt management are summarised in Bohn (1996). As­
suming that the government has debt outstanding indefinitely (not a very unrealistic 
hypothesis, especially if the level of debt is not very high), Bohn agrees with Barro 
that debt should be long-term. He disagrees, however, with Barro on indexation: 
as inflation has historically been associated with ‘bad times’, nominal debt pro­
vides budget insurance when these times occur. The rationale is simpler if budget 
surpluses are projected: debt instruments should mature when the surpluses are 
expected to materialise.
Despite the fact that certain debt instruments display desirable hedging prop­
erties, there is a prohibiting factor in relying exclusively on them: their cost. The 
private investors are expected to request a premium for holding such bonds as the 
returns they will get during a possible downturn of the economy will be lower. As 
Bohn (1996) puts it “[...] the optimal policy is determined by ta x -sm o o th ing  consid­
erations alone. If tax-smoothing considerations suggest that the government should 
issue a security that carries a risk premium, the government should pay the premium 
without complaining” . It is questionable, however, to what extent the governments 
will be happy to pay this insurance premium. If the economy is prone to regular 
shocks, the premium the investors require may be prohibiting. If, on the other hand, 
shocks very rarely occur, the welfare utility of such instruments might not justify 
their issuance.
In the case of the UK the cost minimisation goal is made explicit. Even though 
other objectives are referred to, the clear priority is assigned to cost. In the latest
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debt management report (2001-02) of the HM Treasury the objective is “To minimise 
over the long-term the cost of meeting the Government’s financing needs, taking 
into account risk, whilst ensuring that debt management policy is consistent with the 
objectives of monetary policy”}^
Missale (1999) does not find cost minimisation to be the proper strategy if the 
expected returns on debt instruments simply reflect their risk-return characteris­
tics. However, he lists four cases in which reducing the cost of debt service would 
constitute a justified approach. If the government is facing higher returns due to 
market imperfections, informational asymmetries, systematic mistakes in the forma­
tion of expectations on the part of the private sector, and commitment problems, 
then minimising expected costs is acceptable. The government should avoid paying 
high premia which do not reflect the risk-return characteristics of the bond.
Boothe and Reid (1992) examine a cost-minimising objective in the context of a 
small open economy. They flnd that even in the ‘naive’ case where interest rates are 
assumed to follow a random walk, substantial savings can be made just by following 
the objective. In their analysis, however, they assume that debt management cannot 
be used for stabilisation purposes. A study by Coe et al (2000) evaluates the cost 
efficiency of the British debt management authority. They argue that by using the 
recursive modelling approach they obtain forecasts about future interest rates that 
lead to a substantial reduction in interest costs.
Thus far we have established that debt managers are facing a trade-off between 
the minimisation of debt servicing costs and the minimisation of budgetary risk. 
Ideally, if the government is risk-averse, an instrument indexed to output or public 
spending would be issued. It would pay low in states of the world that output is low 
and public spending is high. In that way the budget would be insulated from the 
effects of a down-turn of the economy on debt returns and risk would be minimised
'^^ Coe, Vahey, and Wakerly (2000) critisise the transparency and accountability status of the 
UK debt management authorities. They argue that the cost and risk objectives should be made 
explicit, and a benchmark portfoHo should be used to assess the debt management authorities’ 
performance ex post.
^^More details on this econometric method can be found in Pesaran and Timmermann (2000).
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as this instrument would imply smoother tax rates. However, due to recording 
delays and moral hazard problems respectively, such debt is not being issued. As a 
result, the managers have to rely on other more conventional instruments. On the 
other hand, the government could be a cost-minimiser if the expected bond returns 
do not just reflect the instrument’s risk-return characteristics.
Two observations can be made at this point. First, there is a gap between 
the academic recipe for hedging risk and practice as it is implemented by the debt 
management authorities. The latter seem to have a more cost-oriented approach. 
Second, characterising the exact nature of a bond and calculating the size and source 
of any risk premia is not an easy task. Consequently, efficient decisions cannot be 
made unless the term structure of interest rates is better understood.
In the next section, we briefly present the debate on whether debt should be 
indexed to the price level. A lot of interest has been drawn to this issue, and, thus, 
it is separately examined. We also refer to other interesting contributions that have 
appeared in the flterature.
2.7 Contemporary Issues
2.7.1 The D ebate on Indexation
Several studies in the area of debt management show that price-index-linked bonds 
should be issued. The indexation clause means that the returns on these bonds 
move in line with the inflation rate. In that way, investors are protected against 
unexpected increases in the price level. As we have seen at an earlier stage of 
our analysis such instruments can be very useful in reducing the incentives of the 
government to create surprise inflation. Additionally, according to a line of thought, 
they are also optimal from a tax-smoothing point of view.
In an influential paper, Campbell and Shiller (1996) give two additional argu­
ments in favour of issuing price-indexed debt. First, they argue that the monetary 
authorities could take advantage of the informational content of indexed bonds to
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obtain new information about expected inflation. This point has also been examined 
in two other studies. Barr and Campbell (1997) forecast future inflation and inter­
est rates for the UK using price information on nominal and price-indexed bonds. 
They find that using observed prices of both instruments enables them to forecast 
future inflation more accurately than relying exclusively on the nominal yields. In a 
similar vein, Breedon and Chadha (1997) reach a similar conclusion: the precision of 
inflation forecasts increases when using indexed debt price information on top of in­
formation on conventional bonds. Creating a market for indexed debt might provide 
the monetary authorities with better information about the market expectations of 
future inflation.
The second argument that Campbell and Shiller (1996) put forward is that pri­
vate issuance of indexed debt may be encouraged as a result of pubflc issuance of 
the instrument (‘demonstration eflfect’). They argue that more efficient allocation 
of risk could be achieved by creating assets that would be regarded as risk-free. To 
justify their claim, the authors show that there is some inflation risk even in holding 
3-month US Treasury Bills.
The contributions arguing for the benefits that might arise as a result of issuance 
of real government securities are many. As we have seen earlier in our discussion 
Barro’s influential work (1995,1997) is supportive of debt indexation. More recently. 
Dale, Mogiardino and Quah (1997) have argued that the optimal debt portfoflo with 
respect to deficit-smoothing for the UK consists of price-indexed gilts. Indeed, they 
cannot find a role for nominal debt in any of their derived portfolios.
Despite the fact that the advantages of debt indexation are not negligible, the 
share of this instrument in governments’ debt portfolios around the world remains 
rather small. In fact, most governments do not issue price-indexed debt at all. A 
clear exception is the UK Treasury, which having issued indexed instruments in
^^FoUowing the publication of the paper and the debate it had triggered, the United States 
conducted their first indexed debt auction on the 29th of January, 1997. A discussion of the 
recently introduced instrument can be found in Wilcox (1998).
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Figure 2.1: UK Debt Composition 1997-2000
1981, it now indexes 25% of its debt to the price l e v e l . Bu t  even in the UK most 
of the public liabilities are still nominal. The composition of the British public debt 
for the period 1997-2000 is shown in Figure 2.1. The share of indexed debt in the 
US currently (as on the 30th of April 2001) stands at 4.5% (see the Bureau of the 
Public Debt online).
What is the explanation for the unwillingness of most debt-issuing authorities 
to index their countries’ liabilities to the price level? A comprehensive listing of 
the arguments and a discussion can be found in Pecchi and Piga (1997). Here, we 
briefly discuss the main possible reasons. First, pohcy-makers may not want to rule 
out the possibility of inflating away the real value of debt. Usually, emergencies like 
wars or natural disasters come hand in hand with hyperinflation. Large quantities 
of indexed debt in such situations could lead to an excessive need for revenue, and
^°For an overview of the British experience with indexation see Townend (1997). It is argued 
that the British debt management authorities have made substantial savings through indexation.
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possibly to default on debt.^^ But, even in the more frequent case of a supply 
shock, the hedging role of nominal debt as described in Bohn (1988) possibly has a 
large weight in the debt managers’ utility function.M oreover, in the context of an 
increasingly integrated world economy domestic prices may not be solely determined 
by the domestic monetary authorities. Internationally correlated price shocks would 
create severe budgetary problems if debt was indexed to the price level. Missale 
(1997) studies the insurance properties of indexed bonds for Italy and the UK. He 
finds that such debt has been particularly beneficial for the UK in the 1990’s. The 
main reason is that lower than expected inflation has led to lower debt servicing 
costs. In Italy, the hedging role is better played by nominal debt.
Second, it has been argued that indexation weakens the opposition to inflation, 
as bondholders of real securities could be indifferent to surges in prices. If inflation 
is the outcome of a political process involving influences from pressure groups, then 
the outcome will be a higher rate of inflation. Brazil has experienced simultaneous 
increases of inflation and indexation in the economy. In fact, efforts to reduce 
inflation were directed towards a de-indexation of contracts (see Goldfajn, 1998). 
However, in countries with moderate inflation, indexation would not easily extend 
to other sectors in the economy. Moreover, the delegation of monetary authority to 
independent institutions makes this argument even harder to accept.
Other reasons for the absence of price-indexed securities from debt portfoflos 
include the practical difficulties in issuing them, the uncertainty regarding their 
Pareto-enhancing performance, etc. However, the examples of the UK and, with 
some delay, the US show that providing investors with an extra asset can be a
^^Goodhart (1999) provides a comprehensive history of UK debt management and monetary 
policies. It is historically true that sharp increases in the level of UK debt have been associated with 
wartime periods. As the author finds, during the first World War nominal long-term financing had 
been very expensive due to the high interest rates. This experience probably led the debt managers 
in World War II to finance debt with shorter maturity instruments. Goodhart asserts that despite 
the high World War I debt service costs there had been no conscious efforts to repudiate the debt 
via excessive inflation, or default. Moreover, after the second World War, it was fiscal rather than 
monetary policies that were used to keep interest rates low.
^^ In the case of a demand shock the intuition is opposite: the corresponding fall in prices makes 
indexed debt an attractive instrument.
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successful operation.
2.7.2 Confidence Crises and Default Risk
Instead of reducing the real value of debt through unexpected inflation, governments 
can default on their obÜgations to debtholders. The recent paradigm of Russia warns 
us that this is more than a distant theoretical possibiflty. The question that emerges 
from this simple fact is when do such circumstances arise, and whether investors 
assess this probabiflty and request a default risk premium accordingly.
In the flterature, confidence crises are triggered by changes in investors’ expecta­
tions. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) ask whether specific policies and debt instruments 
can reduce the probabiflty of such phenomena. They consider an open economy with 
three agents: the Central Bank, the Treasury and the private sector. A speculative 
attack is assumed to take place on the fixed exchange rate, which the Bank can 
defend using its reserves. The possibiflty of currency devaluation raises nominal 
interest rates, and thus makes debt service more expensive. In this situation, the 
Treasury has an interest to finance its obligations with high-powered money. How­
ever, if the Bank gives in to pressure from the Treasury and creates new money, it 
lowers the probabiflty of successfully resisting the speculative attack.
If a large amount of debt has to be refinanced during the attack then the prob­
abiflty of a devaluation is higher. Investors then ask for higher returns on debt 
making the prospect of a devaluation more visible. The authors propose three mea­
sures that, in their opinion, increase the chances of the government to withstand 
a confidence crisis: lengthening the average maturity of debt, smoothing the time 
pattern of maturing debt, and issuing foreign currency debt. In a discussion of 
Giavazzi and Pagano’s paper, Maurice Obstfeld has a different idea regarding the 
ideal composition of debt. He proposes a debt management rule that requires that 
pubflc outlays equal planned taxes in every period. He argues that what matters 
is that government purchases and debt payments are negatively correlated. In that 
sense, high debt payments (because of a large quantity of debt maturing at a point
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in time) when government purchases are low are not necessarily a bad thing.
Alesina et al (1990) develop a model in which the government rolls over its 
debt every period. If the default risks (loss of reputation and future difficulties in 
raising money from the debt markets) are considerable, investors are wilÜng to renew 
their debt holdings at the exogenous interest rate, and default does not occur. If, 
however, today’s investors think that, for any reason, investors tomorrow will request 
the payment of the principal (in other words, if investors tomorrow do not renew 
their debt holdings causing a ‘debt-run’), then there is an equilibrium with default: 
payment of the principal is Ükely to require massive increases in distortionary taxes; 
there is a point at which the costs of distortionary taxation will overcome the costs 
of default. At this point the government may default on debt payments. The point 
is that investors expect this equilibrium and do not roll over the debt causing a 
default t o d a y . T h e  role of expectations in servicing the public debt has been 
examined in Calvo (1998). He argues that as the nominal interest rate is one of the 
main determinants of inflation, it should be prevented from becoming very high. He 
identifies price-indexation of government debt as an effective solution.
Alesina et aVs rationale impfies that the cost of raising taxes in case of a debt- 
run will be higher for highly indebted countries. And, indeed, it seems that high 
indebtedness increases the default risk on government debt. Alesina et al. (1992) 
find a positive correlation between default risk and the level and growth of debt 
for the highly indebted OECD countries. This risk premium is incorporated in the 
long-term nominal interest rates possibly leading governments to issue more short­
term debt. Alesina et al. (1992), though, were not able to confirm empirically a 
positive relation between default risk and the share of short-term debt.
very interesting approach, which however diverges from the debt management literature, 
is taken by Caselli (1996). The author argues that asymmetries in the tax system and coahtion 
governments increase the probability of ‘debt-runs’. The idea is that the costs of default are 
lower if the burden of extra taxation during a debt-run can be evenly distributed among tax bases. 
Moreover, as non-partisan governments are assumed to assign a smaller weight to distributive goals 
than partisan ones, and as tax policy is a better redistributive tool than debt poHcy, it follows that 
coalition (non-partisan) governments will tend to default more. In this setup, investors might be 
asking for ‘tax-imbalance’ and/or ‘coahtion’ premia to invest in government bonds.
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In a recent study, Drudi and Giordano (2000) examine the issue of optimal 
maturity structure taking into account time-consistency and default risk. In their 
setup, issuance of debt instruments with low (or zero) inflation sensitivity reduces 
(or eradicates) the incentive to inflate, but also increases the default risk on gov­
ernment debt. They argue that high debts and real interest rates, together with 
independent central banks or anti-inflationary governments make debt indexation 
less desirable (due to the increase in default premia). Another prediction of their 
model is that, regardless of the precommitment status, the optimal maturity length­
ens when government expenditure falls, and shortens when expenditure increases. 
They also ascertain that the optimal maturity lengthens with default risk. This is in 
agreement with the prescription in Alesina et al (1990): lengthening the maturity 
structure of debt reduces default risk as the government should avoid having large 
quantities of debt maturing in the same period.
Amato and Tronzano (2000) examine debt management strategies aiming to 
provide credibiflty to an exchange rate peg. The authors argue that debt poflcies 
significantly affect devaluation expectations. They find that lengthening the matu­
rity of debt, and issuing larger amounts of foreign currency debt may help to prevent 
successful speculative attacks from taking place.
2.7.3 D ebt Composition, Bond Yields and M onetary Policy
What are the effects of certain debt strategies on monetary policy? This question 
has been the underlying theme throughout this chapter. We have examined how 
incentive mechanisms may affect future inflation rates, and how models in which 
the objective is to minimise inflation can be used to derive an optimal structure 
of debt. This discussion has also presented the dilemmas arising from the different 
properties of the various debt instruments. The debt management authorities are 
aware of these considerations and design the composition of debt according to the 
specific policy goals and the characteristics of the economy. In this section we confine 
our interest on two specific issues: the role of the maturity composition of debt with
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respect to its effect on yields and monetary policy.
Back in 1966, Modigliani and Sutch posed an interesting question; Does the ma­
turity structure of government debt (and, in particular, the changes in the relative 
supply of instruments of different maturity) affect the slope of the yield curve? In 
their model, risk averse transactors (i.e. borrowers and lenders) are facing uncertain 
future interest rates, and exhibit definite preferences regarding the time length of 
the investment or loan. In the authors’ own terminology, investors display a “pre­
ferred maturity habitat” . The Preferred Habitat Theory predicts that the yield 
structure can indeed be affected by large movements in the relative supply of debt 
instruments of different maturity. For instance, an increase in short-term debt with 
a corresponding decrease in debt of other maturities and unchanged habitats should 
lead to a decrease in the yield differential (spread). However, this prediction of their 
model is not verified in the tests they carry out using US data. They conclude that 
their results “do imply that the structure of yields is not very responsive to varia­
tions in the age composition of government debt, at least in the order of magnitude 
experienced in the period studied”.
Several years later. Park (1999) carries a similar exercise and finds more encour­
aging results. The US evidence, according to the author, seem to be consistent 
with the idea that the maturity composition of debt is a significant determinant of 
interest rates. Maturity structure helps predict excess holding period returns. In 
specific, shortening the maturity is found to lower the excess holding period return 
on a short bill, and to increase the return on longer instruments. This implies a 
flatter yield curve. Furthermore, Park finds evidence that the maturity composition 
is also correlated with the term premium.^^ The conclusion of this study is that 
bills and bonds of different maturities are not perfect substitutes.
The same issue is analysed in Hess (1999) for UK data. In specific, he examines 
if instruments of different maturities and indexation characteristics are substitutes 
for one another, as well as for money. One of his findings is that nominal short-
'^^ The term premium is defined as the realised excess returns of a strategy involving rolling a 
short instrument over the life of a long bond.
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term instruments are good substitutes for the M4 measure of money supply. If 
this is indeed the case, then issuing large quantities of short-term debt could have 
expansionary effects. Another finding is that instruments of the same maturity but 
different indexation features are also substitutes. So, what is the effect of a change 
in the relative shares of the instruments in government’s portfolio? The author 
considers a situation where the share of long-term debt falls by 1 percentage point 
and the share of short-term debt increases by 1 percentage point. The outcome is 
that all holding-period returns fall with the long-term ones experiencing the biggest 
decline (i.e. the yield curve measured in terms of holding period returns flattens). 
Interestingly, the effects of changes in the composition of debt are shown to be larger 
in times of uncertainty about monetary poficy and interest rates.
Both studies by Park (1997) and Hess (1999) reach the conclusion that shortening 
the maturity of debt flattens the yield curve, even though the magnitude of this 
result is quite small. It has to be mentioned, however, that identifying the exact 
relationship between maturity structure and the interest rates is not a simple task 
as it is also a reafity that decisions on maturity are taken with an eye on the interest 
rates.
The implications of certain debt structures for the conduct of monetary poficy 
are analysed in Favero et al. (1999). Interest rate reaction functions are studied 
with the maturity of debt used as an explanatory variable. The usual idea is that 
in the presence of large shares of short-term debt central banks might come under 
pressure to set a lower interest rate as this will reduce the roll-over costs. It would be 
expected that inflationary pressures (arising from a supply or demand shock) would 
trigger a less aggressive interest rate reaction on the part of the central bank. But the 
authors assert that this is not the case at least in some European countries. In fact, 
short maturity is positively correlated with more aggressive interest rate hikes to 
combat inflationary pressures. The explanation is persistent inflation: if the central 
bank does not react efficiently in the current period, then inflation and interest rates 
will remain high in all future periods and this will increase the refinancing cost of
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debt. However, another underlying factor could be driving the result. Countries 
acquire credibiÜty not by issuing short-term instruments, but through other ways 
(e.g. delegating the monetary authority to independent institutions). Thus, the 
empirical model might be capturing the fact that these countries face lower interest 
rates and have large quantities of long-term debt in place. Which mechanism is in 
place remains open.
In any case, the consensus at a conference organised by the Bank of England 
with the topic “Government debt structure and monetary conditions” , was that 
the effects of debt management on real yields and the central banks’ incentives are 
small. As John Campbell puts it; “Monetary policy is highly relevant for debt 
management, whether or not debt management is relevant for monetary policy” .
2.8 Final Remarks
The literature on the effects of government debt management has grown considerably 
since the influential and widely cited paper by Lucas and Stokey (1983). The role 
of debt management is deemed relevant in many aspects of macroeconomic fife, and 
there is an active research interest in the field. In this chapter we have attempted 
to summarise the basic issues and contributions. Our presentation of these issues 
has not been exhaustive, but it is hoped that we have reviewed the most important 
strands of the literature accurately and sufficiently.^^
The composition of a government’s fiabilities can affect the way the budget re­
sponds to shocks, the probabilities of confidence crises, and potentially the conduct 
of monetary poficy. Researchers are trying to identify optimal behaviour as well as 
to resolve existing puzzles in the practice of policy-making. The question of what 
policies are chosen can be easily answered by examining the data. In contrast, the 
question of why these policies are selected requires considerable effort. There have 
been efforts in the literature to address the latter, but we think that more work is
very interesting survey on debt management is by Anderson et al. (1999).
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required to explain and formalise the observed patterns. We offer an explanation 
for the decision-making process of the debt manager in Chapter 4. We derive our 
results from a model of time-consistency, taking into account that the debt manager 
has a preference for nominal debt.
At this point we can make the observation that the focus of current research is 
more on the empirical side of the subject, and efforts are made to deliver direct im- 
phcations for poHcy-making. In chapter 5 we contribute to the empirical hterature 
by estimating long-run relations between variables that matter for tax-smoothing. 
This study complements the existing hterature that has used VARs to obtain impli­
cations for debt policies aiming to reduce the impact of shocks on the budget, but 
has neglected longer-term effects.
In the chapter that follows we set out to investigate empirically the role of debt 
level in affecting inflation rates across countries.
CHAPTER 3
A Cross-Countries Study of the Relation between Public
Debt and Inflation
3.1 Introduction
Several economic commentators have recently argued that “inflation is dead” . Be- 
hevers in the New Economy argue that technology -and especially information tech­
nology (IT)- makes it possible for an economy to reach the full-employment level 
without facing severe inflationary pressures. But despite the optimism that this 
behef and the recent example of the United States have offered, it would be unwise 
to ignore the threat of inflation and denounce it as a thing of the past. We need to 
understand the causes of inflation better before writing it off as dead. This chapter 
is a contribution towards that aim.
The first reason is related to labour market mechanisms. Suppose that the 
economy is operating at full capacity. At some stage tight labour markets are fikely 
to trigger an inflationary process as firms will try to employ people from an almost 
empty tank. Firms will be competing with each other to attract employees or
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motivate non-working individuals to enter the labour market. As a result, nominal 
wages will increase and companies will want to pass the higher production costs to 
consumers.
The second reason draws from the fact that efficiency-enhancing new technologies 
are not adopted and used around the globe in the same degree. Modern technologies 
that can drastically reduce the costs of production are not being used throughout the 
world but are rather the privilege of a few developed or rapidly developing countries. 
The implication of this fact is that we are still far from the point that the benefits 
of technology are drastically reducing prices uniformly across countries.
The aim of this chapter is to examine the differences in inflation rates across 
countries covering a period from 1980 to 1998. More specifically, our main focus is on 
the role of debt in affecting monetary policies. To measure its effect with accuracy 
the specification includes a number of variables that have qualified as significant 
determinants of inflation in previous studies. We use data on openness, central bank 
independence, past inflation rates, structural unemployment and pofitical instability.
There are three reasons why we have chosen to revisit this subject. First, we 
provide a strong link between the theoretical models that we review and our em­
pirical results. In other words, even though our angle is empirical we have placed 
a considerable weight on displaying a coherent set of theoretical arguments to form 
our specifications. Second, we examine the effects of several control variables that, 
we beheve, are used for the first time in conjunction with rich information on in­
debtedness (for example, our regressions include a measure of the natural level of 
unemployment). Finally, we believe it is useful to re-examine appfied issues using 
updated information. To our knowledge, this study uses more observations on debt 
than previous contributions.
The process of collecting the data has been extremely demanding as a variety of 
sources had to be used, and great care had to be taken in constructing an informative 
and reliable data-set. Our efforts have led to rewarding results as we present new 
evidence on the relevance of debt in determining cross-countries inflation rates, as
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well as interesting intuitions on the rest of the explaining variables. We also compare 
our results with those of relevant studies from Grilh et al. (1991), Cukierman et al. 
(1992), Romer (1993), and Campiilo and Miron (1996).
Figure 3.1 depicts the inflation rates experienced by the countries in our data­
set. It can be easily seen that this experience has been anything but uniform. The 
inflation rates range from the very low (e.g. Japan and Switzerland) to the extremely 
high (e.g. Nicaragua and Peru). So, how can we explain these differences? We 
begin our analysis by examining the theoretical issues concerning the relationship 
between central bank independence and inflation in the next section. Section 3.3 is 
concerned with open economy effects, and section 3.4 examines the role of structural 
unemployment. Our empirical analysis is carried out in section 3.5. Section 3.6 
concludes the chapter.
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3.2 Central Bank Independence and Inflation
3.2.1 Dynam ic Consistency Considerations
Who could have imagined that the arguments in favour of central bank independence 
would be described as bearing a resemblance to the Greek mythological monster 
Charyb dis? Well, this is exactly the comparison Milton Friedman had used long 
before the debate on time-consistency and central bank independence was given a 
boost by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Rogoff (1985) respectively. The great 
economist argued in 1962: “The Charybdis is the belief that the need to adapt to 
unforeseen circumstances requires the assignment of wide discretionary powers to 
a group of technicians, gathered together in an “independent” central bank, or in 
some bureaucratic body. Neither has proved a satisfactory solution in the past; and 
neither is likely to in the future” }  Friedman is in favour of a monetary rule (stated 
in terms of the behaviour of the stock of money), and in general a ‘government of 
law’ instead of men.
However, despite Friedman’s suggestions, theoretical arguments and recent em­
pirical findings in the hterature have triggered an interesting debate on the issue. 
Is it optimal to delegate power to an independent monetary authority? Economists 
and pohcy-makers worldwide have engaged in an exchange of proposals, ideas and 
forecasts about the hkely outcomes of a decision to grant monetary authorities with 
independence. In a recent paper, Bhnder (1999) conducted some interesting re­
search among central bankers and (mainly academic) economists. He found that 
the majority from both samples agree that credibility makes disinflation less costly 
and helps hold down inflation once it is low. In addition, they agree that a central 
bank gains credibility by doing what it says it will do, and by being independent. In 
what follows we wih examine the debate from different angles; both the arguments
^For the interested reader, Scylla and Charybdis were a six-headed monster and a whirlpool, 
respectively, that hindered the ship of Odysseus, a Greek mythological hero, from sailing through a 
strait. Scylla and Charybdis have become a proverb to indicate the choice between equally dreadful 
alternatives. Friedman assigns the role of Scylla to the belief that that a purely automated gold 
standard is feasible and desirable in fostering economic co-operation and a stable environment.
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for and against independence of the monetary authorities will be presented. The 
empirical analysis of the second part of the chapter aims to shed some more light 
on the ongoing dialogue.
The main argument behind the need for an independent monetary institution 
is that it enjoys more credibiflty in the eyes of the pubflc. If monetary authori­
ties are not independent they may come under pressure from politicians to deliver 
sub-optimal rates of inflation; given the short-run benefits of surprise inflation on 
employment, nominal debt, etc. it is expected that a government-influenced central 
bank will resort more easily to seignorage. It is then argued that the more indepen­
dent a central bank is, the less it will be under the spell of political influences, and 
the less the monetary authorities will be forced to finance deficits by creating money 
(see Eijflnger and de Haan, 1996). In other words, an independent central bank will 
enjoy a ‘credibility bonus’ that can solve the problem of dynamic inconsistency as 
outlined in Kydland and Prescott.^
Two additional arguments have been made in favour of central bank indepen­
dence. The first one draws from results of empirical studies that have shown that 
lower inflation and lower inflation variability are achieved with the establishment 
of independent central banks at no cost in terms of greater output growth or em­
ployment variability. Apparently, the establishment of such an institution is a ‘free 
lunch’. The second argument focuses on the success of the German Bundesbank in 
keeping inflation low over the years.
Several forms of independence have been proposed in the flterature. Rogoff 
(1985) has suggested that the appointment of a conservative central banker leads 
to a lower inflationary bias and a lower variance of inflation.^ This, though, comes
^Forder (1998) makes a distinction between the wider idea of time-consistency and the idea 
of credibility. Time-consistency is described as a situation where benevolent policy-makers can 
achieve a better policy outcome by explicitly following a rule or by repeatedly following the same 
implicit policy, affecting in this way the expectations of a backward-looking private sector. When 
the notion that the policy-maker can ‘cheat’ or, simply, deliver an unexpected outcome enters the 
picture, the credibiflty problem arises. Following the previous line of thought, the relevant angle 
here is how to make the rule credible.
I^t is assumed that the central bank and the society have different objective functions. Given 
the trade-off between inflation and employment stabilisation, society assigns a greater weight on
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at the expense of greater output variability from supply shocks, because the central 
banker offsets output shocks to a lesser extent than the government. Moreover, 
there are several problems with this solution. The right degree of conservatism 
or independence is not practically easy to be found, and the possibility that the 
government will overrule the central banker cannot be ignored.
Forder (1998) provides an interpretation of Rogoff that differs from the conven­
tional one. According to this interpretation, Rogoff’s argument is that as a strong 
commitment to low inflation is not optimal, in the absence of ideal rules, a balance 
must be achieved. So, the recipe is not for a rule but rather for discretion, with a 
‘conservative banker’ being the best solution to the agency problem. Forder urges 
us not to take the appointment of a conservative central banker literally but rather 
to think of it as an analytical device. This interpretation would lead us to reject the 
view that the case for Central Bank (CB) independence goes hand in hand with a 
mandate for price stability (this is rather a Kydland-Prescott type rule). It would 
also help distinguish the ‘degree of independence’ and the ‘degree of inflation aver- 
sity’. According to Forder, Rogoff discusses the optimal attitudes of a policy-maker 
and this should not be confused with independence.
al-Nowaihi, Levine, and Mandilaras (2001) provide a new synthesis of open 
economy effects and political business cycles in the context of a Rogoff delegation 
game. They begin by examining a multi-country world of interacting economies 
where Left- and Right-wing parties are contesting elections in each one of these 
economies. Building on micro-foundations they identify inter-country spillover ef­
fects that emerge through surprise real exchange effects. A surprise inflation in 
country A boosts foreign employment and output through the real exchange rate 
depreciation.
The authors proceed to set up a game where country A has an independent 
central bank whereas the rest of the economies operate with government-influenced
employment and a conservative central banker assigns a greater weight on minimising the variance 
of inflation. This weight, however, should not be infinite as the bank’s responses to supply shocks 
would be very inappropriate.
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monetary institutions. The economies are interdependent. They show that for 
country A, in the absence of exogenous shocks, there is no poHticai uncertainty and 
output remains at its natural level with a constant inflation bias. This is how they 
also explain the ‘free lunch’ notion of CB independence: countries that delegate first 
enjoy low average inflation whilst free-riding on the monetary expansion of the other 
countries.
The authors also examine the implications for the rest of the countries, and derive 
three propositions. First, a Left government-dependent CB will have a higher infla­
tion bias and a higher natural level of output than a Right government-dependent 
CB. Secondly, as in an open economy a boost in output caused by surprise infla­
tion is partially offset by a real depreciation, global integration reduces the output 
variance caused solely by political uncertainty. Finally, the authors argue that in 
the open economy there is always some stabilisation loss for the single independent 
CB. What is even more interesting is what the authors call ‘bad news’ for CB inde­
pendence: the stabilisation loss increases as more countries provide their monetary 
authorities with independence. In other words, the trade-off between low inflation 
and higher output variability re-emerges.
Another approach to the credibility problem was introduced by Walsh (1995). In 
this setting, the government is viewed as the principal and the central bank as the 
agent. A contract is being signed between the two parties, according to which the 
bank will be subject to an ex post penalty scheme that is linear in inflation. In this 
way the bank will not only follow the optimal precommitment rule in a discretionary 
regime, but will also be able to respond optimally to supply shocks. However, the 
Walsh contract does not solve the time-inconsistency problem, as there might be 
circumstances when it will be in the interests of both the principal and the agent 
to renegotiate the contact rather than enforce it. In al-Nowaihi and Levine (1996, 
2000) reputational equilibria are proposed. In the resulting equiflbrium the Walsh 
contracts are not renegotiated and the credibiflty problem is solved. Another recent 
approach by al-Nowaihi and Levine (1998) stresses the role of transparency as a
A Cross-Countries Study of the Relation between Public Debt and Inflation 55
signalling device. In this setup, the political monetary cycles can be avoided even 
with dependent central banks.
In the same principal-agent setting, Persson and Tabellini (1993) propose a 
shghtly different approach: the government sets an inflation target and holds the 
central bank accountable for meeting this goal. Walsh and Persson and Tabellini 
show that the optimal central bank contract may serve to eliminate the inflation 
bias without a trade-off in stabilisation. A remaining question is the enforcement of 
such contracts.
Summarising, the theory predicts that central bank independence as a credibiflty- 
enforcing mechanism can have beneficial effects in the fight against inflation. At the 
same time, a conservative and independent central bank, or one that has been given a 
clear mandate to fight inflation as its over-riding priority, might lead to inadequate 
output stabilisation. But what is the verdict of the data? How effective is the 
delegation in ehminating the inflationary bias, and what is the cost (if there is one) 
in terms of growth? In the next section, we take a closer look on the empirical 
evidence.
3.2.2 Empirical Findings
There is a widespread belief that there exists a negative link between inflation and 
central bank independence (e.g. Alesina and Gatti, 1995, and Alesina and Summers, 
1993). In this section we present the findings of the empirical hterature regarding 
this relationship.
Grilli et al. (1991) find a significant negative relation between their legal mea­
sure of central bank independence and the rate of inflation for 18 GEGD countries. 
Gukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) -henceforth OWN- also find a negative rela­
tion for developed countries but are unable to establish a significant effect of legal 
independence for developing economies. To cope with this issue they proxy central 
bank independence with the actual frequency of change of the CEO of the bank, 
which is found to be positively correlated with inflation. So, developing countries
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that regularly replace the central banker face higher inflation rates than countries 
with a lower turnover rate. Romer (1993) uses a CWN index which is based on 
an aggregation of the legal index and the governor’s turnover rate index (‘Overall 
index’).^ This ranking basically reflects the degree of central bank dependence and 
enters Romer’s regressions of inflation on openness with a significant positive sign. 
However, Campiilo and Miron (1996) do not find a significant relationship between 
inflation and central bank independence, and this result comes independently of the 
choice of the index as they try both the legal and the overall one.
A criticism that is often made on empirical studies supporting the existence 
of a negative link between the degree of CB independence and inflation is that 
there may be a two-way causafity in the results. That is, a factor that does not 
appear in the regressions might affect both the inflation rates and the degree of 
central bank independence. For example, distaste for inflation or past inflation 
experience might have led to lower current rates of inflation and more independent 
monetary institutions. Moreover, Cukierman et al (1992) describe the relation as 
a “vicious circle”. Less independence contributes to higher inflation, and higher 
inflation encourages processes that make it easier for the government to influence 
monetary poficy. Especially the turnover rate of governors that they use as a proxy 
for developing countries’ degree of central bank independence might be the outcome 
of such a process. However, estimating their model with two-stage least squares 
and instrumenting the turnover variable with the turnover variable in the previous 
decade, does not induce a deterioration of the results.
But the strongest criticism on the case for central bank independence has re­
cently come from Posen (1998). In a study of 17 OECD countries for 1950-1989 
he finds no evidence to support the hypothesis that the mechanism by which cen­
tral bank independence leads to low inflation is the enhancement of credibility of 
commitments to price stability. Posen tests four predictions. First, “Where cen­
tral bank independence is greater, the cost of disinflation should be lower, ceteris
“^ This is an indicator developed to create a comparable measure of independence across the 
authors’ two sub-samples (developed and developing countries). Data are from Table 11 of CWN.
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paribus" . The rationale here is that since announcements should be more credible 
when made from an independent monetary policy authority, and since a monetary 
tightening should lead to a recession only when the growth rate of the money stock 
falls more than expected, the disinflation costs should be lower with an independent 
central bank. Second, “Where central bank independence is greater, nominal wage 
rigidity should be greater” . This follows from the expectation that private agents 
interacting in a low-inflation and low-inflation-uncertainty environment would prefer 
to be engaged in longer nominal contracts in order to avoid costs incurred through 
renegotiating, information gathering, etc. Third, “A higher level of inflation at the 
beginning of any disinflationary episode should result in lower costs of disinflation 
(holding nominal wage rigidity constant)”. This testable prediction is derived from 
the fact that if we know that a low inflation environment is associated with central 
bank independence, this will lead to greater nominal rigidities, and higher costs 
of disinflating, other things being equal. Finally, the fourth testable prediction is 
“Where central bank independence is greater, disinflation from time of implementa­
tion of contractionary policy should be faster” . This follows from the fact that two 
things happen: the CB sets the lag between the announcement and implementation 
of policy for all contracts to adjust. Second, when contracts expire, agents engaged 
in these nominal contracts have the incentive to reset their nominal wage demands 
according to the CB’s announced target. When the policy reaflses the inflation 
adjusts instantly.
The findings of Posen are remarkable: he finds that in countries with high central 
bank independence disinflations do not cost less (and are not speedier), nominal wage 
rigidities are not greater and monetisation of deficits is just as likely as in countries 
where monetary policy is directly controlled by the government.
It also has to be argued that the results on the effect of central bank independence 
on inflation are sensitive to the index employed. Legal indices which constitute a 
good proxy for actual independence should be used for developed countries, whereas 
indices like the turnover rate of governors should be used for developing countries.
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In our empirical analysis we incorporate all three measures of central bank indepen­
dence offered in CWN: the legal ranking, the turnover rate of governors, and the 
overall index that combines both.
Summarising, the literature has delivered both theoretical and empirical argu­
ments in favour of a negative fink between inflation and the ability of the monetary 
authorities to conduct their policies independently. However, the independence of 
the monetary authorities is neither necessary nor sufficient a condition for low in­
flation. Despite the fact that it is a widely accepted idea that independent central 
banks enjoy a credibility bonus and that this translates to lower levels of inflation, 
there have been some doubts on the causality of this relation. Additionally, the 
establishment of such an independent institution does not automatically guarantee 
the solution of the dynamic inconsistency problem as there are instances that it is 
in the interest of the parties to renegotiate the contract. Naturally, there is a limit 
to the extent that independence is granted to monetary authorities as accountabil­
ity requires that there has to be a democratic control over all aspects of economic 
policy.
3.3 Openness and Inflation
Romer (1993) found and documented what seems to be a robust link: openness and 
inflation are negatively correlated. His argument is based on dynamic inconsistency. 
Unexpected monetary expansion leads to a depreciation of the real exchange rate. 
As the consequences of real depreciation are greater in more open economies, the 
benefits from an inflation surprise are decreasing in the degree of openness. In other 
words, it can be argued that economies that trade more enjoy a credibility bonus as 
their incentive to resort to surprise inflation is lessened by the fact that the resulting 
real exchange rate depreciation would have serious effects on the budget. Figure 3.2 
on the next page scatter plots average inflation and openness 1980-98 for the 70 
countries of our data-set. It can be seen from the graph that the trend is negative.
In his analysis that draws from Barro and Gordon (1983), departures of actual
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Figure 3.2: Openness and Inflation 1980-1998
inflation from expected inflation drive the departure of output from its ‘natural’ 
level. Monetary authorities by creating surprise inflation can increase output above 
its equiflbrium value. The relationship is depicted in
y = y* + /3(rr -  tt‘), (3.1)
where y is actual output, y* the natural rate, tt inflation, tt® expected inflation and 
/ ) > 0.
The policy-maker values increases in output but dislikes higher inflation. His/her 
objective function is
72/, (3.2)
where 7  > 0. Assuming rational expectations and no uncertainty the equiflbrium 
inflation is
7T^ =  TT =  7/ ) .  (3.3)
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Now, increased openness will result in reducing 7 , the benefit of increases in 
output above its natural rate. Domestic expansion increases output at home relevant 
to output abroad and, thus, reduces the relative price of domestic goods. The larger 
the fraction of goods that are purchased from abroad, the greater the cost of this 
real exchange rate depreciation.
In addition, a given expansion of domestic output will lead to higher inflation 
in a more open economy. Put differently, more open economies will have a lower (5. 
Assume that the real exchange rate is
eP*
where e is the nominal exchange rate, P* is the foreign price level, and P  is the 
domestic price level. A depreciation ( |  e) means that foreign prices in domestic 
currency rise faster. Given the impact of an output expansion on domestic prices, 
the impact on inflation is increasing with the degree of openness (amount of goods 
purchased from abroad). Moreover, increased openness causes a monetary expan­
sion to lead to a larger increase in domestic prices for a given increase in output. 
Romer’s conclusion is that policy-makers’ incentives to expand are lower in more 
open economies, and equilibrium inflation under discretion is smaller.
However, Romer’s results came under criticism from Terra (1998) who argues 
that the negative relation between openness and inflation is only significant for 
severely indebted countries (SICs) during the debt crisis. As these countries are the 
ones with less precommitment in monetary policy she argues that the link is stronger 
among them. Her formal argument is as follows: A country that has a large external 
debt will need to generate trade surpluses to make the debt repayments (external 
transfer), and to transfer resources from the private to the public sector as foreign 
debt is assumed a public sector liability (internal transfer).
Suppose we have two countries: country A which is more open (has a larger 
share of imports over its GDP), and country B which is less open. Country B will 
need a larger depreciation of the exchange rate to create the trade surplus. The
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depreciation raises the value of the external liabiÜties in domestic currency, and as 
a result more resources will have to be transferred from the private to the public 
sector. If the government achieves that through the inflation tax (seignorage), a 
higher inflation rate is the outcome. Thus, Terra concludes, the less open a country 
is, the higher its inflation will be during a debt crisis.
Romer (1998) in his reply makes the point that a borrowing country can run a 
trade deflcit rather than a surplus, and that there is no evidence that SICs run larger 
surpluses than other countries or that their trade balances moved more towards 
surplus during the debt crisis. He argues that the negative link is not just due to 
the SICs during the debt crisis. Instead, he makes the point that the variation with 
indebtedness largely reflects the fact that countries that become more indebted were 
ones that had less successfully solved the commitment problem in monetary policy.
In a recent study, al-Nowaihi, Levine and Mandilaras (2001) study open economy 
effects in the context of a pofltical business cycle model. Consider a world of n +  1 
identical interdependent economies. It is assumed that monetary authority i at time 
t adopts a standard intertemporal loss function of the form St{Lit) where
T = t  ^
T — t
k v  +  >^i(2/ir -ÿ)^]. (3.4)
.1 + .^
Equation (3.4) says that the monetary authority has a preference for zero inflation 
and is averse to deviations from an output level y. In this setting, it is assumed 
that the monetary authority uses inflation as its instrument. This can be regarded 
as inflation targets set by the central bank.
Output is given by
y == -  t ” -  £ - i {t '“)] + ^  ^ TT; -  e, (3.5)
i=l
where ÿ G [0, 1] is a parameter such that 1 — ÿ expresses the degree of openness of 
the economies and measures the impact of a domestic inflation surprise on domestic 
output, r^, are VAT and income tax rates respectively and e is a supply shock.
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Also, Pi = [og{Yi/Yi) % — Y i)/Y i  is the proportional change in output relative
to Fi, the steady-state natural rate path, and = TTi — S-i{'iri) indicates a CPI 
inflation surprise. The parameters (j) and ^ are given by
(3-6)
where a = (C /Y ) / ( l  — G/Y), G /Y  and G /Y  are consumption and government 
spending expressed as proportions of baseline output respectively, p  is capital’s 
share of output, 72 is a consumer preference parameter for imported private (non­
government) goods such that 7172 is the share of these goods in total consumption.
Country 0 is assumed to have an independent central bank with a degree of 
conservatism 60 =  1/6. The remaining n  central banks are not independent and 
have preferences described by 6^  =  1/6^ if a ‘Left’ government is in power and 
hi = 1/ 6# if a ‘Right’ government is in office where 6 < 6# < 6#. In each period, 
there is an exogenous probability p, of a Right government being elected and a 
probability (1 — p) of a Left government being elected. The sequencing of events is 
as follows:
1. In the initial period t = 0 the CB in country 0 is appointed with a preference 
60 =  1/ 6. Government 0 is committed to this choice in all future periods.
2. Fiscal policy is set consisting of the tax rule 
1 + Rr  = G /Y l -
. l - b #
1 (1 -  miT)d ^  G /Y  +  (R -  p)(l -  m7r)d (3.7)
and a constant proportion of deflatable debt m. Initial debt and m  is the same 
for all countries. The beginning-of-period debt/GDP ratio is denoted by d, R  
and g are the real interest and GDP growth rates, and r  =  is the total
tax rate (assuming income tax and VAT are the sole sources of tax revenue).
3. In each country nominal wages are set based on expected inflation next period.
4. The governments determining monetary policy in countries 1 to n are elected.
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5. The common supply shock occurs in each economy.
6 . The CBs independently and simultaneously set inflation in response to obser­
vations of the shock.
The choice of conservatism at event 1 is treated as exogenous, and the authors 
solve the game from event 2 onwards. Proceeding by backwards induction at event 
6, the effect of an inflation surprise, tt, in country 0 is to reduce the debt/GDP ratio 
permanently by an amount mdir. The expected welfare loss is therefore given by
S[L] =  7T^ + b { y - y f  
1
+  S 
+  S
1 + S 
1
K(ÿ +  (-Ri -  g)md)îti P ^ { R -  g)mdÎT -  y f  
— (R2 -  g)md)TT2 + i { R -  g)md7T -  y f (3.8)
The first order condition with respect to t t  is
TT + b^ [(j) + {R -  g)md] {y -  y)
^)md^)(((ÿ +  (Ri -  g)md)7ri + ( ( R -  g)mdn -  y)1 + 6 
1
=  0.
(((R -  p)md7r)(g(ÿ +  (jRs -  p)md)^2 +  ( ( R -  g)mdTt -  y)
(3.9)
In (3.9) the real interest rate on debt is calculated before the current shock, whereas 
the inflation rate is set having observed the shock. Hence S{R i7Ti ) =  0. Using 
+  ( ïà p  +  “  ~  and applying analogous reasoning to the other countries, the 
authors derive the first order conditions:
7T +  b^ y> - \ -{R -  g)md]{y - y )  + ^ { R -  g)mdô ^[C{R -  g)md7r -  y] = 0 (3 .10)
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for country 0, and
7TR + A ( R -  g)md]{yR - y ) p ^ { R -  g)mdô~' [^l {^R -  g)mdîÏR -  y] =  0, 
ttl + bL^ [(j) P { R -  g)md\{yL -  y) P ^{R -  g)mdô~'^[^{R -  g)mdîrL - y \  = 0(3.11)
for countries l,2,...,n. (3.11) applies to up Right and n[l — p) Left administrations 
respectively.
The inflation rates are then decomposed into two parts: an inflation bias iTi 
which depends on the type of monetary authority and beginning-of-period debt, 
and a term tt which is dependent on the current observed shock. Corresponding to 
this composition output is written yi = ÿi-\- yi] i = 0,1,- -n. The authors first solve 
for the inflation bias and equiflbrium non-shock contingent output. At event 3 of 
the game expectations are given by
5_i(7t) =  S-; £ _ i{w i)= p w [ i+ { l-p )w L ,i= l ,2 ,- - - ,n ,  (3.12)
where from (3.10) and (3.11)
w + b^[<t>+(l + S -^ ){R -g )m d ]{ÿ -y )  = 0, (3.13)
7rR + bR^[^+(l + ô -^ ){R -g )m d l(ÿ K -ÿ )  = 0, (3.14)
lTL +  6L?[0 +  (l +  r* ) (Â -f f )m d ](ÿ i-ÿ )  =  G. (3.15)
For country 0 substituting (3.11), the second spillover term in (3.5) is given by
n n
-  S-l{7Ti)] = n[p7T#+ (1 - p )7Tl], (3.16)
i= i j = i
where ttr = ttr — S^ i (tvr) and = ttr — £_i(7t#). Hence using (3.5) we have that 
S-i{y) — 0. Then noting that the Ramsey-Keynes rule implies that R — g = 6, and
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using the first order condition (3.13) for country 0 the authors arrive at
ÿ = 0] TT = b^{^-\-{l-\-ô)md)ÿ. (3.17)
The authors also go on to show that assuming weights 6# > 6# > 6 for a Left 
government-dependent CB, a Right government-dependent CB and an independent 
CB respectively, the corresponding inflation biases and output, in the absence of 
shocks, satisfy > W# > ^, p =  0, p# < 0 and > 0 .
More importantly for the purposes of this chapter, given the inflation of other 
countries, this model predicts that the inflationary bias decreases with openness and 
central bank independence, and increases with the deflatable debt-GDP ratio and the 
bliss level of output relative to the equilibrium level which is approximately equal to 
the equilibrium unemployment rate.
3.4 The Role of Structural Unemployment
Figure 3.3 on the following page (again taken from al-Nowaihi et al, 2001) shows 
that unanticipated monetary expansions lead to an increase in real economic activ­
ity and a corresponding decrease in unemployment below the natural rate. The ex 
ante optimal policy consistent with rational expectations (on the Long-Run P hillips 
Curve) is zero inflation at point P. This requires precommitment to enforce. If the 
rule, though, does not come with enough enforcement power, the policy-maker can 
choose a point on the Short-Run Phillips Curve to reach a utility curve closer to 
the bliss point B  (full employment), at point C. This is a ‘cheating’ pohcy in which 
private agents expect zero inflation, but non-zero inflation is deflvered. However, in 
a rational expectations equilibrium the private sector anticipates the calculation of 
the policy-maker. As high inflation is anticipated, we end up on LRPC  with employ­
ment back to the natural rate and high inflation at point D. PD  is the inflationary 
bias. Thus, benefits arise in the short-run as an effect of expansionary monetary 
policy, but not in the long-run (due to the rational expectations hypothesis). In
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Figure 3.3: The Inflationary Bias
fact, the benefits arise when the policy-maker views the natural rate as excessive. 
This can happen if distortions from income taxation, unemployment compensation, 
etc., make the average level of privately chosen work and production too low. It 
follows that higher natural levels of unemployment might be associated with higher 
levels of inflation given the incentive of the policy-makers to reduce unemployment 
in the short-run.
We can also introduce open economy effects in the mechanism. If countries 
cooperate in the choice of inflation rates then the short-run Phillips curve (SRPC)  
is flatter and we end up with a higher inflation rate PD'. Thus in the absence of 
precommitment we have an example of counterproductive cooperation first pointed 
out by Rogoff (1985). Without cooperation, each country is inhibited in engaging in 
surprise inflation by the resulting real exchange rate depreciation. With cooperation 
this discipline disappears and the inflation bias in equilibrium rises.
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3.5 Empirical Work
3.5.1 Sources, Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
In this section we examine whether the predictions of the theory about the effects 
of openness, debt and central bank independence on inflation hold for a group of 
selected countries. We also examine the role of structural unemployment, political 
instabihty and past inflation. Data on inflation, imports and GDP are taken from 
the International Financial Statistics (IPS) of the IMF. Central bank independence 
measures for the 1980s are from Cukierman et al (1992). Data on debt were 
obtained from Missale (1999), the IFS, and the OECD World Tables. Estimates of 
structural unemployment as a percentage of total labour force were obtained from 
Elmenskov and Scarpetta (1999). These are based on the non-accelerating wage rate 
of unemployment (NAWRU), defined as the level of unemployment which over the 
short-run (one year) is associated with stable wage inflation. The original source 
is OECD Secretariat. However, this measure of NAWRU is only available for 20 
OECD countries. To deal with the lack of data and estimate the equation with 
more degrees of freedom we (crudely) proxy NAWRU with average past inflation. 
Our political instability measure is from Woldendorp et al. (1993). It is constructed 
as the average number of days that governments stayed in office from the period 
1948 to 1989, and is available for a number of OECD countries.^
Our initial sample consists of 70 countries (countries for which the OWN indexes 
are available, minus Lebanon and Taiwan). However, the number of available ob­
servations is reduced by the inclusion of other variables for which we were unable to 
collect a complete set of information. For example, the inclusion of the debt to GDP 
ratio induces a drop in the sample as we could only obtain data for 64 countries. 
Still, the basic equation is estimated with 63 observations.
Inflation is measured as the average annual change in the log CPI from 1980 to 
1998. Where information on CPI was not available we have used the GDP deflator.
detailed list of all missing observations can be found in Appendix A.l on page 145.
A Cross-Countries Study of the Relation between Public Debt and Inflation 68
As in Romer, we will use the log of inflation in order to prevent extreme values of 
inflation from dominating the results.
Throughout our analysis we will be reporting coefficients for the whole sample, 
the OECD countries, the non-OECD countries and the member-states of the Euro­
pean Union.® However, not much credence should be placed in the results for the 
EU due to the small number of observations. Table 3.1 on the next page reports 
the means and standard deviations of the variables used in the regressions. These 
variables are:
1. the log of average inflation 1980-1998 (Log Inflation),
2. the degree of openness 1980-1998 measured as the ratio of imports over GDP 
(Openness),
3. the stock of total debt in 1980 expressed as a percentage of GDP (Debt 80),
4. the overall central bank dependence index constructed by CWN for the 1980s 
(GB Overall),
5. the legal index (CB Legal) and the turnover rate of governors index for the 
same period (TOR),
6. the measure of pofltical stabiflty (Stability) from Woldendorp et al. (1993),
7. the log real GDP per capita (Log Real GDP) from Summers and Heston (1991), 
and
8. the average inflation rate 1948-1980 (Past Inflation).^
The table shows that the OECD and EU countries have been more successful 
than the developing countries in containing inflation, both before and after 1980. 
Additionally, the stock of debt in 1980 was almost 50 % lower for the richer countries. 
During the period 1980-89 the central bankers stayed longer in office, but the average
®See Appendix A.2 on page 148 for the grouping of countries.
"^ Past inflation is measured as the average of the annual percent change of the deflator index.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics 
All OECD Non-Oecd EU15
Variable Mean StDev Mean StDev Mean StDev Mean StDev
Log Inflation -3.00 1.12 -3.72 0.7 -2.63 1.12 -3.8 0.5
Openness 0.36 0.26 0.33 0.17 0.37 0.29 0.38 0.19
Debt 80 0.40 0.37 0.31 0.16 0.45 0.44 0.33 0.19
CB Overall 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.19 0.06 0.08 0.05
GB Legal 0.34 0.12 0.37 0.15 0.33 0.1 0.38 0.15
TOR 0.24 0.19 0.15 0.11 0.29 0.21 0.13 0.09
Instability - - 6.49 0.39 - - 6.44 0.44
Past Inflation 0.12 0.18 0.07 0.35 0.15 0.21 0.07 0.03
Log Real GDP 8.26 1.04 8.92 0.75 7.92 0.22 8.93 0.73
NAWRU - - 0.08 0.04 — - 0.09 0.04
legal index is similar for all sub-samples. Similarly, the degree of openness does not 
differ considerably between the rich and the developing countries. Scatter plots of 
the independent variables with inflation are shown in Figure 3.4 on the following 
page.® The visual impression is that debt, past inflation, the overall central bank 
index, and NAWRU are positively correlated with inflation, whereas the relations 
with the legal index and the turnover rate are not easily identiflable.
Tables 3.2 on page 71, 3.3 on page 72, 3.4 on page 73, and 3.5 on page 74 display 
the sample correlations among the variables. Some early observations follow: First, 
the negative link between inflation and openness is considerably stronger for the 
developing countries. If the richer economies have indeed solved the problem of 
dynamic inconsistency to an extent, the credibility mechanism described in section 
3.3 will not come into effect. However, we measure the effect of openness with 
greater confidence in the empirical analysis that will follow.
Second, the effect of debt on the inflation rate is of considerable magnitude in 
the case of developing countries (correlation r  =  0.23). It has been argued that 
developed economies make flttle use of the inflation tax (see GrilÜ et a/., 1991), and, 
indeed, the correlation of debt with inflation is less than half of the corresponding 
non-OECD value. Nevertheless, it is positive.
®We exclude openness since we have already seen a similar graph (page 59).
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Figure 3.4: Scatter Plots
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Third, the overall central bank dependence index is positively correlated with 
inflation in all sub-samples. The legal measure has the expected sign for the rich 
countries, and is also positive for the developing ones. However, for the latter the 
best measure is the turnover rate of the CEO of the bank, which as we can see from 
table 3.4 is positively correlated with inflation.
Past inflation exhibits a positive correlation with inflation in all sub-samples, 
but is of higher magnitude in the case of the OECD and EU countries. The real 
GDP’s correlation with inflation is of a small magnitude throughout. NAWRU, as 
expected, displays positive correlation with both inflation and past inflation (for 
reasons explained in section 3.4), justifying the use of the latter as a proxy for 
NAWRU. The stabiflty variable is negatively correlated with EU inflation, but all 
results regarding the European Union should be interpreted with caution as the 
number of observations are not sufficient for a robust estimation.
3.5.2 M ain Results
The estimations have been carried out with OLS using the White robust covariance 
matrix, and thus, are corrected for heteroscedasticity. Table 3.6 on page 77 reports 
the estimated coefficients of a regression of the log of inflation on openness, debt, past 
inflation, and the overall index of CWN. We also report the estimated parameters 
dropping past inflation from the specification. We can see that the coefficients enter 
the equation with the right signs in all sub-samples, except from the coefficient of 
past inflation whose effect and significance varies. They are also significant in the 
1 percent level in most cases. Estimating the model without past inflation does 
not change the results significantly except in the case of OECD countries where the 
coefficients of debt and openness lose their significance.
An interesting point is that average past inflation is positive and significant for 
the rich countries. Campillo and Mirron (1996) -henceforth CM- offer the expla­
nation that it is possible that high inflation induces investments in technologies for 
avoiding the costs of inflation. Once these are developed they are not costly to use.
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and thus they reduce future aversion to inflation. CM claim that such technologies 
might be easier to develop in high income countries. They also confirm the negative 
effect of openness on inflation, and the use of the inflation tax.
It has to be noted that the results on the role of the degree of central bank 
independence in Table 3.6 are sensitive to the index being used. In agreement with 
CM, when we estimate the model with the legal index we do not find any significant 
effects. On the other hand, the turnover rate of governors (TOR) seems to be a 
good explanatory variable. Quite surprisingly, we even find a significant effect in 
the OECD sample. We include these estimations in Appendix A.3 on page 149.^
But how sensitive are these results to the inclusion of additional explaining vari­
ables? The next table shows the change in the estimated coefficients when we also 
add the real GDP per capita to the specification. Data are from Penn World Tables 
(Summers and Heston, 1991). Additionally, the regression for the whole sample 
includes a dummy for eighteen rich countries, as identified in Romer (1993).
It can be observed that the coefficients and their significance do not change 
much. The coefficient of real GDP per capita is only significant in the rich countries 
samples, and it comes with a positive sign as in CM.^° In contrast -and consistent 
with Romer (1993)- we find that the rich countries have experienced significantly 
lower inflation rates. The coefficient of the high income countries’ dummy variable is 
negative and significant. In other estimations (which we do not report), we have also 
included our political stability variable or the political instability index used in Barro 
(1991).^  ^ Both estimations produced insignificant coefficients for these variables and 
very similar results with those reported in the tables in all other aspects.
Thus, we can conclude the following: more open countries face lower inflation 
rates, more indebted countries use the inflation tax more, and countries whose mon­
etary institutions are more dependent are more likely to experience higher inflation
^Appendix A.4 on page 149 reviews the ‘free lunch’ hypothesis that the establishment of an 
independent central bank comes at no cost in terms of output variance.
stress the same argument they use to explain the positive sign of past inflation: rich 
countries adapt more easily to inflation.
^^Political instability is measured as the number of coups and revolutions per year.
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Table 3.7: All Variables^
Variable All OECD Non-OECD BU15
Constant -3.24* -6.73* -3.32** -6.5*
(-3.28) (-11.5) (-2.68) (-31.5)
Openness -1.91* -1.0 -2.21* -1.61*
(-6.51) (-1.6) (-6.58) (-7.7)
Debt 80 0.67* 1.15* 0.72* 1.43*
(3.6) (3.59) (3.52) (17.03)
CB Overall 6.2* 9.28* 6.24* 9.3*
(4.16) (11.0) (3.56) (44.67)
Past Inflation 0.1 12.18* -0.15 13.57*
(0.12) (6.4) (-0.2) (11.35)
Log Real GDP -0.03 0.16* -0.00 0.14*
(0.28) (3.36) (-0.03) (6.12)
Dummy -0.37** - - —
(-2.1) - - -
Adj. R squared
F-statistic
Sample
0.56
14.4
63
0.77
16.54
24
0.45
7.33
39
0.96
69.16
15
N ote. Same as Table 3.6.
rates. Note though that the latter finding is conditional upon the index used. Past 
inflation, which we use as a proxy for structural unemployment does well in ex­
plaining inflation in the OECD and EU sub-samples, but is insignificant for the 
developing countries and the overall sample.
A regression specification error test (RESET) of the basic specification of Ta­
ble 3.6 on the preceding page does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis that 
the model is correctly specified (RESET F statistic is 1.28).
It is worth mentioning that the debt to GDP ratio is positive and significant for 
the high income (OECD and EU) countries. Consequently, a higher initial stock of 
debt is associated with higher future inflation rates even for developed economies 
that are usually assumed not to monetise debts. This comes in contrast to Grilli et 
al. (1991), but reinforces the results of CM (1996).
We have also tested for the possibility that it is the deflatable proportion of debt
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that creates inflation. Countries with higher shares of inflation-sensitive instruments 
(e.g. long-term nominal debt) are generally more likely to face higher inflation rates 
as the public understands the incentive of the government to create surprise inflation. 
The government then simply validate these increased inflationary expectations. 
This well-known result is predicted by Missale and Blanchard (1994) and Mandilaras 
and Levine (2001).
However, the data do not seem to support this idea. It is the total level of 
debt to GDP that is inflationary and not the fraction of it that can be inflated 
away. Estimation of the model with deflatable debt over GDP in the place of total 
debt over GDP does not yield any significant results. A possible explanation for 
this might be that the causality which runs the other way round is more robust: 
higher inflation expectations induce a change in the debt management strategy. The 
government issues less deflatable debt to signal its non-inflationary intentions. This 
line of thought predicts a negative relation between the share of inflation-sensitive 
instruments (as a fraction of total debt) and inflation. So, estimating a model where 
we have substituted deflatable debt over GDP with the share of inflation-sensitive 
instruments (deflatable debt over total debt), and controlling for total debt, would 
probably capture this negative relation. However, the inabiflty to estabflsh a positive 
relationship between inflation and deflatable debt might just be data-originated, as 
we only have 17 observations available.
The predictions of the theory are also validated from the data when we use 
NAWRU instead of past inflation. We have obtained four observations (1986, 
1990, 1995, 1998) on the estimated non-accelerating wage rate of unemployment 
(NAWRU) for twenty OECD countries (we also carry out the estimation for a smaller 
sub-sample of 13 EU countries). We use the mean of these four observations as a 
proxy for structural unemployment over our sample period, and we use this together 
with openness, debt, and the central bank index as explaining variables. The results 
of Table 3.8 on the next page show a significant positive effect of NAWRU on the 
inflation rate, and the other variables have the effect predicted by our theory. The
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Table 3.8: The Role of NAWRU^
Constant Openness Debt 80 CB overall NAWRU
OECD -4.99* -0.81 0.81** 10.59* 4.7*
(-20.18) (-1.10) (1.95) (13.21) (3.07)
EU -4.68* -1.87* 1.27* 10.68* 3.5*
(-22.9) (-6.3) (6.24) (9.99) (4.6)
Adj R-sq. 0.66 (OECD) 0.87 (EU) F-stat 7.2 (OECD) 20.8 (EU)
N ote. Same as in Table 3.6.
only qualification is that for the OECD as a whole, openness although correctly 
signed is not significant at the 10 percent level.
3.6 Some Final Remarks
In this chapter we have briefly reviewed the literature on the effects of central bank 
independence and openness on monetary policy. We have also tested the predictions 
of the theory using an up-to-date data-set with as many degrees of freedom as 
possible. The main findings are that openness is negatively associated with inflation, 
higher debts bring higher future inflation rates, and that the degree of central bank 
independence is relevant to the conduct of prudent monetary policy.
We have also examined the role of structural unemployment for a smaller subset 
of OECD countries and found that it is indeed associated with higher levels of 
inflation. Past inflation experience (which we use to proxy NAWRU) is a relevant 
variable for the developed countries. Our comprehensive cross-sectional analysis, 
which has built on Romer (1993) and Campillo and Miron (1996), has also shown 
that the level of debt is a significant determinant of monetary policies.
Summarising, given the economics profession’s current stock of knowledge, ar­
guing that inflation is dead is rather premature. Despite this acknowledgement, 
active research promotes our understanding of the nature of this phenomenon and 
identifies policies that are ‘rewarded’ with lower inflation rates. This chapter is an 
effort in this direction. And, indeed, we have confirmed the relevance of fiscal pohcy
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in determining inflation across countries. Moreover, there seems to exist a ‘globali­
sation effect’, or, in other words, a trend which shows that countries engaged more 
actively in trade (more open economies) face lower inflation rates. Assuming that 
the current trend of increasingly integrating economies continues, one can only be 
optimistic at least with regard to containing increases in the price levels.
In the next section, we examine the effects of higher inflationary expectations on 
the structure of debt.
CHAPTER 4
Public Debt and Inflation: The Role of Inflation-Sensitive 
Instruments
4.1 Introduction
In light of an integrated world economy the issue of public debt becomes even more 
intriguing. For example, the Stability and Growth Pact adopted by the European 
Union in 1997 carries a number of implications for the choice of fiscal policies (e.g. 
Beetsma and Uhlig, 1999). There are several issues that can be examined in the 
context of debt analysis. A starting point could be the study of the short-run and 
long-run macroeconomic implications of the issuance of government securities. Such 
a query is relevant as a strand of the literature argues that Ricardian Equivalence 
holds: the way a policy-maker decides to finance government expenditure -through 
debt or taxes- does not matter.
If debt matters, though, a policy-maker can maximise a social welfare function 
by deciding on the fraction of government expenditure that will be financed with 
new debt, and by actively choosing the combination of the available instruments
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employed for that purpose. The debt manager can choose from a variety of instru­
ments including short-term and long-term securities, nominal, price-indexed and 
financially indexed bonds, domestic and foreign currency debt, etc. In the pub­
lic debt management literature, it has been shown that governments can succeed 
in implementing welfare-maximising policies (for example policies aiming to reduce 
variations in prices and taxes), if they choose the right maturity and contingencies 
structure of debt (e.g. Barro, 1997).
Another important dimension of government debt management is the effect that 
different strategies might have on the time-inconsistency problem. Indexation and 
maturity can play a significant role in affecting the incentives of future policy-makers 
(Lucas and Stokey, 1983). Persson et al. (1988) show that the optimal fiscal and 
monetary policy can be made time-consistent under discretion if each government 
leaves to its successor a particular maturity structure of debt, and both nominal and 
real bonds are traded. In other words, debt management can affect the incentives 
of the government in order to follow an optimal plan in the future.
This chapter focuses on the choice between debt instruments with high infiation 
elasticity (or defiatabie debt) and instruments with low (or zero) inffation elasticity. 
-In other words, we categorise the different kinds of debt according to the sensitivity 
of their returns to infiation. We define as infiat ion-sensitive instruments the kinds 
of debt whose returns are negatively correlated with unexpected infiation. In this 
group we include nominal long-term bonds denominated in domestic currency. We 
regard price-indexed, foreign currency, and short-maturity debt as ‘non-sensitive’ in 
the sense that these instruments cannot be infiated away and investors enjoy returns 
that cannot be eroded by surprise infiation.
The question we ask is whether changes in the perception of the public about 
future infiation affect the amount of defiatabie debt issued by the government, and 
to what extent. We are also interested in identifying the mechanism that provides 
the link and integrate it with the literature on credibility. Building on Missale and 
Blanchard (1994) we produce a model that allows for the joint determination of infia-
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tion and the share of inflation-sensitive instruments. We introduce the preference of 
the government for a chosen level of deflatable liabiÜties into their loss function and 
consider the non-commitment solution. We show that the model impfles a sub-game 
perfect equilibrium involving a negative relation between inflationary expectations 
and the share of inflation-sensitive debt. In other words, higher expected inflation 
induces a change in debt management: the government issues more instruments of 
lower inflation elasticity in order to enhance its credibility.
The model is presented in section 4.2. In section 4.3, we use panel data estimation 
methods to measure quantitatively the effect of our finding. Section 4.4 concludes 
the chapter.
4.2 The M odel
This section extends the Missale and Blanchard model (henceforth MB) to allow 
for the joint determination of inflation and the proportion of inflation-sensitive debt 
issued by the government. Unlike MB, in this chapter we do not rely on trigger 
strategies to enforce an outcome better than the non-commitment equilibrium. Trig­
ger strategy equifibria, although sub-game perfect are not “renegotiation-proof” and 
this raises questions about the credibility of such equilibria (al-Nowaihi and Levine, 
1994). We therefore confine ourselves to non-commitment solutions to the govern­
ment’s problem without trigger strategies. We assume that the debt management 
decision-making takes place in two stages. In the first stage the government chooses 
an optimal proportion of inflation-sensitive debt fh to smooth taxes over time and 
across states of nature.^ At this stage, credibility considerations have not yet been 
taken into account. Once time-consistency is considered, in stage two, we will show 
that the government issues ^  m, which is suboptimal.^
^rh is assumed a country-specific time-invariant constant. The public debt literature suggests 
that m  depends on structural inflexibilities that prevent economies from adjusting to shocks, but 
we leave this re-specification of the model for future research. For an in-depth analysis see Missale 
(1999), chapter 5.
^See also Missale (1999), chapter 6.
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The hterature in public debt management is not yet conclusive regarding the 
kinds of debt that should be preferred by debt managers. The selected instruments 
may reflect several underlying economic conditions; credibflity problems, supply or 
demand shocks hitting the economy, or simply the need to buy insurance from the 
private sector. In this chapter we identify the preference of the government for at 
least some nominal long-term debt denominated in domestic currency. The role of 
such debt in cases where output shocks are negatively correlated with unexpected 
inflation is quite obvious; the government will have to pay lower returns to bond 
holders when output and consequently the tax base are surprisingly low. In that 
way taxes are smoothed over time and across states of nature. This shock-absorbing 
role of nominal debt is even more apparent during wars or crises (e.g. oil shocks). 
Generally, nominal debt is a better hedging instrument than price-indexed debt if 
productivity and public spending shocks prevail (see Missale, 1997 and 1999). The 
optimal share of nominal bonds is increasing in the covariance of inflation with 
public spending and decreasing in the covariance of inflation and output.
The presence of nominal liabilities allows the government to use a combination 
of taxes (including the inflation tax) during output or public spending shocks. This 
idea is pictured in Bohn (1988): given a shock that affects the government’s budget, 
the changes in the path of prices will reduce the real value of debt, thus requiring 
less distortionary taxes to be raised. We do not explicitly model these responses 
to shocks. To keep the modelling tractable we capture these stabilisation reasons 
for issuing nominal long-term debt in a single term (m). In Calvo and Guidotti 
(1990b) we also find a role for nominal debt even if price-indexed debt is available. 
They argue that full price indexation is not necessarily optimal, because the gov­
ernment would be completely prevented from applying the inflation tax on bonds to 
smooth out conventional taxes. In Fischer (1983) “The best of all possible worlds, 
if governments acted optimally, might be one in which governments had the option 
of imposing a capital levy in this way in emergencies like wars” . But that is, if  
governments acted optimally. In other words, the issuance of long-term nominal
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securities creates an incentive for the government to resort to surprise inflation and 
this raises the credibiflty issue.^
The credibility considerations involving the issuance of nominal public debt have 
triggered a boost in the relevant literature. In our analysis we also take up this issue; 
our model shows that given the government’s preferences, if the government can fully 
precommit itself to future inflation and a certain structure of public debt, then it can 
also set the share of debt instruments with high inflation sensitivity to the desired 
level m. However, in the absence of government precommitment, our specification 
calls for a negative relationship between the share of deflatable debt and inflationary 
expectations. In an environment where expectations about future levels of inflation 
are increasing, the government in our model switches to other debt instruments 
that enhance its credibility (short-term bonds, real or foreign currency debt, etc.). 
However, the degree of issuance of incentive-compatible securities should be carried 
out with prudence (e.g. Giovannini 1997). The Mexican crisis is an example of a 
situation where the effort to acquire credibility through the debt markets resulted 
in a disaster.^
Taking the above into consideration we construct the government’s single period 
loss function:
-  7T() +  cTt +  ^(m  -  m tf ,  (4.1)
where irt and Trf are the inflation rate and the rational expectations of inflation 
respectively, Tt is total taxation and rut is the proportion of inflation-sensitive debt.
The first term reflects the costs of inflation, the second the benefits of surprise 
inflation arising from the labour market; if wage contracts are nominal then an in­
flation surprise reduces the real wage and unemployment. The third term represents
^Note, though, Dornbusch (1998) who argues that today, inflating away debts no longer works 
because the costs (higher real interest rates) are too high.
“^ Indexing debt to a (strong) foreign currency for credibility purposes entails the risk of an 
appreciation of the foreign currency and exposes the budget to exchange rate risk in the same way 
short-term debt exposes the budget to interest rate risk.
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the (linear) costs of taxation and the last term the government’s preference for do­
mestic, nominal, long-term debt for the reasons mentioned above. The accumulation 
of real debt is given by
Dt^i = (1 +  r) [1 — mt{'ïït — 7T^ )] Dt~\- G — T*, (4.2)
where Dt is the stock of debt at the beginning of period t, r is the expected real
interest rate, assumed to be constant, and G is government spending (which, in fact,
plays no role as it is also assumed constant).^ The government commits itself to a
tax rule;®
Tt = r[l-mt{7rt-7Tt)]Dt  + G, (4.3)
which implies that
Dt+i =  [1 -  rntin  -  < )] Dt, (4.4)
i.e., debt is constant in the absence of an inflation surprise. Given Dt and mt, it
follows that = Dt. The timing of events is as follows:
1. Government sets mt for the period t.
2. The private sector sets 7rf.
3. Government chooses inflation rate in period t.
In each period the government chooses its instruments mt and tt^  to minimise an 
intertemporal loss function
oo
^Equation (4.2) is a linear approximation of the debt accumulation identity, valid for small 
TTt, 7rf, and r.
®This is the optimal rule under tax-smoothing and constant government spending. See Missale 
(1991) and Missale and Blanchard (1994).
Public Debt and Inflation: The Role of Inflation-Sensitive Instruments 88
We now need to distinguish the optimal policy with commitment and the time- 
consistent optimal policy in the absence of commitment. If the government could 
commit at event 1 to inflation and maturity rates, then it would put tt® =  tt* (con­
sequently Dt+i = Dt) and minimise
OO / -j \   ^ 1
(^ 1 + 7 / +  (^rDt+i +  -  (m  -  m t + i f ] .
Clearly, the solution to this optimization problem is
7T( =  0, mt = rh. (4.6)
Thus we have the result:
T heorem  1. I f a credible commitment mechanism was in place that allowed govern­
ment to commit to future inflation and maturity rates, then the equilibrium consists 
of zero inflation and an optimal proportion m  of inflation-sensitive debt
In the absence of an external commitment mechanism, it can be shown (as in MB) 
that a trigger strategy can sustain an equilibrium ttJ', mj where 0 ^  ^  TTt', mt ^
^  m where tt^ , mt is the non-commitment solution derived below. However, for 
reasons we have discussed we do not allow for trigger strategy equilibria and we focus 
on the time consistent equilibrium. To find this (sub-game perfect) equilibrium to 
this infinitely repeated game we proceed applying the one-stage deviation principle 
(which within each period implies backward induction) at event 3.
Event 3. Choice of tt^ .
Using (4.1) equation (4.5) can be written as:
Vt = Lt + Y ^ V t+ i  = l-n-? -  6(7T( -  TT^  +  cr[l -  mt{iTt -  < )]A
+ la (m  -  m t f  + j ^ [ c r ( A + i  +  +  •••)]
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-{-terms in ‘7rt+i,7rt+2i'^t+ii'^t+2i'^+h'^t+2’-- (4.7)
Equation (4.7) expresses Vt in terms of the inflation rate in period t and ail future 
inflation rates. The effect of an inflation surprise in period t is to reduce debt to 
A+i = [1 — m((7T( — 7rf)] Dt permanently. Thus, the debt terms in (4.7) may be 
written as
[1 -  mt {ïït -  Txf)] A .
Hence (4.7) may be written as
Vt =  Itt?  -  h{Kt -  TT?) +  E I M  [1 _  mt (vr, -  < )]  A +
i a  (m -  m t f  +  terms in n+i, TTt+2 , T^ t+i^  7r^2, mt+i,mt+2 ‘-> (4.8)
To obtain a time-consistent solution the government minimises Vt with respect to 
TTt given,7T®, mt and future policies. The first order and the second order conditions 
are:
7Tf -  6 -   ^^  ^ crmtDt = 0, (4.9)
and
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Thus, the loss-minimising choice of inflation given tt®, mt and future policies is
TTt = b p  cr(l + S~^)mtDt = TTt (mt). (4.10)
Event 2. Rational expectations.
given by (4.10) in this perfect foresight set-up.
Event 1. Choice of mt.
The government chooses mt given the reaction function (4.10), tt® =  tt* and Dt+i = 
Dt, i.e., mt is chosen to minimise
A  =  (TTf {mt)Ÿ +  crDt P ^ a { m -  m t f  , (4.11)
with respect to mt, given Dt. The first and second order conditions are:
dLt dlTt / — \ n7T(- a{m — mt) = 0,
dmt dmt
and
dm? V dmt j  dm?T —T +  a > 0.
Hence using (4.10)
(4,12)
For the non-commitment (time-consistent) equilibrium, inflation and the share 
of inflation-sensitive instruments are jointly determined simultaneously by equations
Public Debt and Inflation: The Role of Inflation-Sensitive Instruments 91
(4.10) and (4.12). Letting =  cr’(l +  6 ^)Dt the reduced form of mt  is given by
m — ^  ^
mt = ----------- < m  (4.13)
14- a
if A  > 0. Thus we have the result:
Theorem  2. In the time-consistent equilibrium the proportion of inflation-sensitive 
debt is below its optimal level.
Before turning to the empirical section we have to add some realism to the way 
we have modelled the conduct of monetary policy. The monetary instrument in our 
set-up is the inflation rate, but monetary authorities do not of course ‘set inflation’. 
However, they can conduct policy through inflation targets. If we assume that 
inflation outcomes are given by tt^  =  Trf 4- where 7if is planned inflation and ct is 
a random zero-mean shock, then the preceding analysis goes through except that 
actual inflation in (4.10) and (4.12) must be replaced with expected (i.e. planned) 
inflation. In the next section we estimate equation (4.12) with tt® instead of tta 
Prom equation (4.10) we can see that there is an endogeneity problem which the 
econometrics does address. Prom the reduced form (4.13) we see that changes in h 
cause mt and irt to move in opposite directions. Thus if the preference parameter b is 
the main source of changes between countries and over time, then we would observe 
a negative relation between mt and ttj. The reduced form shows an unambiguously 
negative relation between mt and debt. Thus consistent with the model we have:
C onjecture 1. Increased inflationary expectations and initial debt leads to issuance 
of less deflatable debt; this could mean a shortening of the maturity or issuance of 
instruments with low (or zero) inflation elasticity: variable-rate debt, price-indexed 
debt or foreign currency debt.
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4.3 Panel Data Estimation
4.3.1 D escriptive Statistics
The empirical analysis of this section aims to validate Conjecture 1 that the pro­
portion of inflation-sensitive public debt is a negative function of expected inflation 
and of government debt. Put simply, increased inflationary expectations and the 
level of government debt are associated with less deflatable debt issued.
Since our data-set follows a sample of 15 OECD countries over time, we shall use 
panel data techniques to estimate the coefficients of the selected model. The share 
of inflation-sensitive instruments is denoted by m  (see Appendix B.l on page 152 
for definitions). Nominal long-term yields are denoted by i and will be used to 
approximate expected inflation tt®. Actual inflation -as measured by the percent 
change in deflator values over the previous year- is denoted by tt. We use d for the 
ratio of total debt to GDP. Table 4.1 on the next page reports the average values of 
the four variables for each country in our data-set. The sample period for which data 
were available for each country is also reported. Apparently, fixed-rate, nominal, 
long-term debt in domestic currency has been the main instrument for government 
borrowing for the majority of countries. Nine countries have a share of inflation- 
sensitive debt that amounts to over 50 percent of their total debt. On average, 
deflatable securities account for 54 percent of total debt.^ Inflation in our data-set 
averaged 6.4 percent, and indebtedness as a fraction of GDP 40.7 percent. The 
long-term yield averaged 9.1 percent and, as expected, it exhibits high correlation 
with inflation (60.6 percent).
Low inflation countries like Germany and the Netherlands exhibit a particularly 
long maturity structure. The opposite happens with countries that have experi­
enced higher levels of inflation, like Italy and Spain: the maturity structure of their 
liabilities leans toward the short end. The general trend can be inferred from figure
^This stylised fact provides support to our argument that governments have a preference for 
domestic, nominal, long-term debt.
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Table 4.1: Average Values Reported by Country
Country m 7T i d Period
Austraha 0.640 0.077 0.011 0.213 1974--95
Austria 0.467 0.048 0.081 0.315 1969--95
Belgium 0.649 0.048 0.085 0.736 1962--94
Canada 0.336 0.052 0.089 0.451 1962--94
Finland 0.096^ 0.075 0.095 0.191 1970--96
France 0.432 0.069 0.099 0.225 1971--95
Germany 0.826 0.039 0.075 0.311 1962--95
Ireland 0.513 0.081 0.107 0.758 1962--95
Italy 0.312 0.096 0.111 0.570 1962--95
Japan 0.644 0.040 0.063 0.330 1966--97
Netherlands 0.920 0.047 0.076 0.400 1962--95
Spain 0.353 0.103 0.134 0.220 1962--95
Sweden 0.562 0.067 0.093 0.430 1962--96
UK 0.676 0.076 0.099 0.430 1962--96
USA 0.582 0.048 0.077 0.354 1962--96
^ The share o f long-term debt for Finland might look particularly low. The  
explanation is that for several years the government had been using foreign 
currency debt as its main instrument.
B.l in Appendix B.3 where we have used the averages of t t  and m  for the fifteen 
countries of our data-set: high inflation countries issue less inflation-sensitive debt 
than low inflation countries. Figure B.2 shows the evolution of the share of nominal 
long-term debt and inflation for Italy and Spain from 1962 to 1995. We can see that 
the two variables moved in the opposite direction for the majority of years in our 
sample period. The panel data estimation will enable us to capture some interesting 
time-series relations that cross-sectional only analysis cannot provide. For example, 
countries that experienced high indebtedness for some periods in the past had to 
drastically shorten the maturity of their securities and loans (see Figure B.3 for Italy 
and Belgium).
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4.3.2 H eterogeneity Tests
Standard least squares methods cannot be applied on longitudinal data-sets un­
less we assume that the regression coefficients do not change across countries and 
over time. If this assumption does not hold and the intercepts and/or the slope 
coefficients vary across individuals and/or time, we must employ other estimation 
techniques. For example, if we assume variable intercepts, we can use the least 
squares dummy variable method (LSDV) to estimate a fixed effects model and the 
feasible GLS method to estimate a random effects model. However, if the coeffi­
cients prove to be homogeneous across the two dimensions of the data-set, we pool 
the data and use GLS. In the presence of structural changes in economic behaviour 
one might also allow for variable slope coefficients. However, such models are more 
complex and are not widely used. In our analysis, we examine models with constant 
slopes and variable intercepts since such models provide reasonable alternatives to 
models with invariant intercepts and slope coefficients.
We can identify whether the data are compatible with a pooled regression model 
or with some kind of intercept variation by employing heterogeneity tests. Het­
erogeneity tests can be carried out using the analysis of covariance procedure as 
outlined in Hsiao (1986). We begin the presentation of the basic model considering 
a one-way and two-way fixed effects approach. The one-way models incorporate 
country (or time) specific constants. The two-way model has an overall constant as 
well as a ‘country’ effect for each country and a ‘time’ effect for each period.
By basic model we mean the one directly implied by the theory and conjecture 
1 : the share of nominal long-term debt in domestic currency m  is on the left-hand 
side and expected inflation tt® is on the right-hand side together with the amount of 
total debt as a percentage of GDP, d. In other words, we estimate a linearised form 
of equation (4.12). We conjecture a negative sign for the coefficient of tt®.
Our first model describes the homogeneous case:
mit = a P  +  P2dit +  Eit, (i)
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Table 4.2: Testing for Heterogeneity of the Intercept
Test F-vaiue DF(N)^ DF(D)® p-vaiue Decision
(ii) vs (i) 137.100 14 430 0.000 Choose (ii)
(iii) vs (i) 0.810 35 409 0.774 Choose (i)
(iv) vs (i) 42.331 50 395 0.000 Choose (iv)
(iv) vs (ii) 1.848 35 395 0.003 Choose (iv)
Degrees of freedom (numerator)
 ^ Degrees of freedom (denominator)
The stochastic term is assumed to have mean zero, E[£it] = 0, and constant variance 
Var[£it] = (j|.
The second specification allows the intercept to vary across countries i with 
homogeneous slope coefficients.
mu = a iP  piTTu +  P2dit +  eu- (ii)
Our next model has time-specific intercepts and homogeneous slope coefficients 
over both dimensions of the data-set.
mu = at + PiTT^  ^P P2du +  (iii)
The two factor model displays varying intercepts over time and countries.
mu — clqP ai P ^ t P  Pit^u +  P2du +  Eu (iv)
Next, we test (i), (ii), and (iii) on (iv) to identify the kind of the possible vari­
ation of the intercept. We use F-tests to examine whether the intercept varies over 
time, countries, or both over time and countries, or if it does not vary at all (the 
homogeneous case). The results of the tests are presented in Table 4.2.
The test between model (ii) with the country variant intercept and model (i) 
-the pooled regression model- delivers the statistically strong result that the ho­
mogeneous case should be rejected. In contrast, focusing on the time dimension.
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the data do not seem to support the idea of time-only specific effects. An F-test of 
model (i) on (iii), which allows the intercept to vary over time, fails to reject the 
null hypothesis and does not support the idea of time-varying intercepts. Our next 
test -(i) on (iv)- rejects the null and suggests that the two-way model, which allows 
the intercept to vary both across countries and over time, should be preferred. Fi­
nally, we test the two-way model (iv) against the group effects model (ii) in order 
to identify the one that better fits our data. The relevant F-test favours the two 
factor model, and thus, we should employ a specification that allows the intercept 
to vary both across countries and over time. As indicated by the previous tests, the 
main source of variation that makes a two factor model preferable to a specification 
that restricts the intercepts to be invariant across the two dimensions of the panel 
is country-specific.®
4.3.3 Fixed vs Random Effects
Whether one treats the effects of the model as fixed or random is an important 
question in panel data estimations. If the sample of individual observations (coun­
tries in our case) are drawn from a large population (all the countries in the world) 
then it might be appropriate to view individual specific constant terms as randomly 
distributed across cross-sectional units Greene (2000). Moreover, “when inferences 
are going to be confined to the effects in the model, the effects are more appropri­
ately considered fixed. When inferences will be made about a population of effects 
from which those in the data are considered to be a random sample, then the effects 
should be considered random” (Hsiao, 1986). At a first glance, it seems that in 
our case the proper strategy would be to consider the effects to be random, as our 
data-set does not cover the entire population of countries. On the other hand, given 
that the OECD countries bear similar characteristics and economic structures which 
are not common to all the countries in the world, it would not be wise to generalise
®This is also supported by the fact that the F-statistic of the last test in Table 4.2 on the page 
before is not particularly high.
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our conclusions from this empirical study and assert that they describe the whole 
population. This viewpoint would argue for the case of fixed effects. Hence, the 
decision is not a straightforward one. Another point that needs to be made is that 
the estimation methods employed vary in effectiveness according to the formulation 
of the effects. The LSDV estimator (the covariance estimator CV) is unbiased and 
consistent in both cases of fixed and random effects. However, while it is also BLUE 
when effects are fixed, it is not BLUE when the effects are random. The BLUE in 
the latter case is the Generalised Least Squares estimator.
For the country-specific intercept case, the random effects approach specifies that 
the constant term is a group-specific disturbance, similar to Su except that for each 
group, there is but a single draw that enters the regression identically in each period 
(Greene, 2000). We can now re-specify our model under a random effects approach. 
In the case of country effects we have:
m i f = a P u i P  piTTu +  p2dit +  Su, (ii')
where Ui is a country-specific disturbance, and E[ui] = 0, Var[ui] = cr^ , and 
Cov[eit,Ui] = 0. Respectively, the model with time-specific effects becomes
mit = a P w t P  PiTTu +  P2dit +  Su, (iii')
where E[wt] =  0, Var[wt] = cr ,^ and Covl£u,wt] = 0. Finally, the model that 
allows for variation of the intercept over countries and time under the random effects 
assumption becomes
mu = a P u i P w t P  PiTT^ t +  p2dit +  £u. ( i /)
A Lagrange Multiplier test confirms our previous results that the appropriate 
model should allow for some kind of intercept variation. The value of the LM 
statistic with one degree of freedom for country-specific effects (=3214.93) exceeds 
the 3.84 critical value. The null hypothesis of a classical regression model with a
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Table 4.3: Hausman Tests
Test chi-squared DF p-vaiue Decision
(ii') vs (ii) 4.04 2 0.133 Reject (ii)
(iii') vs (iii) 11.33 2 0.003 Reject (iii')
(iv') vs (iv) 44.01_____ 2 0.000 Reject (iV)
single constant term is rejected in favour of a random or fixed model. The same 
holds true for models (iii) and (iv). However, the value for time eflfects is only 
4.29, which indicates the weakness of the time effects. The respective value for the 
two-way model is 3219.22. As mentioned earlier, the choice between random or fixed 
modelling of the effects is not a trivial one. Several theoretical dimensions should 
be taken into account when selecting the appropriate model. Additionally, the 
Hausman test is the relevant statistical test that enables us to make a decision based 
on sound statistical criteria.^ The results from the Hausman tests are presented in 
Table 4.3.
Since our previous tests indicate that the intercept should be modelled as country 
and time variant we are interested in the last test of table 4.3: we clearly reject the 
case for random effects even at the 99.5 percent level of significance; the data seem 
to be consistent with a fixed effects model. The Hausman tests together with the 
discussion made earlier on the theoretical dimensions of the decision provide support 
to a fixed formulation of the effects.
4.3.4 Estim ated Coefficients
In the previous section we discussed the choice between fixed and random eflFects. 
In this section, the relevance of this discussion is confirmed as our results show that 
the estimated coefficients differ in explaining power and significance between the 
two models. The regression outcomes of both the two-way fixed and random effects 
models are reported in Table 4.4 on the following page for reasons of comparison.
®See Hausman (1978).
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Table 4.4: Estimated Fixed and Random Effects^
Model Variable Coefiicient S.E. t-ratio p-value
Fixed 7T® -2.44416 0.313 -7.800 0.000
d -0.12576 0.038 -3.350 0.009
constant - - -
Random 7T^ -1.24150 0.244 -5.089 0.000
d -0.05498 0.031 -1.789 0.073
a
constant 0.66606 0.059 11.238 0.000
errors. In the case of random effects the ratio is asym ptotically distributed as 
standard normal. Constants are assumed country and tim e specific and are not 
reported for the fixed effects model. Estim ation methods: Least Squares Dum m y 
Variables for the fixed effects model, and Feasible Generalized Least Squares for 
the random effects model.
These results show that there is strong evidence for a significant negative relationship 
between the share of domestic, nominal, long-term debt and expected infiation in our 
data-set. This relation is twice as strong for the fixed effects model. A 1 percentage 
point increase in infiationary expectations, as captured by an increase in the nominal 
long-term yield, will lead to almost 2.5 percentage points decrease in the amount of 
defiatabie long-term debt issued. In the random effects case the same increase will 
result in 1.24 percentage points decrease in m. The coefficient of debt to GDP ratio 
is also negative and significant in both cases. However, like the coefficient of tt®, it 
experiences a drop in its t-ratio and magnitude if we assume random effects. The 
R-squared statistic for the fixed effects is almost 86.3 percent.^®
These results provide support to Missale and Blanchard (1994) and Missale 
(1999) at least with regards to the relevance of the debt ratio. In Missale and 
Blanchard (1994) the authors use time-series data for Italy, Belgium, and Ireland 
to establish the negative effects of the debt burden and infiation on the maturity 
structure of government debt. In Missale (1999) there are also regressions with the 
long-term interest rate on the RHS. For these country regressions (the countries of 
our data-set plus Portugal and Denmark), the long-rate (which we use as a measure
^°The random effects model is estimated with GLS. As a result, the R-squared is not meaningful.
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of inflation expectations) does not perform well, or it is generally outperformed by 
the debt ratio. Our study, which also incorporates the cross-sectional dimension 
of the data, delivers different results. The panel estimation is consistent with a 
significant negative effect of the long-term interest rates on the share of defiatabie 
securities.
4.3.5 Robustness Checks 
A utocorrelation and H eteroscedasticity
Our results are robust when we correct for possible patterns of autocorrelation 
and/or heteroscedasticity. Assuming one-way, country-specific effects (and thus ig­
noring time-varying intercepts) enables us to carry out the estimations. The coef­
ficient of long-term yield enters the estimated equation with the expected sign and 
retains its significance in all cases, even though the magnitude of its effect varies 
according to the assumed patterns of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The 
effect of the debt to GDP ratio is also clear, even though its significance is not ro­
bust to all specifications. The coefficient loses its significance when we use a robust 
covariance matrix to deal with groupwise heteroscedasticity, but is still significant 
when we correct for autocorrelation with the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation or 
when we estimate a heteroscedastic model with cross-sectional correlation using fea­
sible GLS. However, in all cases we get the expected sign. Tables 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 
on the next page report the results of these estimations.
Endogeneity
A criticism that can be made of our empirical analysis is that our specification suffers 
from the endogeneity problem (see Falcetti and Missale, 2001). A way to overcome 
this potential situation is to estimate the model with two-stage least squares (2SLS)
have also estimated the model without Finland, which could be a potential outlier in our 
data-set. The results were essentially the same.
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Table 4.5: Corrected for Autocorrelation®
Variable Coefficient S.E. t-ratio p-value
7T^
d
-0.39334
-0.09594
0.148
0.038
-2.666
-2.532
0.008
0.012
Notes. Dependent variable: share o f inflation-sensitive debt. 
This is a  one-way, flxed effects model corrected for flrst-order 
autocorrelation. T he autocorrelation coefficient used in the  
Cochrane-Orcutt transformation (=0.841) has been obtained  
from the least squares regression.
Table 4.6: Corrected for Heteroscedasticity®
Variable Coefficient S.E. t-ratio p-value
7T®
d
-0.98633
-0.03862
0.159
0.026
-6.217
-1.465
0.000
0.143
Notes. Dependent variable: share o f inflation-sensitive debt. 
This is a  one-way, fixed effects model corrected for groupwise 
heteroscedasticity using the robust covariance matrix.
Table 4.7: Feasible GLS Estimation®
Variable Coefficient S.E. t-ratio p-value
7T^ -2.65594 0.103 -25.847 0.000
d -0.10491 0.008 -12.343 0.000
const 0.88522 0.010 88.407 0.000
Notes. Dependent variable: share of inflation-sensitive debt. This 
method is used to  estim ate a model w ith assumed heteroscedastic 
panels w ith cross-sectional correlation. We use a ‘balanced’ version 
of our data-set: 24 observations (1971-1994) for each of 12 coun­
tries (Austria, Belgium, Canada, FVance, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, and USA).
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instrumenting the suspected endogenous variable. The ‘exogenous’ variable can act 
as an instrument for itself.
Assuming a country-specific intercept is not far from reality as we have seen in 
section 3.2. Our specification then becomes
mu =  T Pi'^u T P2dit T Eu,
and first-differencing gives
mu — m u-i = Pliait ~  +  P2{du — du-\) +  uu,
where uu =  Eu -  Eu-i^
Using T^u-i~'^it- 2  85 an instrument for t^u — t^u-\ and du — du-\ as an instrument 
for itself we estimate the model with 2SLS. The estimated coefficients reported in 
Table 4.8 on the following page do not differ substantially from the LSDV results of 
Table 4.4 on page 99.
Finally, we use a robust covariance matrix to correct for heteroscedasticity and 
the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation method to deal with autocorrelation. Even 
though this process triggers a deterioration of the results, the coefficients remain 
significant and with the expected sign (Table 4.9 on the following page).
Summarising, the empirical analysis has shown that increases in expected infla­
tion lead to lower shares of inflation-sensitive instruments. Additionally, our study 
provides further support to Missale and Blanchard (1994), as increasing debt to 
GDP ratios are associated with issuance of less inflation-sensitive debt. We have 
subjected these results to several robustness checks and their reliability has been 
established. However, there are certain limitations which we discuss next.
F u rther Com m ents
Our decision to estimate a linear version of equation (4.12) can raise some ques­
tions, since equation (4.12) predicts a non-linear relationship between the share of
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Table 4.8: Instrumental Variables Estimates®
Instruments: 7T^ _i - and dit —dit—l
Variable Coefficient S.E. t-ratio p-value
' i^t ~  '^it-1 —1.97692 0.81 -2.444 0.014
dit — dit—i —0.16336 0.068 -2.391 0.017
Notes. Dependent variable: first-differences of share o f inflation- 
sensitive debt.
Table 4.9: Robust Instrumental Variables®
Instruments: 7rf^ _i —<f-2 and dit —dit—i
Variable Coefficient S.E. t-ratio p-value
-1.2732 0.7 -1.821 0.068
dit — dit—i —0.138 0.061 -2.259 0.024
p 0.20229 0.049 4.147 0.000
Notes. Dependent variable: first-differences o f share o f inflation- 
sensitive debt. Corrected for heteroscedasticity and flrst-order au­
tocorrelation.
inflation-sensitive debt and the explaining variables. However, this choice does not 
appear to be problematic, as a regression specification error test (RESET) of the two 
way flxed effects model has not indicated any problems with the functional form.^^ 
Another aspect of our empirical work that may cause some concern is that we 
have based our analysis on the assumption of constant slope coefficients. This as­
sumption is, apparently, restrictive. Indeed an F-test provides evidence that the 
unrestricted case of variable intercept and slope coefficients is preferred to a model 
with variable intercepts only.^ ® Assuming fixed effects (an assumption supported 
by the Hausman tests in section 4.3.3), the appropriate estimation method would
carry out the test we obtained the squared fitted values from the original two way fixed 
effects model, and included them as a new regressor in the specification. Re-estimating the equation 
with LSDV produced an insignificant parameter for the new variable (p-value: 0.95).
^^The relevant F-statistic for testing =  o* +  /?i7rfj +  p 2 du  +  £u against m u  =  Uj +  -f-
'yidit + £ i t  is F  =  , where N  is the number of cross-sections, T is the number of
time observations, and K  is the number of exogenous variables. R S S i comes from the unrestricted 
model, whereas R S S 2 comes from the restricted model. The F-statistic has a value of 27.1, and 
we clearly reject the hypothesis of constant slope coefficients across countries at all meaningful 
significance levels.
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then be a restricted form of the SURE (seemingly unrelated regressions estimation) 
method (see Judge et al, 1985, pp. 517). Early work using SURE has given results 
only partly compatible with the findings of this paper. This suggests the need to 
examine other specifications; for example the assumption of a time-invariant opti­
mal proportion of inflation-sensitive debt in, highflghted in footnote 1 on page 84, 
could be relaxed, and allowance made for rh to depend on structural inflexibilities. 
We leave work in this direction for future research.
Finally, even though we estimate a two way model, most of the robustness checks 
reported are for a one-way (cross-sectional fixed effects) model. This is so because 
some estimations can only be carried out assuming one-way variability of the inter­
cept. Since the heterogeneity tests of section 4.3.2 have shown that the variation of 
the intercept is mainly attributed to differences across countries, we conclude that 
this does not create any particular consistency problems.
4.4 Concluding Remarks
The aim of this study has been to present some basic issues concerning the manage­
ment of public debt in the presence of higher expected inflation. In the ‘real world’ 
government debt is actively managed and there is a wide spectrum of decisions to 
be made regarding the maturity, currency denomination, indexation features and 
overall structure of the public sector’s liabilities. We have focused our attention on 
the amount of inflation-sensitive instruments (nominal long-term debt denominated 
in domestic currency). Our model is an extension of the Missale and Blanchard 
(1994) model and allows for the joint determination of inflation and the proportion 
of inflation-sensitive government debt. We have shown that unless the government 
can precommit to inflation and the share of inflation-sensitive debt, it will not be 
able to achieve the structure of debt that ensures tax-smoothing over time and across 
states of nature.
Our theoretical result has also been tested empirically. We have measured the 
effect of expected inflation and debt using an unbalanced longitudinal data-set con­
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sisting of time-series observations for fifteen OECD countries. Our specification has 
also included the ratio of debt to GDP as a measure of indebtedness. We have used 
the long-term yield as a proxy for expected inflation. The panel data estimation 
has produced results that are compatible with the theory. Of course, our examina­
tion has not been exhaustive or free of complications. The trend, though, has been 
clearly identified, that higher expected inflation and higher total debt lead to the 
issuance of fewer inflation-sensitive instruments.
It would be interesting to investigate the role of Central Bank independence on 
the structure of public debt. A more independent -and inflation averse- Central 
Bank will generally enjoy more credibility in its fight against inflation. An institu­
tion shielded from political powers that often assert pressure for excess monetary 
expansion is expected to perform better in the inflation front. A longer maturity 
structure of nominal debt is expected to be the result of an independent monetary 
institution. A theoretical model that accounts for the degree of Central Bank inde­
pendence would be of considerable importance. Several authors have taken up this 
task and some early findings can be found in Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997), and 
Falcetti and Missale (2001).
CHAPTER 5
Public Debt Indexation and Tax-Smoothing: Evidence from
a Cointegrating VAR
Even though debt management is concerned with issues of both cost and risk, most 
of the empirical work in the field has been devoted to studying the objective of 
minimising costs (e.g. see Boothe and Reid, 1992, and Coe, Pesaran and Vahey, 
2000). In policy-making things are not different. Virtually all debt management 
authorities in OECD countries share the objective of minimising funding costs (see 
Table 10 in Mylonas et al, 2000). The UK Debt Management Office (DM0) has a 
clear mandate to minimise costs while taking into account risk.^ However, despite 
this implicit recognition of the importance of risk, it is not clear what the term 
entails.
While minimising the costs of debt service is undoubtedly the main priority of 
the debt managers, risk considerations should not be ignored. Prominent researchers 
in the area have called for a shift of interest to risk (e.g. Missale, 1999). Underlying 
this line of thought is the tax-smoothing argument. The idea, first brought forward
^The objective as stated in the DMO’s literature is given in page 36.
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by Bohn (1988), is that debt management can play a desirable shock-absorbing role 
in case of adverse budgetary shocks. This role depends on the correlations between 
innovations in real macroeconomic variables (such as real output, spending, etc.) 
and innovations in the inflation rate. For example, if a negative shock in real output 
increases the inflation rate, then the resulting reduction of the real return on nominal 
debt is highly desirable, as the government does not need to increase the tax rate 
and cause further distortions in the economy.
Suppose, though, that the government had tried to exploit an upward-sloping 
yield curve and shifted big amounts of debt onto short-term maturities to lower 
its service costs. At the outset this might have looked like a good strategy from a 
cost reduction perspective, but once the output shock had been realised the need to 
issue bonds at a higher rate would not look as good! This simple example (which 
abstracts from time-consistency issues) shows that the debt manager’s problem is 
more complicated than just minimising costs by looking at the yield curve. The 
structure which ensures that debt service costs are lower when there is a shortage 
of revenues is typically different than the one that is ex ante less expensive. If, in 
addition, the government uses debt management to signal its intentions on monetary 
pohcy to the markets, then the problem becomes even more complex.
A unified theory of debt management that takes into account cost, risk, and time 
consistency would probably be the appropriate way to characterise the optimality 
of the manager’s decisions.^ However, we do not pursue this task here. We confine 
ourselves to investigating the optimality of certain debt instruments from a tax- 
smoothing perspective. We carry out this empirical exercise using a cointegrating 
vector autoregressive (VAR) model. Even though VARs have been used before to 
explore these correlations, the long-run relations have largely been ignored.® This is 
exactly the gap that this study aims to fill in. We estimate the long-run cointegrating 
relation(s) and derive the error correction representation of a system involving real 
GDP and government spending, a price index, a long interest rate and a policy rate
^An early account of research in this direction can be found in Goldfajn (1996). 
^See Missale (1997), and Bohn (1990b).
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or a short rate. This way of modelling enables us to retain all short- and long- 
run information. Our results and policy recommendations follow from the effects 
of changes in variables that belong to the cointegrating relationship. For example, 
evidence of positive cointegration between real output and inflation is supportive of 
price indexation of debt. An unexpected decline in output would lead to a permanent 
decline in inflation which would in turn lead to lower returns on real debt.
In addition, we use (generalised) impulse response analysis to study the be­
haviour of prices resulting from real macroeconomic shocks. The analysis becomes 
more complete by obtaining series of correlations of innovations among our state 
variables (GDP and spending) and inflation. We are able to implement this exercise 
by using a rolling VEC model: we estimate the system using a constant window 
of observations which we move through our data by sequentially dropping the first 
observation within the window and including the first one outside the window. More 
specific policy recommendations could be made on that basis, since the evolution 
of the correlations over time could contain valuable information regarding the opti­
mality of debt instruments during certain periods.
A basic question concerns the choice of variables that are included in the spec­
ification. And, indeed, this decision is an important one for the robustness of the 
results. The development of the VAR methodology in the 1980s was accompa­
nied by a discussion regarding the degree to which good-performing but almost 
a-theoretical models are acceptable. The idea that statistics had won over eco­
nomics was too much for most economists to accept. Despite this fact, however, 
the forecasting ability of VAR models and the rich dynamics they help to unveil 
have established them as a very useful econometric tool in the hands of economists 
both in the academic and the policy-making world. Central banks routinely investi­
gate the monetary policy transmission mechanism and IS-LM models using VARs. 
Moreover, numerous papers have appeared in the literature where VARs are used 
to extract the covariance structure of systems of variables.'^
^For a comprehensive literature review on VARs, see Canova (1995).
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In this study, our first priority is to ensure that the chosen specification is robustly 
defined. We think of our system as a reduced form of aggregate demand and supply 
with a reaction function of the monetary authorities that set the pohcy rate. The 
focus will be on examining the long-run properties of the relation between real 
spending, output and inflation with the goal of making inferences on optimal debt 
management.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.1 reports descriptive statistics 
and unit root tests of the variables. In section 5.2, we carry out cointegration tests 
and report the estimation output of the error correction models for the UK. We 
obtain series of correlations of innovations using a rolling window of observations in 
section 5.3. In section 5.4, we carry the same econometric exercise for other OECD 
countries, but we report the results in a more concise way. Section 5.5 summarises 
the chapter and comments on the main findings.
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Unit R oot Tests
We have obtained quarterly observations from Datastream’s UK series. The sam­
ple period begins in the second quarter of 1970 and ends in the first quarter of 
2000. Data on real GDP and general government’s real consumption expenditure 
are seasonally adjusted. Our set of variables also includes the retail price index, 
the Bank of England’s base rate, and a long-term interest rate as measured by the 
gross redemption yield on 20-year gilts. In our econometric analysis all variables are 
in natural logarithms except from the interest/policy rates. Descriptive statistics 
on these variables are reported in Table 5.1 on the next page. Plots are shown in 
Figure 5.1 on page 111.
The stationarity of the variables is our first concern. The visual impression from 
Figure 5.1 is that the variables are not stationary and could possibly contain a unit 
root. A closer examination with the use of Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and 
Phillips-Perron tests confirms this impression for all variables except for LGCE. 
In this case the results are more ambiguous. The fourth-order ADF test with a
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics®
LGCE LGDP LRPI Y20P BASEP
Mean 11.741 11.872 91.989 0.103 0.097
Median 11.756 11.845 93.555 0.098 0.095
Max 11.921 12.219 167.5 0.165 0.17
Min 11.478 11.554 18.44 0.045 0.045
StDev 0.108 0.147 48.3 0.027 0.032
Obs 120 120 120 120 120
® LGCE is the log real government consumption expenditure, LG DP the  
log real GDP, LRPI the log o f the retail price index, Y20P the yield  
on a 20-year nominal bond (as a percentage), and BASEP the Bank’s 
policy rate (as a  percentage).
deterministic trend only marginally rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root, whereas 
the Phillips-Perron test does not reject it at the 1 percent level of significance. In 
what follows, we assume that LGCE has a unit root. Further ADF tests using first 
differences have shown that no variable is 1(2). The case of LRPI is marginal as the 
Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron are not in full agreement with each other. The 
ADF test fails to reject the unit root hypothesis for the first-differenced series of 
LRPI at the 1 percent level, but it does so at the 5 percent. The Phillips-Perron 
test easily rejects the null at all levels of significance. In what follows, based on the 
graphs and the unit root tests, we assume that all variables are 1(1). All unit root 
tests are reported in Table 5.2 on page 113. Plots of the first differences are shown 
in Figure 5.2 on page 112.
5.2 Cointegration Tests and Vector Error Correc­
tion
Considering only first differences of 1(1) variables would lead to the loss of useful 
long-run information if these variables were cointegrated (see Hamilton, 1994 pp 
574-575). So, the next natural step in our analysis is to test for cointegration using 
the Johansen (1991, 1995) approach. However, before determining the number of
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Table 5.2: Unit Root Tests^
Levels First Diff.
ADF PP ADF PP
LGCE -4.073 -3.529 -4.613 -13.7
LGDP -2.503 -2.178 -4.063 -10.225
LRPI -1.544 -0.209 -3.479 -7.456
Y20 -2.626 -2.438 -5.62 -9.2
BASEP -3.178 -2.588 -5.554 -9.852
The regressions include an intercept, a trend, and four 
lags o f the dependent variable. T he M acKinnon critical 
values are -4.0393 (1%), -3.4487 (5%), and -3.1483 (10%).
cointegrating vectors, we need to choose the order of the lags in the VAR.
The usual steps include examining the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the 
Schwarz-Bayesian Criterion (SBC), and the Hannan-Quinn Criterion (HQC). Typ­
ically, these statistics are rarely in agreement with each other. In addition, re­
searchers usually try to define a lag length that ensures that the error terms in 
the equations are not autocorrelated, and, at the same time, does not reduce the 
available degrees of freedom dramatically. The frequency of the data, as well as the 
number of observations are also considered. For example with annual data and a 
hmited set of information a lag length of two should not be considered unusual. In 
contrast, with long monthly series such a choice would probably lead to problems.
In our case, all three criteria suggest that a lag length of one should be chosen. 
However, we do not follow the prescription of these tests, and choose a lag length 
of four, which is long enough to capture the dynamics in our specification. As our 
series are quite long, the loss in the number of observations that are available for 
estimation should not be a reason for concern.
We can now use Johansen’s procedure to test for cointegration. The VAR model 
can be written as
=  ao +  T AiW^f_i +  ... +  T Uf, (5.1)
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where
and
W t  = LRPIt LGDPt LGCEt BASEPt Y20Pt
^  i.i.d. TV (0, n ),
where O is a symmetric positive-definite matrix. The A ’s are 5 x 5  matrices of 
coefficients. We carry out the cointegration tests assuming unrestricted intercepts, 
and, since variables LGCE and possibly LGDP seem to be trending, we conjecture 
the presence of a restricted deterministic linear trend. The trace statistic indicates 
the existence of two cointegrating relationships at the 5% level, and one cointegrating 
relationship at the 1% level. The maximum eigenvalue statistic indicates one and 
no relationships, respectively.
The non-uniformity of the conclusions between the above-mentioned statistics 
is a common situation in cointegrating VARs. When the data do not provide clear 
evidence on the choice of the cointegrating rank r, the researcher has to decide which 
hypothesis to accept based on his/her expectations from economic theory. As the 
purpose of this study is exactly to investigate the long-run relations between inflation 
and a set of other endogenous variables, we conjecture that there is one cointegrating 
relationship. This assumption is not ‘heroic’ in any sense, as it is clearly supported 
by the maximum eigenvalue statistic at the 5% level of significance, and by the trace 
statistic at the 1% level.
The vector error correction representation is given by
3
AW, = ao -  a/3'(W,_i -  ^i) +  ^  B,AW,_, +  u„ (5.2)
where a  is a 5 x 1 vector, and /3' is a 1 x 5 vector including a trend coefficient. 
Notice that as we have assumed a restricted deterministic trend, the trend coef­
ficients enter the cointegrating relations. Normalising on the first element of the 
cointegrating vector (i.e. the price index), we obtain the following ML estimates of
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the cointegrating vector:^
L R P I LGDP LGCE B A SE P K20P Trend
1.00 1.9 -0.99 —6.13 -4.22 —0.03
. ( - ) (0.87) (1.28) (0.95) (2.54) (0.007)
(5.3)
The adjustment term in the inflation equation is negative and significant, even 
though its magnitude is only moderate. Its value of -0.02(0.009) shows that 2% of 
the disequilibrium is corrected in each quarter once the system is shocked.
The significant negative relation between real output and the price level is ev­
idence for the optimality of nominal bonds in the UK. An unexpected shortfall in 
real output leads to a permanent increase in prices, providing budget insurance in 
such circumstances. The current practice in the UK involves issuance of both nom­
inal and price-indexed bonds. The British DM0 began issuing real debt in 1980 
and today 25% of the total debt is indexed. A ‘mix’ of nominal and indexed debt 
is thought to provide the hedge against unexpected variations in inflation that the 
DM0 requires. An unexpected surge in prices increases the value of index-linked 
bonds while it reduces the real value of nominal bonds. In contrast, in the event 
of an unexpected fall in prices the value of real debt falls while the real value of 
nominal debt increases. This approach is regarded as optimal if the types of shock 
affecting the economy are unknown.
Our result supports the issuance of nominal debt for hedging against supply 
shocks. It is robust to a specification of eight lags, and has the same magnitude if we 
exclude LGCE from the VEC. A VEC including LGCE and excluding LGDP delivers 
a significant positive coefficient on spending. But as we have seen, estimation of our 
preferred specification with both variables makes the long-run relation between real 
spending and inflation insignificant.
We now turn to the long-run estimated relation between the base rate and in-
^Standard errors in parentheses.
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flation. If monetary authorities react to higher inflation by raising the base rate in 
order to slow down economic activity and reduce the inflationary pressures, then 
our model rightly predicts a positive relation between the two variables. We also 
document a positive relation of LRPI with the long-term rate, which is again ex­
pected as higher inflation results in higher premia required by investors in order to 
hold long-term assets.
5.3 Implications from a Rolling VEC
Studying the residual correlations among the variables that are relevant to the debt 
management process is our next step. This exercise builds on previous work by 
Missale (1997, 1999) and Goldfajn (1996, 2000) to derive the correlation structure 
between the innovations of output, spending, and inflation. The difference of our 
study is that we extract the information from an estimated system that controls for 
long-run relationships. In other words, we use our VEC specification rather than 
the VAR models employed in the afore-mentioned models.
The methodology we have chosen is that of a rolling regression. We have done 
so in order to obtain a measure of the evolution between the residual correlations 
over time. The process involves selecting a constant window of observations, which 
we move across our data. Estimating the model using the number of observations 
included in the window produces one set of estimates. We have set the ‘length’ of 
the window to 57 observations. Since our data-set comprises of 120 observations, 
this procedure enables us to estimate 58 models.® For example, we estimate the first 
model using observations 1971Q3 to 1985Q3, the second using 1971Q4 to 1985Q4, 
and so on, up to the last model that is being estimated using observations 1986Q1 
to 2G00Q1. The selected model is an error correction model of order four with one 
cointegrating vector. We do not test this assumption for every sub-sample, but 
we stick to this specification throughout the process in order to obtain comparable
’120 observations minus 57 (the constant window) minus the 5 variables.
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results. From each estimated model we obtain the correlations from the off-diagonal 
elements of the residual correlation matrix.^ The correlation estimate becomes an 
observation dated according to the last observation of the window. In that way, we 
obtain a series of correlations starting 1985Q3 and ending 2000Q1.
It has to be mentioned that the implications from this exercise should not neces­
sarily coincide with the outcome of our cointegration analysis. Here, the focus is on 
the dynamics of the short-run relations between the innovations of the variables of 
interest. The reason we take this additional route is that existing studies focusing 
on the role of these relations in assessing the optimality of certain instruments for 
risk-smoothing purposes have extracted the relevant information from VAR specifi­
cations that neglect the long-run relationships. Instead, we revisit the subject using 
a VEC specification.
Figure 5.3 on the next page plots the correlations between the innovations of the 
price index and output, and the price index and spending. A positive correlation 
between the price index innovations and output innovations indicates that a macroe­
conomic shock resulting in lower tax revenues is better hedged with price-indexed 
debt. As falling economic activity threatens the budget, lower inflation means lower 
returns to real securities, and thus reduces the need for revenues.
The picture we get from the data is rather mixed. The innovations are related 
in a non-consistent manner as in some periods the correlations are positive and in 
others negative. This points out to the uncertainty regarding the kind of shocks 
hitting the economy. This uncertainty would certainly give credence to issuance of 
both nominal and price-indexed debt instruments for reasons explained earlier.
The situation is more clear with regard to the correlations between spending and 
price innovations, as these seem to be mainly negative. Extracting the innovation
^The matrix is
where r  is the resic
1
r  L R P I,L G D P  1
rL R P I,L G C E  rL G C E ,L G D P ) 1
rL R P I,L E A S E R  Tl b A SE P,LG D P  rL B A S E P ,L G C E  1
f'LR P I,Y20P  I'Y20P,LGDP f'Y20P,LGCE f'Y20P ,B A SE P  1
ual correlation coefficient.
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correlations from our error correction model confirms Missale (1997) with respect to 
the relation between unanticipated spending and price movements as price-indexed 
debt appears to be optimal from a tax-smoothing perspective. The intuition here is 
that as a spending shock requires further government revenues, the associated fall 
in prices reÜeves the budget from an additional burden if debt is indexed.
The generahsed impulse responses show that prices are more responsive to spend­
ing shocks.^ Figure 5.4 on the preceding page shows that a unit change in the inno­
vation for spending results to a sharper change in the value of LRPI. The reported 
form of the responses is robust to the choice of different lags and specifications.
5.4 Results for Other OECD Countries
In this section we repeat our econometric exercise for several OECD countries. The 
specification remains the same with real spending (LGCE), real output (LGDP), 
the consumer price index (LRPI) and two interest rates included (TB and LRATE). 
Whenever the policy rate is not available, we use the return on a three-month 
Treasury bill, or the three-month London interbank rate. We are reporting the esti­
mated cointegrated vector(s) with the adjustment coefficient, as well as the impulse 
response functions. We also compare our results to Missale (1999).
5.4.1 U SA
The US debt markets are crucially important to the healthy operation of the world 
financial system. The reason is that Treasury securities fulfill several significant 
roles. They are used as a risk-free benchmark, a reference and hedging benchmark, 
and a reserve asset of central banks around the world. The recent reduction in the 
debt level, and the prospect of more massive debt buy-backs, forms a challenge for 
the US debt management authority.®
^Generalised impulse responses are invariant to the ordering of the VAR. For a formal discussion 
see Appendix C.l.
^Fleming (2000) discusses in detail the imphcations of the US debt paydown.
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Debt management in the States has always been based more on transparency 
and simphcity rather than innovation (see Missale, 1999). However, after a long 
discussion, price-indexed debt was eventually introduced in 1997. Our analysis 
regarding the hedging properties of real debt against budget shocks dehvers relatively 
clear results. The long-run relation between inflation and output is significantly 
negative, whereas the relation with spending is significantly positive. Both relations 
assign a hedging role to nominal debt. This result supports the findings of Bohn 
(1990b).
In contrast, our rolling estimations teU a rather more complicated story: the 
correlations between innovations in spending, output and inflation follow an erratic 
pattern over time (see Figure 5.5 on page 127). The conclusion that can be drawn 
is that no credible debt management strategy can be designed on the basis of such 
information as the way prices are related to spending and output shocks is not 
consistent.
The adjusted sample we have used for estimation in the USA begins in the third 
quarter of 1978 and ends in the first quarter of 2000. We have used information 
on the consumer price index, real output and spending, the three month Treasury 
Bill rate, and the US Treasury yield adjusted to constant maturity (30 years). The 
trace statistic supports the presence of three long-run relationships at both the 1 
and 5 percent levels. Estimating the error correction model with three cointegrating 
vectors, we obtain:
L R P I TB LR A TE LGDP LGCE Trend
= 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.07 —0.92 -0.01 (5.4)
( - ) ( - ) ( - ) (0.57) (0.23) (0.004)
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L R P I TB LR A TE LGDP LGGE Trend
0.00 1.00 0.00 -2.19 0.62 0.01 , (5.5)
_ ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) (0.42) (0.16) (0.002)
L R P I TB LR A TE LGDP LGCE Trend
0.00 0.00 1.00 -0.43 0.11 0.003 (5.6)
( - ) ( - ) ( - ) (0.21) (0.08) (0.001)
02 =
A  =
The impulse responses (Figure 5.6 on page 127) show that prices react more 
sharply to innovations in output.
5 .4 .2  A u s t r a l i a
The adjusted sample we have used for estimation in Australia begins in the third 
quarter of 1971 and ends in the first quarter of 2000. In addition to the consumer 
price index, real output and real government consumption we have used the three 
month Treasury Bill rate (end of period), and a Commonwealth government bond 
yield (end of period, maturity 10 years). Evidence from the trace and maximum 
likelihood statistics regarding the order of cointegration are not very clear. Both 
tests support the presence of one cointegrating relation at the 5% level. In contrast, 
both tests do not reject the null of no cointegration at the 1% level. But if there is 
indeed a long-run relation, estimating a VAR would lose us important information 
for risk-smoothing. Thus, we estimate the system assuming one cointegrating vector.
The evidence is clearly against price-indexed debt, as the long-run relation be­
tween LRPI and LGDP is negative. Thus, Missale’s (1999) results are not confirmed 
here. The coefficient of spending is insignificant and as a result no credible conclu­
sions can be drawn from this relation.
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0  =
L R P I LGDP LGCE T B LR A T E  T  rend
1.00 13.3 0.75 -19.05 23.17 -0.134
( - ) (3.02) (1.37) (3.42) (5.3) (0.02)
(5.7)
The evolution of the innovation correlations, as depicted in Figure 5.7, indicates 
a positive trend for both. Even though the correlations are initially negative, soon 
they become positive, and, in the case of price and output relation, of significant 
magnitude towards the end of the sample. If this positive relation were to continue 
in the future, a case could be made for indexed debt. However, as with the data 
in other countries, the stability of the relation cannot be guaranteed. The impulse 
responses show a very similar pattern of reaction of prices to shocks in output and 
spending.
5.4.3 Italy
The adjusted sample we have used for estimation in Italy begins in the second 
quarter of 1975 and ends in the first quarter of 2000. In addition to the consumer 
price index, real output and real government consumption we have used the three 
month Treasury Bill rate (end of period), and a Treasury bond net yield (end of 
period). The trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics support the presence of two 
long-run relationships at the 1% level of significance. Estimating the model with two 
cointegrating vectors and normalising appropriately, we obtain a positive relation 
between output and prices. An unexpected change in output is associated with an 
unexpected change in the same direction in prices. This finding gives support to a 
policy of indexation, which has not been followed by the Italian fiscal authorities. At 
the same time, we find a significant negative relation of prices with spending, which 
also gives evidence of the appropriateness of indexed debt for hedging budgetary 
shocks. The adjustment coefficient of the first cointegrating vector in the equation 
for inflation is -0.008(0.004). We report the cointegrating vector of interest.
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0  =
L R P I T B LGDP LGCE LRA TE Trend
1.00 0.00 -6.87 5.31 -11.6 0.03
( - ) ( - ) (3.33) (2.01) (1.93) (0.01)
(5.8)
Figure 5.9 on page 129 does gives the same account of events. Correlations 
of spending and inflation have remained mainly negative throughout the period 
-an indication in favour of price-indexed debt. The correlations between output 
and inflation have not been consistently positive or negative. A strong positive 
correlation gradually gives its place to a strong negative correlation. This variation 
in correlations are also a feature of the estimations in Missale (1997), and they show 
that the stochastic structure of the economy is not constant. Poflcy decisions based 
on these correlations then should be made after careful consideration.
The impulse responses show that in Italy the response of prices to a shock in 
output and spending are very different. A shock in LGDP initially increases and 
then decreases prices, whereas the opposite happens with a shock in LGCE (see 
Fig. 5.10 on page 129.
5.4.4 Germany
The adjusted sample we have used for estimation in Germany begins in the third 
quarter of 1971 and ends in the first quarter of 2000. We have used information on 
the consumer price index, real output and spending, the three month FIBOR rate, 
and the yield on bonds with maturity 9-10 years. The trace statistic suggests one 
cointegrating relation at the 5% level. In contrast, the maximum eigenvalue statistic 
does not reject the hypothesis of no cointegration. Estimating the error correction 
model assuming one cointegrating vector, we obtain a positive long-run relation 
between output and prices and a negative one between government consumption 
and prices. These findings make a case for indexed debt. The adjustment coefficient 
is insignificant [-0.0005(0.001)].
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The correlations reported in Figure 5.11 on page 130 offer very little evidence in 
favour of one decision or the other. The correlation of prices with output is mainly 
negative (some indication for nominal debt), whereas the correlation of prices with 
spending is also negative, but, generally, of small magnitude. The impulse responses 
show that prices respond more sharply in the case of output shocks.
L R P I LGDP LGGE TB LR A TE Trend
1.00 1.41 0.42 4.81 -0.78 -0.02
( - ) (0 9) (0.85) (1.98) (3.16) (0.003)
0  =       , (5.9)
5.4.5 France
The adjusted sample we have used for estimation in France begins in the second 
quarter of 1979 and ends in the first quarter of 2000. We use information on the 
consumer price index, real output and spending, the three month Treasury Bill 
discount rate, and a long-term bond yield. Both the trace and maximum eigenvalue 
statistics favour the presence of one cointegrating relationship in the data. The 
estimated vector indicates a positive long-run relationship between inflation and 
output. Thus, indexed debt should be the chosen instrument for tax-smoothing. 
On the other hand, the relation between inflation and spending is also positive, 
which indicates that nominal debt should be the preferred instrument as unexpected 
increased spending is associated with unexpected lower prices that reduce the value 
of real debt. The adjustment coefficient is —0.04(0.009).
The residual correlations show that a negative association of spending and in­
flation is a characteristic of the French economy. The conclusion regarding the 
relationship between output and inflation is less clear as it has been both positive 
and negative in different periods (Fig. 5.13). The impulse responses show clearly 
how differently prices react to a shock: they increase as a result of an output shock, 
and they fall as a result of a spending shock (Fig. 5.14).
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0  =
L R P I LGDP LGGE T B  LR A TE  Trend
1.00 -2.28 -1.00 4.41 -7 .9  0.01
( - )  (0.55) (0.44) (1.06) (1.06) (0.004)
(5.10)
5.4.6 Finland
Our adjusted sample for Finland starts in the second quarter of 1976 and ends in 
the first quarter of 2000. In addition to the consumer price index, real government 
spending, and real output, we use the official base rate (end of period), and the 
yiels on 10-year government bonds (monthly average). We estimate the system for 
Finland with one cointegrating vector, as this is suggested by the trace statistic 
at the 1% level of significance, and the maximum eigenvalue statistic at the 5% 
level of significance. The negative correlation of output with prices and the positive 
correlation of spending with prices are both significant. Price-indexed debt should 
hedge budgetary shocks well. The adjustment coefficient for the price equation is 
-0.008(0.022).
Turning to Figure 5.15 on page 132 for further examination, the correlations 
between prices and spending have been positive with very few exceptions. This 
would suggest a role for nominal debt. On the other hand, correlations between 
prices and spending become positive after following a negative trend in the beginning 
of our sample. This would suggest a role for indexed debt. The impulse responses 
(Fig. 5.16) show how a shock in output increases prices, and how a shock in spending 
reduces them.
0  =
L R P I LGDP LGCE B A SE  LR A TE  Trend
1.00 0.86 -1.59 -3.82 -3.00 -0.012
( - )  (0.23) (0.31) (1.41) (0.7) (0.001)
(5.11)
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5.4.7 Canada
The adjusted sample we have used for estimation in Canada begins in the second 
quarter of 1982 and ends in the first quarter of 2000. We use information on the 
consumer price index, real spending, real output, the three month Treasury Bill 
rate (end of month), and the yield of government bonds with maturity over 10 
years (end of period). The data for Canada show two long-run relationships, as 
indicated by both the trace and maximum eigenvalue tests. Estimating the system 
with two cointegrating vectors and normalising appropriately, we find a significant 
positive relation between output and prices. Like Missale (1999), this finding shows 
that there is a role for indexed debt in Canada. The negative relation of prices 
with spending also points to this direction. However, the latter is not significant at 
the 5% level. The adjustment coefficient of the cointegrating vector in the prices 
equation is —0.035(0.012).
L R P I B A SE LGDP LGCE GAFIOP Trend
0  = 1.00 0.00 -1.35 0.46 -1.98 0.001 (5.12)
( - ) ( - ) (0.46) (0.28) (1.22) (0.003)
Our series on Canadian GDP and government consumption are not long enough 
to implement our ‘roffing VEC’ exercise. So, we confine ourselves to reporting the 
impulse responses. The shape of the responses is such that prices react more sharply 
to a GDP shock.
5.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have explored the relations between two macroeconomic variables 
(real output and spending) and prices, using a vector error correction specification 
which also includes a short and a long interest rate. The motivation is that even 
though the stochastic structure of the economy is crucial to the selection of those
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Figure 5.8: Generalised Impulse Responses -  Australia
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Figure 5.12: Generalised Impulse Responses -  Germany
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Figure 5.13: Correlations of Innovations -  France
Response of LFRRPI to Generalized One 
S.D, innovations
.012
. 010 -
.008-
.006-
.004-
.002-
.000
- . 002 -
-.004
LFRGDP  LFRGCE
Figure 5.14: Generalised Impulse Responses -  France
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Figure 5.17: Generalised Impulse Responses -  Canada
debt instruments that optimally hedge the budget from output and spending shocks, 
the long-run relations have not been studied in the relevant debt management liter­
ature.
We focus our analysis on the issue of debt indexation, and ask whether the 
long-run relations among real output and spending with inflation provide useful in­
formation regarding the decision to index the debt to the price level or not. Such 
considerations are important as the consensus among academic economists is that 
risk-smoothing should be the priority of debt management (see Bohn, 1996, and 
Missale, 1999). The authorities should choose instruments that perform well (i.e. de- 
hver lower debt returns) during bad times. If this means that the government pays 
a premium for such debt, then it should pay it for insuring the budget against 
unexpected variations in spending and output.
In our analysis, we have identified a variety of patterns across the eight countries 
in our data-set. The evidence in the UK are in favour of nominal debt. The poflcy 
followed by the Debt Management Office is one of issuing both indexed and nominal
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debt, even though the share of nominal debt is still dominating the debt issues. 
Our cointegrating VAR shows evidence that indexed debt provides insurance to the 
budget against macroeconomic shocks in Canada, Germany, Italy, and France. On 
the other hand, Australia, Finland, and the US should hedge against such shocks 
with nominal debt.
We have also implemented a rolling estimation method in order to obtain time 
series of correlations between the innovations in output, spending and prices. The 
main conclusion from this exercise is that, in most countries, correlations do not 
stay constant throughout our sample-period. This is an indication that economies 
do not always react to shocks in the same way, or that different shocks hit these 
economies over time. We have also used the impulse response functions to identify 
how prices react to output and spending shocks. Here, we have also found a variety 
of emerging patterns. In most cases, though, increased prices seem to be the result 
of output shocks. Prices are more responsive to output shocks rather than spending 
shocks (with the exception of UK and Italy).
Care has to be taken in interpreting econometric results which, however robust, 
may not always be a faultless predictor of expected future patterns of behaviour. 
In fact -unfortunately for economic researchers- very often the data deliver contra­
dicting messages. The decision for the debt manager is furthermore compÜcated by 
the fact that what was true for the economy yesterday might not be true tomorrow. 
This is especially the case in times of economic change when economic behaviours 
cannot be accurately predicted. So, even if there is a clear picture of the stochastic 
structure of the economy for the last, say, fifteen years, it is not certain that the 
economy will react exactly as expected if a shock materialises today.
CHAPTER 6
Concluding Remarks
Debt management is an important economic function. Despite the stated goal of 
most debt management authorities to reduce funding costs, identifying a proper 
issuing strategy is a challenging task, since several considerations complicate the 
decision-making process. Ephemeral gains realised as a result of a straightforward 
cost-minimising policy can lead to excessive risk in the government’s debt portfolio.
Risk in the debt management literature can be of two kinds. First, it can describe 
the possibility of refinancing debt at a higher than expected interest or exchange 
rate. As a result, infiation and exchange rate variabifity make short-term and foreign 
currency debt respectively ‘risky’ instruments. The second kind of risk is associated 
with unexpected fiuctuations in the tax base and government spending. In other 
words, what is of importance here is the behaviour of debt returns in the event of an 
unexpected fall in reafised revenues, or an unexpected rise in the need for revenues 
due to higher government spending.
Regarding the first kind of risk a natural question is why should a government 
issue any amount of risky instruments. If short-term debt exposes the budget to 
the effects of interest rate changes, then the management authority should totally
Concluding Remarks 136
abstain from issuing them. The same argument holds for foreign currency debt.
This line of thought may sound economically logical, but it ignores other sig­
nificant parameters and functions of debt management. First, these instruments 
have the characteristic that unexpected infiation translates into a higher bill for 
debt repayments. In simple words, the government is penalised whenever prices 
are higher than expected. Issuance of such securities then, provides an effective 
incentive mechanism for the government to stick to a prudent monetary policy.
Second, these instruments may be attractive from a cost reduction perspective. 
An upward sloping yield curve at a point in time that investors exhibit high infla­
tionary expectations -and thus require high long-term interest rates- may provide 
the rationale for short financing. Additionally, unstable economic environments as­
sociated with high infiation expectations and unstable exchange rates may induce 
the issuance of foreign currency debt. As debt repayments are being made in a 
foreign currency, investors do not require the premium that they would require if 
debt repayments were being made at the domestic currency.
From the above discussion it is clear that if the government is certain about its 
non-infiationary policies but it cannot signal its resolution to the markets and pays 
‘unfair’ premia, then it can benefit by issuing these securities: lower than expected 
infiation will enable the government to refinance its short-term debt at a favourable 
interest rate. Moreover, the resulting appreciation of the currency will mean that less 
revenues are needed to meet the foreign currency debt repayments. In general, debt 
instruments with low infiation-sensitivity (i.e. instruments whose returns cannot be 
eroded by unexpected infiation) are useful as signalling devices, and can be cheaper, 
too.
Turning to the second type of risk, the discussion becomes even more interesting. 
If unanticipated variations in revenues or spending result in increases or decreases in 
the price level, then certain instruments can provide a hedge against these shocks, 
depending on the sensitivity of their returns to unexpected infiation. For example, 
an output shock that raises prices (a supply shock) can be hedged by long-term
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nominal bonds. As the output shock creates difficulties in collecting taxes, the 
associated price increase reduces the real returns on nominal debt. Thus, no tax 
rate increase is needed to offset the effects of the initial disturbance.
On the other hand, a shock that reduces prices (a demand shock) can be hedged 
by price-indexed bonds. The unexpected fall in prices leads to lower real returns 
on such debt and, thus, reduces the need for extra revenues. In effect, using debt 
instruments in that way is like buying insurance from the private sector. Private 
agents are likely to ask for a premium to invest in securities that deliver real returns 
positively linked with their income: when output and the tax base is surprisingly low 
the returns of the hedging instrument will deliver surprisingly low returns. According 
to the profession’s view the government should pay this premium as it insulates the 
budget against bad times.
However, the million Euro question is what types of shocks hit the economy, 
because depending on the type of shock different instruments are optimal. By having 
this kind of information the government can issue the right instrument, and the 
private sector can charge the insurance premium. However, studying the stochastic 
structure of the economy is not the simplest of tasks as different shocks might 
occur over time. In line with this observation the debt management authorities 
should issue both hedging instruments (nominal and price-indexed debt). This is 
the current practice of the British debt management authorities, and, we feel that 
it is the right one.
In general, though, price-indexed debt is not widely issued. And where it is issued 
the markets are thin in comparison with those for conventional debt. In chapter 4 
we have used this observation as the foundation of our analysis. Governments have 
a preference for nominal long-term debt in domestic currency. We do not claim 
that this formulation of the government preferences describes all countries, but the 
data show that it is sufficiently realistic. Governments mainly rely on deflatable 
securities, and they do so to allow themselves the discretion to use the inflation tax if 
necessary. Our model captures one of the most basic trade-offs in debt management:
Concluding Remarks 138
the composition of debt that is optimal from a tax-smoothing perspective and the 
composition that can actually be set given the time consistency considerations of 
the government.
Time-consistency forms an important framework of analysis in the debt manage­
ment hterature. If the monetary authorities cannot commit to future price stabiÜty, 
or their commitment is not credible, the inflation rate is higher than would other­
wise be. This inability to commit to non-expansionary monetary policies carries a 
significant implication for the optimal design of public debt. With nominal debt 
in place the temptation to create unanticipated inflation is strengthened. A gov­
ernment with a high debt to GDP ratio has an incentive to reduce it by means of 
inflating away the real value of debt.
This line of thought has led economists to look for debt instruments that can 
reduce this temptation. As mentioned earfier in this chapter, the clear answer lies in 
the issuance of debt with returns that cannot be eroded by surprise inflation. The 
optimal debt design in the presence of credibility problems calls for instruments that 
are incentive-compatible. In that sense, unanticipated monetary expansions are not 
rewarded, at least not with a surprise reduction in the real level of debt.
However, such instruments are not the optimal ones from a stabilisation perspec­
tive. For example, assuming that all debt is price-indexed the effects of a supply 
shock that raises prices will be extremely painful for the economy. So, how does the 
debt manager combine time-consistency and stabilisation considerations to produce 
a policy? This has been the subject of Chapter 4. We assume that governments 
have a speciflc target for the share of debt that can be eroded through unexpected 
inflation. This target is usually high in order to insulate the budget from the reper­
cussions of supply shocks. We then examine two cases: the case where a government 
can credibly commit to future inflation and debt strategies, and the case where such 
precommitment is absent. We show that if the monetary policies are credible, then 
the debt-issuing authorities can set the share of inflation-sensitive debt to the desired 
level. In contrast, in the absence of commitment the time-consistent equilibrium in-
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volves a share of inflation-sensitive debt below the desired level.
A testable implication of our model is that higher inflation expectations lead 
to lower issuance of debt instruments that exhibit high inflation sensitivity. Our 
estimations using a panel data-set for fifteen OECD countries have verified this 
relation. Our econometrics has also displayed the empirical importance of the debt 
to GDP ratio as a determinant of the deflatable share. Higher total debt leads 
to the issuance of fewer inflation-sensitive instruments. Overall, the conclusion in 
chapter 4 is that unless the government can precommit to inflation and the share 
of inflation-sensitive debt, it will not be able to achieve the structure of debt that 
ensures tax-smoothing over time and across states of nature.
The underlying theme of this project is the two-way relation between inflation 
and the level and structure of government debt. As we discussed in chapter 4, a 
higher debt level has implications for debt management. In chapter 3 we have also 
shown that the debt level is a significant determinant of the inflation rate across 
countries. Controlling for variables such as openness, central bank independence, 
structural unemployment, political instability, etc. we have estimated a cross-section 
of countries delivering the result that countries with higher debts have experienced 
higher inflation rates. The result of our econometric exercise is a useful reminder 
to policy makers that lax fiscal policies are penalised with higher inflation and 
consequently interest rates.
Our findings in chapters 3 and 4 have shed some light on positive issues. In chap­
ter 5 we embark on a normative approach. The strand of literature concerning the 
optimality of certain bonds for hedging purposes is mainly empirical and underde­
veloped. We address the question “which debt instruments should the governments 
issue in order to avoid unnecessary changes in the tax rate in response to macroeco­
nomic shocks?”. The set of available options consists of nominal and price-indexed 
debt. The methodology we have chosen is that of a cointegrating VAR. The long-run 
implications of the relations between output, spending and inflation have not been 
used before to provide insights in debt management.
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This exercise is important because the way prices react to shocks in the macroe­
conomy implicitly determine the debt instruments that are optimal for stabiHsation 
purposes. Repercussions from demand and supply shocks can be effectively offset by 
very different debt strategies. Investigating these relationships is our aim in Chapter 
5. Our study is not exhaustive or conclusive. However, we do add new insights to 
the hterature studying the optimal debt policies from a stabiHsation perspective.
Our results have revealed a variety of patterns regarding the optimal issuance 
strategies. There is strong evidence for the optimality of nominal debt in the UK. 
In other countries real debt is found to perform better as a hedging instrument. 
Apart from our intuition regarding the effects of cointegration on debt management 
strategies, we have also performed a rolling VEC exercise. The main conclusion is 
that the correlations between innovations in output, spending and inflation vary over 
time significantly. As different shocks are affecting the economies under considera­
tion, the optimal issuing strategies should consist of both nominal and price-indexed 
securities.
Theoretically, the optimal instrument is one that pays low when output is low 
and spending high, and pays high when output is high and spending low. In practice, 
however, instruments that would explicitly take advantage of such contingencies are 
not being issued for several reasons. As a result, the debt management authorities 
have to use a combination of conventional debt issues to hedge macroeconomic risk. 
Our contribution in chapter 5 is to extend the stock of empirical evidence and show 
which instruments should be preferred from a risk-minimising perspective in a set 
of eight OECD countries.
At this point, we think it would be useful to restate the objective of this project: 
[...] the aim of the thesis is to study the two-way relation between the level and 
management of government debt and inflation in order to provide both normative 
and positive insights into the subject. It is our belief that our objective has been met. 
Using modelling and econometric techniques we have examined several angles of the 
interactions between inflation and debt strategies, and have produced a number of
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insights in debt management from both the positive and normative perspective.
The stock of knowledge that we hope we have contributed to (summarised and 
discussed in chapter 2) has provided us with the necessary background for this study, 
and has also offered an invaluable reference for the duration of our research. The 
collection of data that we have used has not been a painless process, but the clarity 
of some of the results has been extremely rewarding. In addition, we have ensured 
that the methodology we follow each time is the appropriate one for the problem at 
hand.
In writing up this research, we have placed a big value on transparency. Every 
effort has been made to provide the reader with sufficient information on the con­
struction of variables and, in general, on every aspect of the work, including any 
hmitations (which follow in this chapter). Additionally, we have tried to base our 
claims on facts. Where necessary, we incorporate graphs and tables to support an 
argument. Appendices are also used to provide further evidence and estimations, 
and are supplementary to the material in the main text.
We hope that the reader has found the research to provide an in-depth intro­
duction to the issues related to the level and structure of pubÜc debt. We also hope 
that our findings have shed some light on the conflicts between the different poflcy 
targets of debt management, and clarify aspects of the decision-making process. Our 
angle has been dehberatefy more empirical, first, to continue the tradition in the 
relevant Hterature, and second, to make this research relevant to policy-making.
Of course, this project is not immune to problems and limitations. More specif­
ically, the unavailability of data for several countries form a natural restriction to 
our econometric exercises in chapters 3, 4 and 5. This restriction applies to the ma­
jority of empirical studies, the quality of which is judged against the relevancy and 
adequacy of the data for the question at hand. As mentioned earlier, we have made 
every effort to obtain reflable and extensive data-sets, which, we believe, contain 
sufficient information for our purposes. Furthermore, we aim to constantly update 
our data-base to include more countries and obtain longer time series in order to
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check for possible new trends and test the robustness of our results.
More specific criticisms also apply in some aspects of our work. In what follows, 
and before outlining our future research agenda, we briefly present the hmitations 
of this project. In section 4.3.5 we have seen how our decision to estimate a linear 
equation instead of a non-linear one is justified. We have also seen how the assump­
tion of constant slope coefficients places a limitation in our approach. As we have 
discussed these issues in more detail in Chapter 4, we do not repeat the arguments 
here.
In Chapter 5, the main problem is the adoption of a single macroeconometric 
model which we apply in every country in our data-set. This is clearly not a first-best 
situation. The reason we have selected this methodology is comparability. We use 
the same specification across countries to derive directly comparable insights into 
the debt manager’s problem. The implication of this strategy is that there is a cost 
in terms of accuracy, since fully capturing economic reality in a macroeconometric 
model is an extremely demanding task which could depend on the special charac­
teristics of each economy. We have not undertaken this task here, and we do not 
claim to have done so. However, our specification is rich enough for our purposes, 
as it captures an important aspect of monetary policy with the inclusion of the base 
rate as an instrument reacting to prices. We believe that our approach is robust 
and suitable for the extraction of information relevant to the debt manager.
Another limitation in Chapter 5 concerns our efforts to obtain time-series of 
the residual correlations between output, spending, and inflation. The choice of 
the ‘width’ of the constant window of observations that is rolled over the data is 
naturally restricted by the total number of available observations. A wider window 
would possibly enable us to obtain smoother time-series, but, at the same time, 
would also limit the number of the extracted residual correlations. We believe that 
given our data-set we have achieved the right balance between the reliability of 
results and the quantity of extracted information. In the future, a richer data-set 
would enable us to perform the task without the limitation imposed by the current
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lack of more observations.
We finally turn to the issue of further research. This will develop in two direc­
tions. First, we would like to examine an issue that broadly belongs to the area 
of political economy of debt management} Specifically, there is a parameter related 
to the adoption of cost-minimising over risk-minimising debt policies that has not 
been properly investigated in the hterature and could constitute an interesting line 
of enquiry. An outfine of our initial thinking on the subject follows.
A government will prefer to minimise its cost in order to fund other poficies 
(e.g. pubhc investment) because it has a short horizon and wants to get re-elected. 
Drawing resources from what the public would regard as necessary investment (for 
example in public services) to pay insurance premiums on debt might not be po­
litically wise. It is hard to imagine how the debt management authorities could 
‘sell’ an expensive debt strategy to a politician who wants to maximise his/her 
chances of re-election. The political authority will probably calculate the product 
of the probability of an output shock during its office and the cost of the expensive 
(risk-minimising) strategy, and compare it with the product of the probability of 
no output shock during its office and the less expensive (cost-minimising) strategy. 
He/she will then choose the less expensive outcome. The obvious difficulty of this 
calculation is that the ex ante probability is not known. In today’s markets, though, 
it is easier for the government to even have inside information of an imminent shock. 
If the same information is shared by the private sector, the premium that will be 
asked will probably cancel the benefit from issuing a hedging instrument.
The second direction we are willing to investigate is that of currency crises and 
debt management. Recently, countries like Chile and Brasil have experienced diffi­
culties in rolling-over their debt, triggering fears of an all-out crisis that could spread 
in other highly indebted countries, too. The surge of interest in this area has led to 
interesting recent contributions (e.g. Benigno and Missale, 2001). We believe that 
further study of debt management and its relation to currency crises in a highly
^Surprisingly, little work has been done in this area. An interesting contribution is by Milesi- 
Ferretti (1995).
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integrated global environment will prove to be a fruitful area of research.
APPENDIX A
The Relation between Public Debt and Inflation Supplement
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A .2 Grouping of Countries
OECD countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, 
and the United States.
N on-O ECD countries: Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, BoÜvia, Botswana, Brazil, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Honduras, Hun­
gary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Kenya, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal,
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Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, 
Singapore, South Africa, Korea, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Western Samoa, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
A .3 Additional Estimations
Table A.2 reports the results of the estimations using the legal measure and the 
turnover rate of governors as proxies for central bank independence (CWN, 1992).
Variable All OECD Non-OECD All OECD Non-OECD
Constant -3.1* -5.17* -3.01* -3.35* -5.02* -2.73*
(-7.37) (-10.69) (-6.08) (-15.19) (-25.0) (-10.95)
Openness -1.65* -1.82* -2.08* -1.73* -1.46** -2.17*
(-4.35) (-2.6) (-4.6) (-5.47) (-2.21) (-6.73)
Debt 80 0.97* 1.82* 0.73* 0.81* 1.42* 0.73*
(3.28) (3.86) (2.85) (4.04) (3.81) (3.5)
CB legal 0.06 0.83 1.97*** - - -
(0.06) (1.18) (1.33) - - -
TOR - - - 2.10* 1.65*** 1.82*
- - - (3.82) (1.51) (3.15)
Past Inflation 1.73** 17.06* 0.75 0.48 5.88* -0.14
(1.75) (5.09) (0.93) (0.49) (6.91) (-0.18)
Adjusted R squared 0.32 0.45 0.42 0.4 0.48 0.47
F-statistic 8.27 5.61 8.12 11.18 6.27 9.33
Sample 64 24 40 63 24 39
Table A.2: Estimations with Other CBI Measures
A.4 The ‘Free Lunch’ Puzzle
In this appendix, we examine whether the degree of central bank independence is 
related to output variance. In other words, is low inflation a ‘free lunch’ that can be 
achieved with the establishment of independent monetary authorities at no cost in 
terms of output variability? The theory (e.g. see Rogoff, 1985) predicts that there
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Table A.3: Central Banks and Stabilisation Losses®
Dependent Variables CB Overall CB Legal Intercept
Real Output Growth (ROG) 0.057 - 0.022
(1.165) - (5.249)
- -0.001 0.027
- (-0.134) (6.911)
St. Deviation of ROG 0.053 - 0.017
(1.703) - (5.913)
- -0.004 0.022
- (-0.532) (6.994)
Unemployment 0.082 - 0.069
(1.037) - (5.503)
- -0.054 0.095
- (-1.017) 3.868
^ Notes. Real Output Growth is the average annual percent change of real output for 
the period 1980-1998. Unemployment is average unemployment for the same sample  
period. D ata on 24 OECD countries. Estim ation method: OLS with robust errors (W hite  
estimator).
is a low inflation higher output variance trade-off. However, empirical studies have 
shown that the predicted trade-off does not characterise the data in most cases, 
and that delegation of power to independent monetary authorities does not trigger 
higher output variabihty. For example, Grilli et al. (1991) found no significant 
relation between output growth and output growth variabihty with their central 
bank independence index. Numerous studies have tried to resolve this ‘paradox’. 
Trigger strategy models (Barro and Gordon, 1983), incentive mechanisms (Walsh, 
1995), political business cycles (Alesina and Gatti, 1995), open economy effects 
(Currie et al, 1996 and Levine and Pearlman, 1997), and combinations of political 
cycles and open economy effects (al-Nowaihi et al, 2001), have all been used to 
explain the absence of stabilisation losses.
We use data on GDP (1990 prices and exchange rates) in dollars for 24 OECD 
countries to construct the average real output growth 1980-1998 figure for each coun­
try. We also calculate the average standard deviation of the series, which we use as 
a measure of output growth variability. Additionally, we use data on unemployment
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for the period 1980-1998 (taken from OECD).
Consistent with the empirical hterature we have not managed to establish at any 
meaningful level of significance that higher degrees of independence are related to 
higher unemployment rates or lower and more variable rates of output growth. On 
the contrary, the CB Overall index seems to be positively associated with output 
growth variabihty. The data seem to be in favour of the ‘free lunch’ hypothesis.
APPENDIX B
The Role of Inflation-Sensitive Instruments Supplement
B .l  Description of Data and Sources
Data on the composition of debt were taken from Public Debt Management (Missale, 
1999). Data on GDP, GDP deflators, and government bond yields were obtained 
from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF.
We have collected 474 observations for Austrafla, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK, 
and the USA. The data-set is unbalanced in that the sample period is not the same 
for each country (this should not cause problems with the estimation, though). In 
our analysis we focus our attention on privately held debt (or market holdings of 
debt, using British terminology). Holdings by the Central Bank or the Government 
are not considered relevant, as they do not increase the debt burden. Market hold­
ings of debt were estimated for most countries since only a few countries distinguish 
between privately held and official debt in their accounts. Where such estimation 
was not possible, we have used the total amount of debt.
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The series on m  (share of inflation-sensitive debt) include nominal long-term 
debt, denominated in domestic currency. We define as long-term debt the sum of 
jfixed-rate notes, bonds and loans with initial maturity over a year. The reason for 
the exclusion of real and foreign currency debt is that unexpected inflation cannot 
reduce their real value (due to the indexation feature and the resulting currency 
depreciation, respectively). We also exclude variable-rate debt as this instrument is 
usually indexed to short-term interest rates. In other words, in our analysis we use 
debt of high inflation elasticity. The long-term series do not include debt that could 
not be identified with respect to its maturity characteristics. We make an exception 
for data on loans from banks. The data-set does not contain sufficient information 
on the maturity structure of such loans, but, in general, the trend leans towards the 
long-end, and, thus, we include them in the long-term series. Detailed information 
on the construction of m  for each country can be found in the next section.
GDP values are nominal. We use deflator changes (percent change over previous 
year) as a proxy for inflation throughout our econometric analysis. Government 
Bond Yields refer to one or more series representing yields to maturity of government 
bonds or other bonds that would indicate longer-term rates (see definition in the IPS 
of the IMF). Note that the number of observations on long-term yield reduces to 447 
as we could not obtain data for Finland (1989-1996), Spain (1962-1978), and Sweden 
(1995-1996). We use these long-term yields as a measure of expected inflation.
B.2 Construction of Inflation-Sensitive Series
This Appendix contains information on the definitions of debt and long-term debt 
that have been used for each country. For a more detailed description of the data 
see Missale (1999).
1. Austrafla
Debt refers to Central Government debt and excludes Internal Treasury Bills.
Privately held debt does not include holdings by the Reserve Bank of Austrafla
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and the Government. Long-term debt consists of fixed-rate bonds (from 3 to 
30 years).
2. Austria
Debt refers to Central Government debt. Privately held debt is gross of Official 
holdings since data on Central Bank and Government holdings could not be 
found except from Central Bank credit to the Government. Long-term debt 
consists of fixed-rate long-term notes (currently 10 years), fixed-rate long-term 
bonds (from 2 to 30 years), and fixed-rate loans from banks. Data on long­
term notes were not available for the period 1969-74. In the calculation of 
long-term debt they were assigned a zero value for this period.
3. Belgium
Debt broadly refers to Central Government debt; it excludes guaranteed debt 
and includes bonds issued by public agencies. Privately held debt was derived 
after deducting Central Bank Holdings and Central Bank advances to the 
“Fonds des Rentes” (the institution performing open market operations until 
the reform of the money market in January 1991). Long-term debt includes 
fixed-rate long-term debt with initial maturity longer than one year issued by 
the Government and public agencies.
4. Canada
Debt refers to National debt, which broadly corresponds to Central Govern­
ment debt. It considers all financial and non-financial liabilities but excludes 
guaranteed debt. Privately held debt is net of securities held by the Central 
Bank, but is gross of Government holdings of marketable and non-marketable 
debt as detailed data were not available for the sample period. Long-term 
debt consists of fixed-rate bonds (2, 3, 5, 10 and 30 years).
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5. Finland
Debt refers to Central Government Debt and excludes a small amount of “Debt 
to the Pension Fund” for the period 1990-94. Privately held debt was derived 
after deducting Central Bank holdings. Long-term debt is defined as the sum 
of yield bonds for personal investors (from 2 to 8 years), new fixed-rate bonds. 
Housing Bonds and Serial Bonds (from 3 to 10 years), long-term promissory 
notes, and long-term loans. Data on long-term government yields were ob­
tained from OECD’s Historical Statistics.
6. France
Debt refers to Central Government debt. Debt figures are gross of the Treasury 
credit balance with the Bank of France and of debt held by the Central Bank, 
since data on Bank holdings could not be found. Fixed-rate bonds with the 
option to exchange them into variable-rate bonds are considered fixed-rate 
bonds. We have deducted, though, the fraction of such debt that was converted 
into variable-rate debt. Long-term debt is the sum of Treasury notes (2 and 5 
years), fixed-rate long-term bonds (10, 15, 20, 30, 55 years), fixed-rate bonds 
with the option of conversion into variable-rate bonds (see above), renewable 
bonds bearing the option for an exchange into later issues, other long-term 
bonds (which include, though, bonds indexed to the price of Gold and to the 
European Unit of Account, and non-marketable debt until 1979).
7. Germany
Debt refers to General Government Debt. Official debt data are consolidated 
across the various levels of government and are net of government holdings. 
Privately held debt was derived by deducting Central Bank holdings. Long­
term debt consists of the following series: Treasury discount notes (from 1 to 
2 years). Treasury notes (2 to 6 years), special federal bonds (5 years), fixed- 
rate long-term bonds (mostly 10 years, but up to 30 years), loans from banks, 
loans from social security funds, and savings bonds (initial maturity of 6 and
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7 years). Practically, according to our definition, all fixed-rate debt, which is 
denominated in domestic currency is long-term.
8. Ireland
Debt refers to National debt, which corresponds broadly to Central Govern­
ment debt and excludes guaranteed debt. Privately held debt was derived by 
deducting Central Bank and Government holdings. It has to be noted that 
full deduction of the stock of bonds held in government department accounts 
yields an underestimate of privately held debt as part of these bonds repre­
sents investments of the deposits of the Post Office Savings Bank and hence 
a liability towards the private sector. Long-term debt consists of fixed-rate 
bonds (mostly 5, 10 and 20 years).
9. Italy
Debt refers to Public sector debt. Published data distinguish between privately 
held debt and total debt. Long-term debt includes fixed-rate bonds (3, 5, 10 
and 30 years), fixed-rate bonds COT, old fixed-rate bonds issued by the Central 
Government and fixed rate Public sector bonds, and loans from banks.
10. Japan
Debt refers to Central Government debt. Privately held debt was derived by 
deducting Central Bank holdings. Long-term debt is the sum of notes (2 and 
4 years), 5-year discount bonds, and fixed-rate long-term bonds (from 6 to 30 
years).
11. Netherlands
Debt refers to Central Government debt. Privately held debt was obtained by 
deducting Central Bank holdings. Long-term debt is Treasury notes (2 to 5 
years), fixed-rate bonds (mostly 10 years and up to 30 years), privately placed 
loans (10 to 20 years) and long-term Treasury certificates.
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12. Spain
Debt refers to Central government debt. Privately held debt was obtained 
by deducting Central Bank holdings. Long-term debt consists of fixed-rate 
long-term bonds (3, 5, 10 and 15 years).
13. Sweden
Debt refers to Central Government debt. Privately held debt was obtained by 
deducting Central Bank holdings. Long-term debt consists of fixed-rate long­
term bonds (2, 3, 5, 10 and 15 years), other fixed-rate long-term Treasury 
bonds, loans from banks, and loans from State institutions and funds.
14. United Kingdom
Debt refers to National debt, which corresponds broadly to Central Govern­
ment debt. It includes guaranteed marketable securities and excludes interest- 
fi-ee notes due to the IMF. Privately held debt excludes holdings by the Bank of 
England and the Government. Long-term debt consists of fixed-rate long-term 
bonds (5, 10, 15, 20 and 25 years).
15. United States of America
Debt refers to Federal government debt and excludes guaranteed debt. Pub­
lished data on debt distinguish between privately held debt, debt held by the 
Federal Reserve, and debt held in government accounts. Privately held debt 
excludes non-marketable paper issued to public pensions for the investment of 
their funds. Long-term debt is the sum of fixed-rate long-term notes (2, 3, 5 
and 10 years) and fixed-rate long-term bonds (30 years).
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APPENDIX C
Debt Indexation and Cointegration Supplement
C .l Generalised Impulse Responses
In this appendix we examine issues related to the impulse response analysis im­
plemented in Chapter 5. Impulse responses capture the effect of a unit change in 
the innovation of variable j  at time on the value of variable i for a number of 
subsequent periods. We employ impulse response functions to answer questions 
hke “what is the effect of a shock in real spending on inflation over a period of 10 
years?” . Answers to such questions are of particular relevance to debt management 
given that the manager wants to smooth debt servicing costs across states of nature 
and over time.
Consider the following vector autoregressive model:
p
= ao -f ajt -f- ^  ^ -{- ©Zf -f- Uf. (C.l)
i=i
where is a m x 1 vector of dependent variables, Z( is a ç x 1 vector of exogenous 
variables, and u* ~  i.i.d.N{0, Q.) with Cl being a m x m positive-definite matrix.
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Ai and © are m x  m  and m  x  q matrices of unknown coefficients, respectively. 
A stationary VAR can be expressed as an infinite vector moving average.^ Thus, 
assuming (C.l) is stationary the representation of can be written as
oo oo
W* =  +  5 3  TiZt-i. (0.2)
i—0 i=0
where i/>i — AiV’i-i +  ••• +  ^ v ^ i - v  ^ith  =  1^, =  0 for j  < 0, and Ti = i/)i©.
Projecting the above expression s periods ahead and evaluating at % =  s, we can
write an impulse response as
=  (C.3)
We have assumed that all other innovations (i.e. innovations of all other variables) 
are held constant at all dates. Plotting against s produces the impulse response 
function. However, since O is not necessarily diagonal, shocks in innovations of 
different variables are likely to be correlated. Thus, the assumption that a shock in 
one innovation is not accompanied by shocks in other innovations would be violated. 
The solution to this problem is the use of orthogonalised impulse responses. The idea 
is to construct a diagonal variance-covariance matrix so that shocks in innovations 
are uncorrelated with each other.
Since O is a symmetric, positive definite matrix, it can be expressed as O =  
PD F', where P is a lower triangular matrix and D is a diagonal matrix. Using P  
we can construct =  P “^ttf. Then,
oo oo oo oo
w*=53 +53 PiZt-i = 53 ipiet-i 53 (c.4)
i=0 t=0 i=0 i=0
where =  i/)^P. Now,
^The analysis of this section is largely based on Hamilton (1994) pp 318-323, Pesaran and 
Pesaran (1997) pp 423-427 and 443-445, and Pesaran and Shin (1998).
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jB(ef4) =  B(P-*U(U',[P-']') =  p -'n [p -^ ]' =  P-1PDP'[P-^]' =  D , (C.5)
in other words, since D is diagonal, the elements of the variance-covariance ma­
trix are orthogonal, and a change in one element in et has no effect on the other
components.
We can write the orthogonaÜsed impulse response function of a unit shock at 
time t to the variable j ’s orthogonalised error on variable i at time t + s as
O rthIR  — iplej, (C.6)
where e^ - is a m x 1 vector with unity as the j th  element, and zeros elsewhere.
However, this approach has the problem that the impulse responses are affected 
by the ordering of the variables in the VAR (notice that 'iIjqP = IP  is lower triangu­
lar), and this ordering cannot be determined statistically. To deal with this problem, 
Pesaran and Shin (1998) developed the generalised impulse responses. They show 
that the generafised impulse response function is
GenlRvAR = (C.7)
The main feature of the generalised responses is that they are invariant to the 
ordering of the variables in the VAR. The generalised and orthogonalised impulse 
responses will only coincide if O is diagonal (i.e. all the off-diagonal elements are 
zero), or if the variable whose innovation we shock is the first one in the VAR.
Now, consider the case of a cointegrating VAR. The vector error correction ( VEC) 
form is given by
p — 1
AWt =  - n w ,_ j  +  5 3  Ti AWi_i + nA Z( +  Ut, (C.8)
i=l
where II =  -  XlLi T i  — -  Y7j=i+i for % =  1, ...,p -  1, and A is a matrix
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of unknown coefficients.
If W t  is 1(1), then AWf has an infinite moving average representation
oo oo
AWe =  5 3  CiUt-i +  5 3  C iU A Z t-i (C.9)
i=0 i=0
The generalised impulse response functions of resulting from a shock in the
jib. equation are shown to be
GenlRcvAR =  (C.IO)
V
where Bg =  B q =  Co =  Im- We use these generafised impulse
response functions in our empirical analysis. One can readily see that the effects 
of shocks on the individual variables are highly persistent. To resolve this, Pesaran
and Shin (1998) use an alternative approach and consider the effects of a shock
in variable j  on the ith  cointegrating relation. The cointegrating relations can be 
written as
oo oo
y* =  /3'Wi =  5 3  /3'BiU*_j + 5 3  iS'BiTlAZt-i. (C .ll)
i=0 i=0
The generalised response functions of are given by
GenIRT, =  (C.12)
The effects of a shock on the cointegrating relationship do die out.
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